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fore taking up the offer (the research opportunities seemed inter-
esting too, obviously). While many of my colleagues were locked
away in the office, struggling with econometrics or model building,
I often found myself police stations and such, talking my ’research
subjects’. Being fully externally funded meant I never had to teach
or supervise theses, so I could dedicate all my time to research. It
does mean however, that you have be a bit flexible in following
your money. When my supervisors left for Tilburg University after
I worked for 1.5 years at Utrecht School of Economics I naturally
followed. I’ve spend three years travelling back and forth between
universities, project meetings all over Europe, police profession-
als and Veiligheidshuizen. Yet, I had a sense of belonging, no matter
where I worked, because of the great people I have met along the
years. Home was where I popped open my laptop, even is that was
at a gas station next to the A27, while waiting for a traffic jam to
resolve.
I’d first of like to thank the constant factors in my research, my
thesis supervisors. Without Arjen van Witteloostuijn and Arjan van
den Born, this thesis would not have been written. They have both
been great supervisors in their own way. Despite my agnosticism, I
would often refer to Arjen as my spiritual leader, as he is extremely
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The notion that organisations cannot work alone in their envi-
ronment originally has its roots in sociology (Weber, 1947). In the
1960’s the Stanford Research Institute claimed that understanding
the concerns of stakeholders is necessary in developing support for
objectives that are essential for the long term success of the corpo-
ration (Freeman, 1984). We define a stakeholder as "any group or
individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the
firm’s objectives" (Freeman, 1984). From the perspective of resource
dependency (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), it seems fairly straight-
forward that in order to survive, organisations have to deal with
stakeholders in their environment in order to acquire the resources
needed. Having resources, or having good connections to those
possessing the resources, creates a more stable environment. If the
focal organisation knows what to expect and when, it will be less
susceptible to external expectations it cannot meet. Most organi-
sations need to get into some sort of relationships with outsiders
in order to be successful, such as with suppliers, customers, share-
holders, unions, regulators, interest groups and competitors. Not
surprisingly, many literatures in the field of strategy and market-
ing are available on topics related to this, such as alliance theory
and corporate social responsibility studies. Yet, the empirical sup-
port for stakeholder management as an instrument to better overall
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social or financial performance is not overwhelmingly clear (Don-
aldson and Preston, 1995).
Oftentimes, these literatures on stakeholder management are
focused on for-profit organisations. Yet, organisations in the public
sector also have to deal with stakeholders, and may need to do so in
order to achieve goals. Public organisations must handle additional
factors in their stakeholder mapping, such as their legal framework
and ethical considerations (Scholes and Johnson, 2001). More than
private organisations, public organisations function because of the
legitimacy they get from the citizenry (Scholes and Johnson, 2001).
In order to conserve their legitimacy, public organisations need to
maintain relations with stakeholders that do not per se offer strate-
gic resources. The citizenry has by itself intrinsic value to the public
organisation. The legitimacy they offer to the public organisation is
crucial, especially for organisations as the police, who execute au-
thority and force against citizens. Police organisations are also very
interesting in terms of stakeholder management as they are a grand
example of a public organisation that is surrounded by stakehold-
ers at all levels of the organisation. The police deal with an enor-
mous range of stakeholders, some of which need the police for ex-
ecution of their core tasks, such as public prosecution services. Yet,
there are also stakeholders that involuntarily get involved with the
police, such as suspects and perpetrators. In this broad range of
stakeholders who help the police carry out their work and stake-
holders who are their work (e.g., criminals, rioters or hooligans), it
is unclear for many police forces how to approach this issue, and
how to keep all of them (or at least most of them) satisfied to retain
their legitimacy as an organisation.
In this thesis, we try to learn more about stakeholder manage-
ment in police organisations. On the one hand, we do this to at-
tempt to close some gaps in the literature on stakeholder manage-
ment in the policing sector. On the other hand, an elaborate study
is desired from a practical perspective. As police forces and many
individual officers cope with external parties on a daily basis, it is
highly relevant to ask if they are doing it right, and if they could
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do it in ways that are more satisfactory for the stakeholder. We
have approached this topic from several angles, looking at both
strategic and operational stakeholder management. In this thesis,
we have dedicated two studies to European forces and two studies
to the Dutch police, yet we think that the findings apply to some
extent to a broader range of countries, and in fact may apply to
a broader range of public organisations, even beyond the field of
law enforcement and order maintenance. Although much has been
written about how corporations and public organisations deal with
a range of external parties, it is seldom that different kinds of stake-
holders are studied at once in the policing industry. They usually
study the relation between the police and one stakeholder, such as
probation, citizens or media (Chermak and Weiss, 2005; Murphy
and Lutze, 2009; Skogan, 2005). In this thesis, we will study the
stakeholder environment more broadly.
1.1 Stakeholder theory
The idea that corporations have stakeholders has been well ac-
cepted in the management literature for a few decades, especially
since Freeman’s 1984 book Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Ap-
proach (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). The use of the stakeholder
concept in the literature has been, and still is up to this day, an
endless dispute as a recent book edited by Phillips, Stakeholder The-
ory: Impact and Prospects, demonstrates (2011). What a stakeholder
is, is still open to interpretation, there exist numerous stakeholder-
mapping techniques, there is no agreement on the value creation
and salience of stakeholders, and the concept is commonly modi-
fied depending on the circumstances, because of its open character.
Various users fight for the precedence of their own interpretation
of the stakeholder concept (Mitchell, 2012). Stakeholder theory has
been described mostly as descriptive, instrumental and normative,
each ample with its own managerial implications (Donaldson and
Preston, 1995).
Descriptive stakeholder theory formulates a model of the firm
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to explain specific characteristics and behaviours. There is ample
evidence showing that managers believe to practise stakeholder
management, and that they think it is ethical to do so. Another
descriptive justification for stakeholder theory stems from existing
practises and institutions, including laws that allow stakeholders to
protest against actions of a focal organisation. Organisations may
be relieved to find that they are not the only ones adopting stake-
holder management, but they do not necessarily justify a theory.
Using purely descriptive data may lead to a "naturalistic fallacy"
(Moore, 1959), where the theory moves from describing to evaluat-
ing without the supporting analyses or explanations. Because there
is only descriptive justification, new evidence that describes oppos-
ing or different stylized facts would invalidate the theory.
The instrumental perspective provides justification for stake-
holder theory based on the idea that the link between stakeholder
management and organisational performance should be examined.
The argument that stakeholder management and performance go
hand in hand has been broadly adapted in the management litera-
ture. From a stakeholder-agency perspective, the argument is that
stakeholders can monitor managers and use enforcement mech-
anisms to curb opportunistic behaviour by managers (Hill and
Jones, 1992). Although the bulk of research on stakeholder man-
agement is (implicitly) based on instrumental stakeholder theory,
there is no structural or compelling evidence that stakeholder man-
agement is the optimal strategy for maximising conventional per-
formance measures of firms. Choi and Wang (2009) are one of the
few who manage to convincingly tie stakeholder management to fi-
nancial performance of firms, but they argue in turn that other firm
resources, such as technological knowledge, are more important
for financial performance. This does not mean however that stake-
holder management is futile. Studies demonstrate that firms can
benefit from managing stakeholders satisfactorily, on issues that
may only be part of overall performance. It is for example com-
monly accepted in the field of project management that effective
stakeholder management is important for the success of a project
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(Achterkamp and Vos, 2008). Also, an organisation may reap ben-
efits from its relation with a particular stakeholder, such as cus-
tomers (Chang et al., 2010b; Kim et al., 2010; Zablah et al., 2012),
suppliers (Srinivasan et al., 2011; Stuart et al., 2012) or partners, for
example in the form of joint ventures (Mellewigt and Das, 2010).
Much of the stakeholder literature also comes from the nor-
mative realm, as it is also often related to business ethics (Has-
nas, 2013). One of the central concepts here is that organisations
should tend to all stakeholders, not just their own. It prescribes
how all stakeholders should be treated on the basis of some under-
lying moral or philosophical principles. Each group of stakehold-
ers needs to be considered for their own sake, and not just because
of their ability to (instrumentally) benefit the interests of the or-
ganisation (Phillips, 2011). Establishing accountability to all stake-
holders requires showing that they have a legitimate claim regard-
ing the business, not that they are functionally useful to it (Stern-
berg, 1997). From the perspectives of business ethics, researchers
use stakeholder theory as a moral lens that offers ethical guidance
to managers as they have to face normative questions to run their
businesses with integrity and self-reflection (Freeman et al., 2010).
Though stakeholder theory has different approaches, Donald-
son and Preston (1995) argue that the three aspects are nested within
each other. The peripheral aspect of the theory is descriptive, pre-
senting practises that are observed in the real world. At the second
level is the instrumental aspect that supports the descriptive as-
pect; if certain practises are carried out, then certain results will
follow from this. At the core is then the normative aspect. The in-
strumental considerations of stakeholder theory ultimately rest on
more than instrumental grounds; the foundation is often norma-
tive. Organisations benefit strategically from stakeholder manage-
ment because it is perceived to be the right thing to do from a moral
perspective; treating stakeholders as a means to an end is deemed
as wrong (Sternberg, 1997). Jones (1995) argues that the strategic
benefits of stakeholder management result from a genuine com-
mitment to all stakeholders. Organisations that sustain relation-
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ships with stakeholders based on trust and honesty have compet-
itive advantages over organisations that do not do this, because it
makes the organisation a desirable partner. If an organisation only
applies stakeholder management for a strategic purpose, than com-
mitments are in fact not really moral, and an organisation can then
not reap the instrumental benefits from stakeholder management.
Stakeholder theory is nowadays often complemented by net-
work theory (Beach et al., 2012; Roloff, 2008; Rowley, 1997). Net-
work analysis or social network theory is the study of social struc-
ture in relation to the behaviour of individuals, groups or organisa-
tions. It has, understandably, been adopted in the context of stake-
holder management, because organisations commonly deal with a
number of stakeholders who may be interconnected as well. These
connections between stakeholders may influence how the focal or-
ganisation responds to these stakeholders. Rowley (1997) theorises
that the network density and the centrality of the focal organisa-
tion influence the behaviour of the focal organisation towards its
stakeholders. Higher density of the network increases the ability
of stakeholders to restrain the actions of the focal organisation, be-
cause they can more easily share information and form coalitions.
Higher centrality increases the likelihood for the focal organisation
to resist the pressures of stakeholders, because a central organisa-
tion will act as a broker and will be able to control and manipu-
late flows of information. Dependent on the level of density and
centrality, focal organisations have to balance their own interests
with those of the stakeholders, and will thus choose their strategy
accordingly. Highly central organisations will take a commanding
role when network density is low, but will have to compromise
with stakeholders when density is high. Non-centralised focal or-
ganisations will have to subordinate when density is high, because
they have no control over information flows. When density is low,
the focal organisation has few links with the network, and can try
to act solitary, as the potential reprisals are small.
Roloff (2008) uses network theory to put stakeholder manage-
ment in a context of an issue-focussed approach to stakeholders.
1.1. Stakeholder theory 7
She argues for an approach to stakeholder management that is
based on a common issue the focal organisation has with its stake-
holders. A network is built around an issue, in which the stake-
holders and the focal organisation then take part to strive to come
to a solution. We also see this idea more frequently in literature
on project management (Achterkamp and Vos, 2008; Olander and
Landin, 2005), which is basically about stakeholder management
on a particular issue, such as a construction project. The social
structure of stakeholders in the context of an issue like a project
are likely to influence the behaviour of organisations (or their man-
agers) towards stakeholders. As mentioned before, in dense net-
works stakeholders can form coalitions and exchange information,
making themselves a larger threat to the project or organisation
than if stakeholders could have been considered on their own.
Despite the relevant uses of network theory in stakeholder man-
agement, it is not a theory central in this thesis. An issue-focussed
approach to stakeholder management would entail that stakeholder
management does not occur, unless there is an issue. This does
not seem to be fully in line with normative stakeholder theory. If
all stakeholders have intrinsic value then a common issue is not
the basis for stakeholder management; rather, the existence of the
stakeholders is the basis for stakeholder management. Managing
stakeholders, even when no specific issues are at hand, shows that
the focal organisation is an approachable and trustworthy part-
ner. Moreover, network theory tries to explain the relation between
social structure and behaviour. It does not explain well what the fo-
cal organisation must do to satisfy stakeholders, as it seems to have
limited influence over its behaviour. The commander and solitary be-
haviours suggested by Rowley (1997) also seem to relate more to
the instrumental stakeholder theory (stakeholders as means to an
end) than to a normative strategy. The focal organisation tries to do
as it pleases to the extent that it can get away with it, manipulating
information exchanges between stakeholders if it must. Through-
out the chapters of this thesis, we will make some reference to net-
work theory when it is considered relevant, but we take norma-
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tive stakeholder theory as our core perspective to depart from. We
believe normative stakeholder theory to hold an important basis,
especially regarding stakeholder management in the public sector,
as we will explain further below. As public organisations create
public value and need legitimacy from the citizenry to do so, a nor-
mative approach to stakeholders where stakeholder satisfaction is
the desired outcome is highly important.
1.2 Earlier research
A gap in the literature exists regarding stakeholder management in
the public sector. The public and the private sector are to some ex-
tent similar, but there are some aspects that differ such that stake-
holders are relatively more important for public sector organisa-
tions. Scholes and Johnson (2001) explain that managers in both
the private and public sector try to turn resources into tangible or
intangible assets. However, managers in the public sector are not
only responsible for creating private value, but also public value.
This more commonly means that they do not only take care of out-
puts, but also of outcomes. Citizens, for example, are probably more
concerned with the incidence of crime (an outcome), than with the
number of police patrols (an output). Because public value is con-
sumed by the citizenry, rather than a paying customer, public or-
ganisations are subjected to the demands of a wide array of exter-
nal stakeholders. Whereas we know much about stakeholder man-
agement in the private sector, much less work has been done on
the public sector, while the external stakeholders are all the more
important in helping public organisations to create value. This cre-
ation of value is also facilitated by resources that stakeholders offer
to public organisations. Where private organisations typically (but
not exclusively) use organisational capabilities that are controlled
by managers, or that can be purchased, public organisations often
have to resort to capabilities that come from outside of the organ-
isation (Scholes and Johnson, 2001). Accomplishing the targets of
a governmental programme can involve others than the focal or-
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ganisation, such as clients or other public organisations. This is in
line with the suggestion of Checkland (1981) that an owner of a
problem should also be a co-owner in the development of a solu-
tion. We may consider for example, that a core task of the police is
to catch burglars. The organisation might thus want to make sure
that arrival times are good (to catch burglars in the act), or to have
well trained staff for forensic analysis. Looking from a different per-
spective, the police might strive to minimise the risk of burglary for
citizens. This calls for employing different capabilities, where oth-
ers may also take a role. Police forces can make use of educational
activities for citizens so that they, for example, do not write on so-
cial media when they are on vacation, thereby decreasing the risk
of burglary. Governments can play a part by subsidising approved
locks for doors and windows, or legally forcing the use of such
locks oin newly built homes.
Stakeholders provide not only money and co-production pos-
sibilities, but also legitimacy to public organisations, crucial to car-
rying out their tasks (Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950). Legitimacy is an
input to the production function of many public organisations, and
the police is a prime example. Resources such as manpower and
technology are futile without a grant from the public to use force
and authority (Moore and Trojanowicz, 1988). It causes people to
make way for police sirens, and allows officers to put people in
handcuffs or even to use a firearm against a citizen. All of these im-
plications of being a public organisation have a significant mean-
ing for the importance of stakeholders. The police is possibly one
of the public organisations that needs the most legitimisation to ex-
ecute its force and authority. Yet, we know less about stakeholder
management in the public sector than the private sector, and the lit-
erature on interaction between police and its stakeholders is even
scarcer.
The existing literature on stakeholders in policing often involve
(case) studies of certain stakeholders. We find, for example, (case)
studies on partnerships with certain stakeholders such as proba-
tion organisations (Corbett, 1998; Evans, 1997; Kim et al., 2010;
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Murphy and Lutze, 2009; Murphy, 2008), schools (Brady et al., 2007;
White et al., 2001), social work (Dean et al., 2000) and (mental)
healthcare organisations (Hunter et al., 2005; Kisely et al., 2010).
Second, there are also several studies on the relation between the
police and citizens, whether this is about police-citizen violence
(Alpert et al., 2004; Binder and Scharf, 1980; Kavanagh, 1997) or
non-violent police-citizen encounters (Reisig and Chandek, 2001;
Skogan, 2005; Tyler and Folger, 1980). Third, we find work on police-
media relations, mainly in the context of handling this stakeholder
well for the purpose of organisational legitimacy (e.g., Chermak
and Weiss, 2005; Mawby, 1999, 2002).
Other literatures focus rather on certain stakeholder strategies.
Collier et al. (2004) find that intelligence-led policing presents an
opportunity to the police for communicating with various stake-
holders. Simmons (2008) argues for the participation of stakehold-
ers in the legal reform of law enforcement agencies, as the rules of
the game for the police also influence the citizenry. He advocates a
collaborative problem-solving approach to ensure the inclusion of
all interested parties.
We also find a number of studies that discuss stakeholder per-
spectives on involvement with specific policing or security issues.
We find work on how to involve stakeholders in process improve-
ment in police forces (Greasley, 2004). Some have studied civil-
ian control models for police integrity (Kaptein and Reenen, 2001;
Prenzler, 2004; Prenzler et al., 2010). Donnermeyer (2002) asked
both internal and external stakeholders how the police can better
prepare itself for terrorism, and Greenberg (2007) did the same re-
garding the topic of campus security (in relation to the threat of
school shootings).
There is a clear realisation in the literature that stakeholders are
relevant for the police, but the focus is generally on the relation
with a certain stakeholder, although some studies are about stake-
holder mapping and the analysis of interests. There is lesser in-
terest in the actual stakeholder management strategies themselves;
why they work (or not), and how they can be improved. What ap-
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pears to be missing in the literature on police stakeholders is a dis-
cussion of the optimal management strategies for different types
of stakeholders. From a societal point of view, relevant research
is needed that can teach both police organisations and stakehold-
ers something about how stakeholders are managed by the police
and what may be optimal solutions to stakeholder management. If
stakeholder management is executed optimally by the police, then
this is not only a win to the police itself, but also to the satisfied
stakeholder. This would cover not only a broad range of organisa-
tions, but also the citizenry as a whole.
Furthermore, the existing literature mostly does not have a
strong tie to stakeholder theory, and hence the focus is also not
that much on the outcomes of normative stakeholder management,
namely the satisfaction of stakeholders. This thesis attempts to
(in part) close these gaps in the literature by providing a diverse
perspective on stakeholder management in police organisations
at both operational and strategic levels, while most literature fo-
cuses only on the tactical or strategic level. This operational aspect
is highly important and relevant for an outward organisation as
the police, as police professionals at many levels of the organisa-
tion deal with external stakeholders on a day-to-day basis, gen-
erally having the professional autonomy to choose how to deal
with them. In other organisations, stakeholder management is ei-
ther limited to specific individuals, or management of stakeholders
has been laid down strictly in protocols that only senior profession-
als can break (in exceptional cases).
1.3 The current study
In this thesis we take the a normative approach to stakeholder the-
ory as our stepping stone, but do not ignore the potential instru-
mental benefits that may arise from stakeholder management. We
assume that police organisations need to manage all stakehold-
ers well, in order to be a trustworthy and legitimate organisation.
As resources from outside the police organisation can be impor-
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tant for reaching either outputs or outcomes, we see an instrumen-
tal potential for stakeholder management, but recognise that there
may not be an overall relation between stakeholder management
and organisational performance. Not all stakeholder management
is likely to be strategic. The question is then how to measure per-
formance. Normative stakeholder theory suggests that the satisfac-
tion of stakeholders is what organisations may strive for, because
stakeholders should be managed out of moral and societal reasons.
If stakeholders are pleased, they can build steady and valuable
relations with the focal organisation. Especially for public organ-
isations this argument of intrinsically valuable stakeholders makes
sense. Scholes and Johnson (2011) claim that, at the strategic level,
managers seek to define the organisation’s mission in terms of max-
imising the value to stakeholders.
In work by van den Born and van Witteloostuijn (2011), on
which we build some of our research, police interviewees were
asked how they deal with the stakeholders they mentioned. This
revealed that stakeholders are managed by police forces in many
different ways. This ranges from intense collaboration to bluntly ig-
noring their demands. The variety within forces is also enormous,
as it is often left to the discretion of police officers individually how
they deal with external parties. Only towards few stakeholders do
police forces have a unified approach, and that approach is most
likely due to the fact that only few persons within the police force
deal with this stakeholder. For example, only high-ranked police
officials have to interact with ministers from the national govern-
ment. Yet, we do not feel that having different approaches to stake-
holders is necessarily a bad thing. In fact, it is likely to be a strength
for police organisations to allow for varied stakeholder manage-
ment at different levels of the organisation. One stakeholder can
have many different interests depending on the issue, the location,
or the level/type of police that they deal with. Let us take citizens
as an example. It is a different stakeholder at the tactical level of the
organisation, basing strategy on general interest of the citizens as a
whole, vis-à-vis the police officer on the street, who deals with them
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as a community or as individuals. They are also a different stake-
holder to the detective than to the community officer. The detective
might only deal with them as a source of information in a criminal
case. To the community officer they are perhaps the most important
stakeholder, collaborating with them daily to make the neighbour-
hood a safer place. Yet, the community officer in a high-income
neighbourhood may manage citizens differently, for example by
informing them on burglary prevention, than the community offi-
cer in an impoverished neighbourhood, who might have to reach
out to drug abusers or troubled youth.
The study by van den Born and van Witteloostuijn (2011) shows
that the management of a stakeholder will often be influenced, or
determined, by police officers at different levels of the organisa-
tion, as individuals or in teams. What a ’good’ (i.e., satisfactory for
the stakeholder) management strategy entails will hinge on the in-
terests of that stakeholder and how influential a stakeholder is. A
(originally corporate) theory of stakeholder mapping and manage-
ment we use is that of Savage et al. (1991), which basically argues
that the management method a focal organisation chooses should
be based on the dependence relationship it has with its stakehold-
ers. High influence combined with big interests, such as a police
force may have in a relation with a public prosecution office, will
generally lead to close cooperation in order for the stakeholder to
be satisfied, and possibly improve some joint measure of perfor-
mance. Little influence and few (or non-existing) interests justifies
mere monitoring of stakeholders. High influence/low interest or
low influence/high interest relations ask for yet other methods. By
all means, we do not intend to state that stakeholders can be stat-
ically categorised, and consequently left to their appropriate man-
agement methods. Different stakeholders need different manage-
ment methods, and depending on the time and place, management
methods may also need to differ or be adapted. Some schools, for
example, like to see close involvement of the police, while others
are perfectly fine without assistance. In one period, the police may
decide to work intensely with the tax agency on cases of fraud or
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tax evasion, while in other times they work on such cases indepen-
dently.
The idea is that using the right stakeholder management method
at the right time will be positive for the performance in terms of
satisfying the stakeholder’s expectations. This is a claim that we
examine in Chapter 2. In Chapter 2, we do a stakeholder manage-
ment analysis of police forces in seven European countries to find
out if managing stakeholders (theoretically) appropriately in re-
lation to their stakeholder type will increase performance on the
stakeholders’ expectations. For this, we create a typology based
on stakeholder management quadrants by Savage et al. (1991) and
Scholes and Johnson (2001). Next to this, we argue that actively
managing stakeholders will always have a positive influence on
their expectations, as blindly ignoring them or window-dressing
activities may cause stakeholders to feel they have no input what-
soever. Lastly, we argue that stakeholders whose expectations are
difficult to manage for whatever reason will be negatively associ-
ated with performance on stakeholders’ expectations, even when
management is active and the method is correct. We use data from
interviews with police professionals on environmental threats and
external stakeholders, and perform OLS analyses to answer our
first research question.
Research question 1. How is the use of management strategies with
certain stakeholder types associated with the police’s perceived perfor-
mance on stakeholders’ expectations?
As will become clear from Chapter 2, a lot of the stakeholder
management that police forces do (and should do) is collaborate
with stakeholders. Collaboration is not only what leads to sat-
isfied stakeholders in specified cases, it can also be necessary to
get jobs done that go beyond the abilities, specialties or mandates
of police organisations. An obvious example is the collaboration
with the public prosecution. A criminal cannot be convicted by the
police itself, yet the prosecution would have no criminal case to
begin with if it was not for the police. There are other examples
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that are perhaps less obvious, but not less relevant. The collabora-
tion between police and social or (mental) healthcare problems is
increasingly becoming an established method to tackle offenders
who also have social or health-related problems. In Chapters 3 and
4, we look at cooperation between police officers and profession-
als from other public organisations when it comes to such complex
problem-solving tasks. Specifically, we have looked at profession-
als working in a special type of teams that we have defined as Pub-
lic Interdisciplinary Interagency (PII) teams. In Chapter 3, we focus
on what kind of people collaborate well in such circumstances, and
how that influences the perceived collaboration and performance
of the joint effort. In Chapter 4, we investigate which structural
characteristics can be offered by a Network Administrative Organ-
isation (NAO) to such interdisciplinary partnerships to facilitate
cooperation. A NAO is an independent body commonly participat-
ing in interdisciplinary networks for administrative purposes, but
which can also be used for offering collaborative structural char-
acteristics to participants. For these studies, we collected our own
data by means of surveys in the Netherlands. We use several statis-
tical methods to analyse the data to explore our second and third
research questions.
Research question 2. How are the characteristics of individuals work-
ing in a public interdisciplinary interorganisational team associated with
how these individuals perceive their collaboration and team performance?1
Research question 3. When the characteristics of the professionals and
the organisations are given, what can Network Administrative Organisa-
tions offer in terms of structure to improve cooperation in these teams?
Chapter 5 is a methodological contribution regarding differ-
ences in performance perception, which follows from our contin-
uous struggle with performance measures throughout our studies,
as is typical for much research involving public organisations. It
1This refers to characteristics of the individual that are either inherent to the indi-
vidual, or are provided to individuals by their home organisations.
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comes as both a warning to researchers and police organisations
alike that performance may be differently perceived, not only be-
tween internals and externals, but also differently in different occu-
pational groups. In Chapter 5, we introduce an existing tool to the
field of public management to see who is biased and/or unknow-
ing when asking internals and externals about police performance.
We use data from the European Social Survey and put a multi-trait-
multi-method (MTMM) model to work to find an answer to our
fourth research question.
Research question 4. How are MTMM models useful in showing bias
in perceived performance of policing in Europe?
In Chapter 6, we briefly summarise the findings of this thesis.
Next to the general findings, we discuss the weaknesses of our re-
search and suggest a future research agenda. Chapters 2 to 5 have
been written as independent research papers: Although they are
related (especially Chapters 3 and 4), the papers stand alone. This
means that the reader can choose to read these chapters separately.
No information will be missed by skipping chapters or reading
them in random order. We must add that the chapters may in-
evitably contain some overlap, particularly Chapters 3 and 4, but
overall the literature and methodology is quite diverse.
In Figure 1.1, we provide an overview of the contents and con-
tributions of this thesis. There are three themes: the general man-
agement of stakeholders, collaboration as a management strategy
toward stakeholders, and performance measurement. Chapter 2
falls under the first theme, Chapters 3 and 4 under the second
theme, and finally Chapter 5 under the third theme. Depending
on the themes and the research questions, the conceptual, method-
ological and empirical contributions vary in weight. Initially, our
interest is to investigate which stakeholders are out there and whe-
ther they are appropriately managed, according to stakeholder
management literature. Hence, the contribution in Chapter 2 is
mainly empirical. Firstly, it adds to the relatively scarce number of
empirical ’fit’ studies; and, secondly, it is (to the best of our knowl-
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edge) the first study that investigates the relation between the po-
lice and their overall stakeholder environment, instead of just one
or a few stakeholders.
Having found collaboration to be a frequently used stakeholder
management strategy in police organisations, we question how col-
laboration could be optimised between the police and its stake-
holders. The theoretical and empirical literature about collabora-
tion between organisations is plentiful, but we found it not to be
fully applicable to this context. Most of the scientific literature re-
lates to for-profit organisations that work together with organi-
sations in similar industries to create profitable products or ser-
vices. What happens when public organisations from different dis-
ciplines try to tackle (possibly non-profitable) problems together?
Literature on public networks provides some information on this,
but fails to answer a number of questions. Does it take a certain
type of professional to collaborate well, or potentially some kind of
structural characteristics in the environment? Because the existing
literature does not fit with this context very well, we introduce the
concept of Public Interdisciplinary Interorganisational (PII) teams.
We have argued that the existing literature on interdisciplinary col-
laboration and teams will fit with the PII context best, and will
hence help in generating hypotheses. Yet, we also create hypothe-
ses that were not in line with existing team literature, because we
believe the PII context to require a focus on other characteristics.
We contribute to the empirical literature by being the first (to the
best of our knowledge) to study these PII teams as such, although
some case studies exist on interdisciplinary collaboration involving
the police (e.g. Abram et al., 2005; Bronstein and Wright, 2007; Cole
and Logan, 2008; Maschi and Killian, 2011). We suggest in these
studies that there are associations between competent people and
a supportive environment on the one hand and perceived success
in this difficult type of collaboration on the other hand.
A returning complicated issue in our research is how to mea-
sure stakeholder satisfaction or (perceived) performance, as we
have tried to measure it in on way or the other in all studies.
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Hence this is the final theme under discussion in this thesis. In
the era of New Public Management, which has a strong focus on
performance measurement, it proves to be a daunting task to find
good performance measures. Especially in the public sector, where
quantitative measures are not always appropriate or relevant to all
stakeholders, organisations may find themselves reliant on biased
perceptions of internal and external stakeholders. In Chapter 5, we
contribute methodologically by introducing an existing model to
the field of public administration to aid (scientific) researchers in
identifying bias amongst respondents.
1.4 COMPOSITE (Comparative Police Studies
in the EU)
The studies in this PhD thesis were financed by COMPOSITE,
through the FP 7 Framework Programme of the European Union.
COMPOSITE does comparative research on police organisations
in ten European countries. The research focus of COMPOSITE is
very much on change and change management. Let it be clear up
front that this thesis is not about change or about stakeholder man-
agement in change processes. Nevertheless, stakeholders analysis
and management is a relevant aspect to study in this context, as
stakeholders form an important part of the environment to which
policing organisations need to stay fit. Knowing who the key stake-
holders are and how to manage them may improve the predictabil-
ity of the environment. Although some environmental changes are
difficult to influence as an organisation, many changes are brought
about by relatively close stakeholders. Political and legal changes
are, for example, often initiated by politicians and national/local
governments. They are usually the ones who determine perfor-
mance measures for police forces, and who influence priorities. A
change in the political landscape can mean that police forces have
to cut costs, reorganise or (re)centralise, especially in the face of
economic downturn.
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The one who loves the least, controls the relationship.†
Abstract
This chapter examines the concept of fit between external stakeholder
types and management methods in relation to perceived performance on
stakeholders’ expectations. We classify external stakeholders as marginal,
non-supportive, supportive or mixed-blessing, with the respective fit-
ting management methods being monitoring, defence, involvement or
collaboration strategies We find that fit between stakeholder type and
management method is positively associated with performance on stake-
holders’ expectations in fourteen police organisations across seven Eu-
ropean countries. Additionally, we include active management of and
difficulty to manage stakeholders’ expectations, and find that the first is
positively and the second negatively associated with perceived perfor-
mance on stakeholders’ expectations.
∗This chapter is the result of joint work with Arjen van Witteloostuijn and Arjan
van den Born.




In the introductory chapter, we already mentioned a number of the
police’s stakeholders, but other examples are abound. In the bor-
der regions of Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, Belgian,
German and Dutch police officers go on patrols together. In the
UK, the police outsource the closing down of shady businesses
to health and labour inspection teams. In the Netherlands, the po-
lice work with housing corporations and energy suppliers to trace
down marijuana plantations. These are just a couple of examples
where the police actively manage stakeholders. Yet, the long list of
all the different parties involved in solving crime, such as the public
prosecutors, forensic laboratories, victims, witnesses, and suspects,
already indicates that dealing with other stakeholders is the rule
rather than the exception in modern policing.
In modern democracies, there are numerous external stakehold-
ers with whom the police have to deal, be it voluntarily or by force
of law. On the one hand, more than ever, police organisations need
other external parties to respond adequately to the increased de-
mand from citizens, growing sophistication of societies, and new
forms of criminality. On the other hand, the police need legitimacy
from the citizenry to operate, which requires satisfactory perfor-
mance in the eyes of a broad range of stakeholders. All in all, the
police must effectively manage all their external stakeholders. This
observation may seem obvious and logical, if not an exercise in
forcing an open door, but a systematic, structural and well thought-
through approach to managing stakeholders is missing in many
police organisations (van den Born and van Witteloostuijn, 2011).
In the academic management literature, stakeholders have been
defined by Freeman (1984) as any group or individual who can af-
fect or is affected by the achievement of the focal organisation’s
objectives. Since the publication of his influential work Strategic
Management: A stakeholder approach (1984), Freeman has released a
discussion about who or what really counts in stakeholder man-
agement. However, to date, no agreement has been reached about
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how to deal with stakeholders, neither in academia nor in practice
(Freeman et al., 2010). Prior scholarly work on stakeholder manage-
ment strategies is primarily theoretical in nature or reports findings
from case studies (Blair et al., 1996; Frooman, 1999; Savage et al.,
1991). Stakeholder theories have also been applied in the field of
public administration (Beach et al., 2012; Foo et al., 2011; Gomes
et al., 2010; Gomes and de Oliveira Miranda Gomes, 2008). Evi-
dence of a significant relationship between using "correct" man-
agement strategies, on the one hand, and performance on stake-
holders’ expectations, on the other hand, is lacking, though. The
present study describes a first attempt to provide systematic evi-
dence through statistical analyses.
Specifically, the current study investigates the relationship of
fourteen European police forces from seven countries with their
external stakeholders, and analyses how fit between external stake-
holders and management strategies is related to the performance
on the expectations of stakeholders, answering the following re-
search question:
How is the use of management strategies with certain stakeholder
types associated with the police’s perceived performance on stakeholders’
expectations?
The basis of our theoretical framework is twofold, namely stake-
holder theory and contingency theory. With this research, this chap-
ter strives to contribute to the academic literature in two ways.
Firstly, our study adds a multivariate model of fit to the empirical
contingency theory literature, which is relatively small compared
to the theoretical work done in this field. Secondly, our study fo-
cuses on an important organisational form in the public domain:
police forces. We argue that a combined instrumental and norma-
tive perspective on stakeholder theory is the best approach to this
organisation, particularly as the police can benefit from access to
resources from stakeholders, on the one hand, to function well, but
needs, on the other hand, (more than other public organisations)
legitimisation from its stakeholders in order to use force and au-
24 Chapter 2.
thority. This implies that the police thus cannot purely execute a
"pure" variant of strategic stakeholder management.
Here, we face a challenge in the domain of performance mea-
surement, as we, in line with normative stakeholder theory, desire
to measure the satisfaction or perception of the stakeholder. We
have to develop tailor-made proxies, specific for the organisational
form at hand: police forces. In the current study, we decided to
work with assessment scores of informed respondents from the
police as to how they evaluate their police forces’ performance
in meeting specific external stakeholder’s expectations. This ap-
proach to performance measurement is another contribution of our
study, being in line with the normative aspects of stakeholder the-
ory, but yet not commonly applied in empirical studies as a perfor-
mance measure.
This chapter is structured as follows. First, we present a litera-
ture review in Section 2.2, where we also explain our theory. Our
empirical methodology is introduced in Section 2.3, and the em-
pirical evidence is provided in Section 2.4. Finally, in Section 2.5,
we will reflect on what our study contributes to the literature, and
what our evidence reveals about stakeholder management prac-
tices in our fourteen European police forces.
2.2 Literature review
2.2.1 Stakeholder theory
The idea that corporations have stakeholders has been well ac-
cepted in the management literature for a few decades, especially
since Freeman’s 1984 book Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Ap-
proach (Donaldson and Grant-Vallone, 2002). Stakeholder theory
has been described as descriptive, instrumental and normative.
Descriptive stakeholder theory formulates a model of the firm to
explain specific characteristics and behaviours. Instrumental the-
ory provides justification for stakeholder theory based on the idea
that the link between stakeholder management and organisational
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performance should be examined. One of the central arguments
from the normative realm is that organisations should tend to all
stakeholders, not just their own. It prescribes how all stakeholders
should be treated on the basis of some underlying moral or philo-
sophical principles.
The idea that stakeholder management and performance go
hand in hand is well accepted in the management literature. A
bulk of the literature on stakeholder management (implicitly) re-
lates to the instrumental perspective on stakeholders (Jawahar and
McLaughlin, 2001). From a stakeholder-agency perspective, one
argument is that stakeholders can monitor managers and use en-
forcement mechanisms to curb their opportunistic behaviour (Hill
and Jones, 1992). Another argument is that of resource dependency
theory. The notion that organisations cannot operate independently
from their environment originally has its roots in sociology (We-
ber, 1947). In this tradition, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) developed
a framework of resource control, giving centre stage to a power
struggle amongst organisations, which goes by the name of re-
source dependence theory. This theory characterises the organi-
sation as an open system, dependent for its resources on contin-
gencies in the external environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).
In an environment of scarce resources that are controlled by dif-
ferent organisations, resource acquisition is critical, but uncertain.
To reduce uncertainty, organisations will develop coalitions with
resource-providing external parties to influence and control the
latter’s behaviour. Scholes and Johnson (2001) emphasise the argu-
ment of resource dependence in public sector industries, as these
are more likely to reach out to stakeholders for resources. This in
contrast with private corporations, which typically (but certainly
not always) already control resources or can buy them with finan-
cial means.
From the field or institutional theory, already quite some things
have been written about organisations and their environment, also
for the public sector in particular, that would support a more in-
strumental approach to stakeholder management, as organisations
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strive for greater organisational autonomy. Boin (2001) explains
that institutions create a buffer against the environment by cre-
ating a degree of autonomy, but that public organisations are sub-
ject to at least a degree of minimal control. The institutional elite
can influence the degree of autonomy by building and maintaining
support for their programs and activities. Police organisations are
in particular very dependent on the democratic environment, as
priorities can be set by politicians from day to day, especially when
local governance has an influence. There are different strategies to
create more organisational autonomy, and hence have more influ-
ence over the organisation’s preferred means, and perhaps even
the goals.
First, one strategy is for organisations to create a favourable
identity. Agency myth, or the idea that the organisation’s goals are
basically impossible to achieve (Hargrove and Glidewell, 1990), is
a good strategy for building autonomy. As there is always an un-
derstanding of a certain discrepancy between what is desired and
what is eventually achieved, the environment assumes that the or-
ganisation has laudable intentions and does not have expectations
equal to the performance goals. Second, co-optation could be an-
other strategy. Usually this is aimed at silencing (potential) critics
by taking them on board and involving them in strategy or decision
making processes (Selznick, 1949). By hearing and tending to the
concerns of stakeholders, organisations find it easier to deal with
opposition to their plans. Third, public organisations must show
desirable core values to the public. They should always emphasise
their frugality, because greedy public organisations are under cri-
tique and scrutiny by the public. They should not openly attack
other (public) organisations. They should be transparent, in line
with the publicity principle; information has to be accessible to the
citizenry. If information cannot be given to the public, then this has
to be because of a good reason, such as privacy or public safety. In
any case, the public organisation reaches more autonomy the easi-
est when they attract the least attention (Boin, 2001). Furthermore,
public organisations may also benefit from showing their manage-
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rial competences to the public.
Network theory and social network analysis is another stream
of literature commonly associated with stakeholder management.
Network theory seeks to explain how social structures influence the
behaviour of individuals, groups or organisations. Network theory
is an interesting approach that is often used in stakeholder man-
agement research regarding project management for example, in
the construction sector. Project managers need to know who the
stakeholders are, what their interests are and how much of a threat
they are to the project. Here network analysis becomes important,
because stakeholders who by themselves do not have that much
influence can form coalitions with stakeholders from their network
and suddenly become a threat. Because this study is about stake-
holder management in general, network theory is not as applica-
ble here as it would be in a project management (case) study. Fur-
thermore, network theory often (implicitly) assumes stakeholder
management as an instrument to obtain better performance. For
instance, Rowley (1997) theorises that a focal organisation will ma-
nipulate information flows between stakeholders if it has a central
(broker) position in the network. When the network is not dense
enough for stakeholders to form coalitions, the focal organisation
will take a commander strategy, attempting to control stakeholder
behaviours and expectations.
Although the bulk of research on stakeholder management is
(implicitly) based on an instrumental perspective, there is no struc-
tural or compelling evidence that strategic stakeholder manage-
ment is the optimal strategy for maximising conventional perfor-
mance measures of for-profit firms (Donaldson and Grant-Vallone,
2002; Jawahar and McLaughlin, 2001; Parmar et al., 2010). This is at-
tributed by Jawahar and McLaughlin (2001) to the developmental
stages of organisations, and argue that different stakeholder man-
agement strategies will be employed by organisations, depending
on their stability. Organisations should take more risks with stake-
holders when they just start, or face financial downturn, and less
risks when they grow or are mature. This means that in the for-
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mer case, organisations should only manage their most important
stakeholders well, and defend against the others, in contrast, in the
latter situation, organisations try to treat all stakeholders well, be-
cause they do not want to (or have to) take any risks by treating
them badly. This theory is however difficult to employ in the public
sector, as most public organisations are mature, which is certainly
the case for police organisations.
Donaldson and Grant-Vallone (2002) rather explain the lack
of a relationship between strategic stakeholder management and
overall organisational performance with reference to normative
stakeholder theory. They claim that the instrumental considera-
tions of stakeholder theory ultimately rest on more than instrumen-
tal grounds; the foundation is often normative. Organisations ben-
efit strategically from stakeholder management because it is per-
ceived to be the right thing to do from a moral perspective. Jones
(1995) argues that the strategic benefits of stakeholder management
result from a genuine commitment to all stakeholders. Organisa-
tions that sustain relationships with stakeholders based on trust
and honesty have competitive advantages over organisations that
do not do this, because it makes the organisation a desirable part-
ner. If an organisation only applies stakeholder management for a
strategic purpose, then commitments are in fact not really moral,
and organisations can then not reap the instrumental benefits from
stakeholder management. We find this theory highly applicable to
the public sector, firstly from the resource dependence theory. If
public organisations commonly have to reach out to a variety of
stakeholders to achieve a goal, then it is important to be recog-
nised as a trustworthy partner. Secondly, the societal and moral
motivation of stakeholder management (the idea that managing
stakeholders is the right thing to do) is crucial for the legitimacy
of any public organisation. Legitimacy in turn is necessary for the
operation of the public firm (Scholes and Johnson, 2001), perhaps
foremost for an organisation that uses force and authority against
the public.
As there might not be a clear direct link between stakeholder
2.2. Literature review 29
management and overall performance of an organisation, we would
argue that it is rather the satisfaction of stakeholders that one would
like to measure. Scholes and Johnson (2001) state that performance
on the expectations of stakeholders is indeed what managers try
to maximise, because it is so crucial from both a resource and a
legitimacy perspective.
Because organisations will not profit from strategic stakeholder
management that is, from managing only those stakeholders that
can benefit the organisation, but rather have to manage all stake-
holders, it is important for organisations to know who their stake-
holders actually are. Stakeholder management can be costly. Man-
aging some stakeholders can be more beneficial for the stakeholder
than the focal organisation. Organisations want to know what kind
of stakeholders they are dealing with, and create some sort of cat-
egorisation. The primary issue is how to keep all stakeholders sat-
isfied, but preferably by managing them in manners most suitable
for that stakeholder. These are issues with which the literature on
stakeholder mapping and management strategies is concerned.
Frooman (1999) outlines that next to mapping external parties
and their demands, a third important issue is the choice of the
management methods that organisations employ to influence and
satisfy their stakeholders’ demands, which he calls stakeholder in-
fluence strategies. The need for these stakeholder influence strate-
gies is based on the assumption that there will be conflicting de-
mands between organisations and stakeholders. After all, if the
organisation and all its stakeholders were largely in agreement,
managers would have no need to concern themselves with stake-
holder influence strategies. Joldersma and Winter (2002) explain
that stakeholder influence - or management - strategies are likely
to be dependent on the type of organisation. Governmental organi-
sations make strategic decisions through formal bureaucratic struc-
tures, with little control over external factors. Because of the lim-
ited power that these organisations have, they are more inclined to
use indirect styles of stakeholder management, such as consulta-
tion, participation and facilitation. In contrast, organisations with
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more influence on their strategies and environment, such as pri-
vate organisations, are expected to use more direct management
styles, like negotiation, bargaining and cooperation. Although this
is an interesting argument, it may not hold for police organisations.
Though the police may be a large bureaucratic organisation when
it comes to strategy making, in terms of stakeholder management
much more flexibility can be expected. This is because policing pro-
fessionals receive much more autonomy than the average public
servant. Plenty of the stakeholder management will be done at the
level of individual officers, or squads, rather than at the level of the
organisation.
Wartick and Cochran (1985) outline management strategies with
a focus on (legal) responsibilities, using the terms reactive, defensive,
accommodative and proactive. Being proactive means to take respon-
sibility, accommodation to accept responsibility, defence to admit
responsibility and reaction to deny responsibility. The general ar-
gument around all these management strategies is that more is bet-
ter, as we also see in empirical studies (e.g., Mishra and Suar, 2010;
Tetřevová and Sabolová, 2010). Stakeholders will prefer organisa-
tions to go beyond their responsibilities rather than to deny them.
As resources are limited, stakeholders will have to be prioritised for
example, based on their salience, power and legitimacy (Mitchell
et al., 1997). This stream of literature may be valid for some fields
of research, such as Corporate Social Responsibility, where more
is probably always appreciated by the involved stakeholders. It
might not be as relevant for the day-to-day business of a police
force. The marginal return on an extra unit of satisfaction of a stake-
holder may be quite low in some cases, as the police goes further
beyond its responsibilities. A school, for example, will probably
want the police to accept responsibilities, might appreciate it when
the police send an officer over for a presentation for the children,
but may be reluctant to have more contact than that. As we have no
reason to assume that it is always worthwhile for the police to do
as much as possible, we turn to a stream of literature that combines
stakeholder mapping with appropriate management strategies.
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Stakeholder mapping can be achieved in numerous ways ac-
cording to the literature, but not all stakeholder grids have been
complemented with stakeholder management strategies. Stakehol-
der mapping by Mitchell et al. (1997), for example, is done on the
basis of urgency, power and legitimacy, and explains to managers
which stakeholders they should prioritise. Mendelow (1991) places
stakeholders in a power/dynamism grid, where power relates to
the influence that a stakeholder can exert over the focal organisa-
tion, and dynamism, as is commonly done, being measured by the
predictability of the stakeholder’s expectations. Again, this grid
only explains which stakeholders are potentially hazardous. John-
son et al. (2008) adapt this grid to a power/interest one and pro-
pose some appropriate management strategies for different types
of stakeholders (see Table 2.1). Stakeholders that have little power
and little interest (A) should receive minimal effort, because they
are neither interested nor a threat. Stakeholders that have little
power but high interest (B) should be kept informed. Johnson et al.
(2008) argue that these stakeholders can be(come) important ’al-
lies’ to influence the attitudes of more powerful stakeholders. High
power, low interest stakeholders (C) should be kept satisfied, which
may seem much effort for a passive stakeholder, but it decreases
the risk of the stakeholder becoming a problem if he/she decides
to increase the level of interest. Lastly, stakeholders with high inter-
est and power (D) are the key players, who can frustrate the work,
strategies and goals of the focal organisation, but no clear strategy
is provided to deal with them.
The typology of Johnson et al. (2008) is well adopted in the
more recent stakeholder literature. It is also found to be a suitable
stakeholder grid for analysing stakeholders in the public sector (Sc-
holes and Johnson, 2001). Johnson et al. (2008) themselves explain
this typology in terms of strategy development. It is not surpris-
ing that we often see it appear in the stream of literature that con-
cerns project management, especially in management of construc-
tion projects (Chinyio and Olomolaiye, 2009; Olander and Landin,
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Table 2.1: Typology as defined by Johnson et al. (2008)
2005; Yang et al., 2011). The management strategies discussed here
are probably more suitable for short-term stakeholder management
in case of change or a project, rather than for the daily operations.
Savage et al. (1991) look at the stakeholder management meth-
ods from the perspective of the focal organisation from a daily op-
erations perspective. They map the stakeholders of an airline com-
pany, and assess their potential threats to the focal organisation
and their willingness to cooperate. This is much in line with other
literature on stakeholder management (van der Laan Smith et al.,
2005; Smith et al., 1994). Hostility or threat is a key variable in the
expansive literature on the organisation-environment-strategy re-
lationship (Miller and Friesen, 1978). Cooperation is relevant be-
cause this may lead to organisations joining forces with other stake-
holders, resulting in better management of organisational environ-
ments. Savage et al. (1991) report that the type of relationship with
a stakeholder x influences the management method that the organ-
isation should employ vis-à-vis this stakeholder x. They suggest a
typology of relationships with matching management strategies, as
shown in Table 2.2.
Low-threat stakeholders are either supportive or marginal. Sup-
portive stakeholders should be explicitly involved in the focal or-
ganisation to raise the potential performance of the latter. Savage
et al. (1991) mention that these stakeholders are often overlooked,
because they are of little threat to the focal organisation. As a re-
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Table 2.2: Typology as defined by Savage et al. (1991)
sult, the fact that their involvement can increase performance is
often ignored. Although involvement takes constant effort, the fo-
cal organisation can relate to these stakeholders by implementing
participative management techniques, increasing decision-making
involvement of these stakeholders (Savage et al., 1991).
Marginal stakeholders are those of little potential threat and
with low willingness to cooperate. Putting much effort into rela-
tionships with these stakeholders is generally a waste of resources.
Only if issues salient to these stakeholders are concerned, manage-
ment should act accordingly by investing in these relationships;
otherwise, monitoring is the most efficient strategy. An organisa-
tion could, for example, enlarge the board of non-executive direc-
tors with representatives of these stakeholders - not for them to
influence the decision-making processes per se, but rather to be
aware of the importance of particular issues for these stakeholders.
Non-supportive stakeholders are of high potential threat and
with little potential for cooperation. They are generally the most
distressing to a focal organisation. The best method of dealing with
them is a defensive strategy. Defensive strategies are aimed at re-
ducing the dependence that forms the basis for the stakeholder’s
interest in the focal organisation (Kotter, 1979). They include many
traditional marketing and strategic tactics as designed for han-
dling competitors. Savage et al. (1991) give the example of how
airline companies voluntarily cut back flights when US air traffic
controllers were striking, rather than waiting for the Federal Avi-
ation Agency to regulate this. Organisations can also launch PR
campaigns to improve the relationship with these stakeholders.
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The mixed-blessing stakeholder is not only a potential threat,
but also potentially cooperative. Collaboration with these stake-
holders is the first-best stakeholder management strategy. By max-
imising collaboration, these stakeholders will find it increasingly
more difficult to oppose the focal organisation. Joint ventures are a
well-known example of such a collaborative strategy: if you cannot
beat them, join them.
Though different from one another, we find similarities be-
tween different stakeholder mappings and management strategies.
Chinyio and Olomolaiye (2009) also recognise that many differ-
ent stakeholder mappings exist, some also developed by govern-
ments and consultancy firms, but that there are some key vari-
ables that underlie most of them. Commonly stakeholder map-
pings use power, support, influence, interest and attitude. There
is not a golden rule for stakeholder mapping, such that we may
take some freedom to develop one of our own. On the one hand,
we take a measure of power and one of interest, in line with Schol-
es and Johnson (2001), as this framework has been accepted for
use in the public sector. On the other hand, we decided to take
management strategies from Savage et al. (1991), as these are better
applicable for stakeholder management in daily operations. Blair
et al. (1996) have also used the typology of Savage et al. (1991) in
a public sector study, such that we may expect that the strategies
suggested by Savage et al. (1991) are also acceptable for the public
sector. Our typology is summarised in Table 2.3. Rather than look-
ing at the potential to cooperate, we look at which interests stake-
holders have. We replace potential threat with another measure
of stakeholder power, namely the influence that stakeholders have.
We believe that the management strategies outlined by Scholes and
Johnson (2001) are in fact not so far from those offered by Savage
et al. (1991), but just better applicable to daily operations instead
of project management. Organisations monitor vs. minimise effort,
they involve vs. keep informed, they collaborate with key play-
ers, and defend vs. keep satisfied. Defending can imply keeping a
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Table 2.3: Our typology based on Scholes and Johnson (2001) and
Savage et al. (1991)
stakeholder satisfied, but may also mean the opposite.
Of course, it is hardly possible to classify stakeholders into fixed
categories for every police force and over time. A stakeholder may
be more influential or have different interests for one police force
than for another (or even within a police force), and their posi-
tions may change over time as well. For a community police offi-
cer, a school may be a mixed-blessing stakeholder, if he/she sees
that kids are dropping out and are resorting to crime. This might
even call for a collaborative effort. For a detective, schools may be
marginal stakeholders most of the time, and he/she will only inter-
act with the school in case of a criminal investigation at a school or
in relation to its students. Depending on the police officer, unit or
department, different strategies may be employed towards a stake-
holder such as citizens. In some communities, monitoring may be
a sufficient strategy, while in other cases police officers might want
to involve citizens in making their environment safer and prevent
specific crimes like burglary. One can imagine situations where
police work together with citizens, when human resources of the
police are not necessary or sufficient. An example may be neigh-
bourhood watches, or organised search efforts for missing persons.
However, by way of illustration, below we add examples relevant
in our police force setting as to how certain stakeholders may be
perceived and treated in a given context.
As the police are not highly influenced by supportive stake-
holders, the appropriate management method is involvement of
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such stakeholders. Sport event organisers may be exemplary of
supportive stakeholders, for instance in cases where they are de-
pendent on police forces for delivering security units at soccer
games. Public prosecution services may be a good example of a
mixed-blessing stakeholder: they are usually dependent on the po-
lice, but also very influential. Failure to cooperate may also have a
strong negative impact on the performance of both organisations.
The media could be an example of a stakeholder that is not very
dependent on the police for their own performance; after all, they
have plenty of other issues to report on, and other sources to con-
sult. The media is, however, very influential as they can make or
break the police’s reputation. Such non-supportive stakeholders re-
quire a defensive strategy. Low dependence of a stakeholder on the
police, such as can be the case with schools, will not motivate co-
operation, as low-dependence stakeholders exert little influence on
the police. When a school and the police operate perfectly fine in-
dependently, but decide to come together in the context of specific
issues, such as the prevention of drug trading, then the school can
be considered a marginal stakeholder. Monitoring these marginal
stakeholders would be sufficient for dealing with such relation-
ships.
2.2.2 Contingency theory
A next step is to link our stakeholder typology with actual stake-
holder management strategies, such that we may assume that there
is a ’fit’ between a stakeholder and a certain management method.
The relationship between environment and strategy has been ex-
tensively analysed in the fit literature in management studies. In
this section, we focus on the stream of work that evaluates the effect
of specific strategies in specific contexts on a specific organisation’s
performance. This has been the focus of the so-called formulation
school in the field of strategic management, a well-known contri-
bution being Porter’s (1998) framework for competition analysis
and competitive strategy (Heijltjes and van Witteloostuijn, 2003).
The key argument here is that specific strategies of specific organi-
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sations fit with specific contexts.
The notion of fit - or, alternatively, alignment, congruence or
match - has been very popular in management studies ever since
the classic contingency-theoretic studies of the 1960s (Parker and
van Witteloostuijn, 2010). The argument is that complementaries
(’fits’) across organisational features could benefit organisations
such that performance is enhanced to above-normal levels (Mil-
grom and Roberts, 1995). It logically follows that fits will yield bet-
ter performance than misfits (Doty et al., 1993). Misfit and fit are
complementary concepts; each implicitly implies the other (Bur-
ton et al., 2002). Misfits might have a significantly negative effect
on performance, however; alternatively, misfits may not have any
effect at all. Burton et al. (2002) refer to performance-decreasing
misfits as ’extreme misfits’.
Based on these ’fit’ arguments, we will develop a multidimen-
sional model that analyses the relationship of stakeholder types
and management methods, or strategies, and the effect of a stake-
holder type - management method fit or misfit on focal organisa-
tion representatives’ perception as to the performance of the fo-
cal organisation in meeting this stakeholder’s expectations. Specif-
ically, we focus on a two-fold research question: (1) What is the
relationship between external parties and management methods in
the context of our sample of European police forces?; and (2) What
combination of external parties and management methods is asso-
ciated with higher perceived performance?
As is common in the contingency theory literature, we hypothe-
sise that a fit will have a positive effect on (perceived) performance.
Hypothesis 1. A fit between a stakeholder type and a management
method is positively associated with the police’s perception of performance
on the expectations of this external stakeholder.
This hypothesis can be argued to be tautological. After all, mea-
sures of ’fit’ will have positive association with performance by the
very definition of the ’fit’ concept. So, of course, Hypothesis 1 is
empty without a detailed specification of what fit entails in our
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specific context. In this respect, the added value of contingency fit
studies is that we have to specify precisely what ’fit’ does imply.
Here, we follow the logic implied by Table 2.3, derived from Schol-
es and Johnson (2001) and Savage et al. (1991). We summarise the
four cases of fit in the form of four lemmas.
Lemma 1. If the stakeholder is a marginal stakeholder, then a monitor-
ing strategy will result in a fit.
Lemma 2. If the stakeholder is a non-supportive stakeholder, then a
defensive strategy will result in a fit.
Lemma 3. If the stakeholder is a supportive stakeholder, then an in-
volvement strategy will result in a fit.
Lemma 4. If the stakeholder is a mixed blessing stakeholder, then a col-
laborative strategy will result in a fit.
The literature indicates that there may be other forces at work,
next to fit, that may be related to the performance of a stakeholder
management strategy. Scholes and Johnson (2001) argue that seven
important stakeholder characteristics have to be taken into account
in a stakeholder analysis:
1. Formal authority over the focal organisation;
2. Influence on the focal organisation;
3. Understanding of the focal organisation’s activities;
4. Predictability of the stakeholder’s expectations;
5. Active management of expectations by the focal organisation;
6. Difficulty for the focal organisation to meet stakeholder’s ex-
pectations; and
7. Performance on the stakeholder’s expectations by the focal
organisation.
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These seven characteristics suit the stakeholder management
typology very well, but do not cover the typology completely. Au-
thority (1) and influence (2) are captured by the measure of ’in-
fluence’ in the stakeholder typology, and understanding (3) and
predictability of expectations (4) are captured by ’interest’. Per-
formance on stakeholder expectations (7) is the perceived perfor-
mance outcome measure (see following section). This leaves active
management of (5) and the difficulty to manage (6) for further con-
sideration. Below, we will explain the relevance of both extra vari-
ables, as identified by Scholes and Johnson (2001), with reference
to the extant literature.
According to Leach and Britain (2005), stakeholder’s percep-
tions of decisions made by organisations are positively influenced
by the stakeholder’s involvement in the focal organisation’s deci-
sion-making processes. Even if the decision made by the focal or-
ganisation is not the preferred outcome from the perspective of
the stakeholders, involved stakeholders tend to respond more pos-
itively because they feel that their arguments have been seriously
considered. Such involvement should be genuine; the feeling of
’window dressing’, such as merely involving stakeholders as a
mechanistic tool of regulatory compliance, can provoke resentment
among stakeholders (Foo et al., 2011). But genuine active stake-
holder management will increase the level of stakeholder under-
standing and acceptance that not all their expectations will be met,
or that they might have to lower their expectations. Waddock and
Graves (1997) also show in their research that treating stakeholders
decently through relations is crucial in managing them success-
fully.
Hypothesis 2. Active management of a stakeholder is positively associ-
ated with the police’s perception of performance on the expectations of this
external stakeholder.
Stakeholder expectations may be difficult to manage when they
are unclear. Clear expectations foster mutual accountability and ex-
ecution responsibility (Austin, 2000). Unclear expectations would
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thus negatively influence performance with regard to these expec-
tations, because demands are less likely to be satisfied. Addition-
ally, Austin (2000) argues that poor interpersonal relations can neg-
atively affect the relationship between organisations. If difficulty in
managing relations is due to interpersonal issues, this could have
a negative effect on the focal organisation’s performance on stake-
holder expectations.
Hypothesis 3. Difficulty to manage the expectations of a stakeholder is
negatively associated with the police’s perception of performance on the
expectations of this external stakeholder.
Figure 2.1 summarises our conceptual model. All arrows in the
model point in one direction, suggesting causality, yet we want to
emphasise the correlational nature of this study. We elaborate on
this issue in the section below.




A research design shows how one intends to identify the causal
effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable. In our
case, that would be, for example, the causal effect of ’fit’ on the
perceived performance on expectations of stakeholders. Ideally,
we would conduct an randomised experiment (with a sufficiently
large number of participants), where an experimental variation in
fit is created. In that case, if we see any association between fit and
performance, then we can conclude that fit causally affects per-
formance. Now, this is unfortunately not feasible. To assign police
officers and stakeholders randomly to a (mis)fit situation may be
not only undesirable, it may be borderline unethical. If the police
officer would start to bluntly ignore a public prosecutor, this could
mean that the process of justice is hampered, because the police
does not deliver evidence for criminal cases.
However, because we have to deviate from the golden standard
of a randomised experiment, it means that we struggle with a num-
ber of issues which make it very difficult for us to make causal in-
ferences about our study. We observe the police and its (mis)fits
with stakeholders as they are, and the way things are is unlikely to
be random. There may be characteristics that we do not observe,
but which could be important. Because we do not take these unob-
served characteristics into account, we may be over- or underesti-
mating the effect of fit (or one of the other independent variables)
on perceived performance. We will try to restrict a number of is-
sues. We have added controls that we find theoretically to possi-
bly have an effect on the outcome variable, in an attempt to deal
with the omitted variable bias. However, we cannot be sure these
controls are responsible for all unobserved variation; most likely,
they are not. As we make use of a cross-sectional design, we can-
not benefit from the estimation techniques that can be used with
panel data, mostly in terms of coping with omitted fixed effects.
However, the least we could do, and have done, was to add coun-
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try dummies to the estimation, to account for this potential fixed
effect.
Hence, as we find the research design to be far from perfect, we
will not make any causal inferences about our findings, and (still
carefully) treat the findings of this correlational study as mere as-
sociations between the variables of interest. This does not mean,
however, that work of this nature has no merit on its own. Explo-
rative studies like these pave the way for further research, as asso-
ciations can suggest which variables may be of the greatest interest
or relevance. We will discuss the implications of the weaknesses in
our research design in the discussion of this chapter.
2.3.2 Data
Contingency fit studies come in many different forms and shapes
(Parker and van Witteloostuijn, 2010). An important distinction is
the one between criterion-free and criterion-specific contingency
studies. Only the latter relate contingencies to an outcome variable
such as performance, similar to what we aim to do in the current
study, although we do not intend to make causal claims. Another
important distinction follows from the precise conception of fit, and
the corresponding method of measuring fit. For instance, distance
measures of fit are often contrasted with interaction measures. Dis-
tance measures require the identification of an "optimum", some-
thing that is not needed in the context of interaction measures of
fit. In the current study, we employ a conception and measure of
fit that is not associated with the need to identify an "optimum".
So, we adopt a criterion-specific but optimum-free conception and
measure of fit. Within the context of this approach, two key issues
relate to (a) the choice for one method of measuring fit to the other
and (b) the associated empirical methodology of analysis given the
involved sample size. We return to (a) below, and first deal with
(b).
Siggelkow (2001, 2002) reports findings from two fit analyses
with data from two case studies of a clothing manufacturer and a
mutual fund provider. Burton et al. (2002) used a sample of approx-
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imately 250 firms for multivariate regression analyses. Obviously,
both approaches have their benefits. In-depth case studies provide
much and rich information, while larger samples allow for statis-
tical tests and conclusions that can be generalised. In deciding on
the sampling strategy in the context of the current study, a trade-
off was made between a wish for representativeness and binding
capacity constraints, as we will explain below.
Our study analyses data that were collected in the context of
a large EU-financed project called COMparative Police Studies In
The EU - or COMPOSITE. Below, we will briefly introduce the sam-
pling strategy and data. For further details, we refer to the COM-
POSITE website.1 Our sample is betwixt-and between, and has a
hybrid character. For the current study, we have a sample with
a large number of respondents (297); yet we have only studied a
small number of police forces (14). As we will explain below, we
opted for regression analyses exploring the answers from our 288
respondents, after removing cases with missing values, construct-
ing a fit measure at the individual respondent - stakeholder dyad
level.
Looking at the level of the individual is very relevant and im-
portant for police organisations. This is because a lot of the people
who work at police organisations deal with a great variety of stake-
holders every day. A detective has an different relation with citi-
zens than a community police officer, even if they work in the same
police force. They have to deal with different expectations, which
they may also have to manage in different ways. Much of the liter-
ature is based on stakeholder management by managers, but look-
ing at the managers only would certainly not be sufficient in the
policing context. Of course, there may be some general guidelines,
to some extent, regarding how to deal with particular stakeholders,
for example when it comes to social media usage by police officers
towards the public, or codes of conduct for using force against citi-
zens. Overall, however, police departments, units, and individuals
can make relatively autonomous choices as to how to deal with
1http://www.COMPOSITE-project.eu
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stakeholders, especially if you would compare it to the average
large private or even public organisation. An employee of a tax
agency, for example, is not as flexible as a police officer who may
give a warning for a breach of the law. A flexible attitude towards
stakeholders by police organisations may be an essential capabil-
ity to maintain the satisfaction of the citizenry. This makes it rele-
vant to ask police officers at different levels what their organisation
does to manage a stakeholder. It allows us to question which dif-
ferent parts/individuals of the organisation deal with which stake-
holders, how they do that, and if this leads to satisfaction with the
stakeholder. Stakeholder satisfaction should be achieved at differ-
ent levels of the police organisation in broad ways to get legitimacy
from the public. Community officers should satisfy their neigh-
bourhood, up to the senior managers who have to properly manage
politicians and senior managers of other public organisations.
The sampling strategy aimed for a right mix between internal
and external interviewees - the former across higher and lower lev-
els in the police forces, uniformed as well as investigative police
officers, and rural as well as urban police forces (van den Born
and van Witteloostuijn, 2011). Information was gathered by means
of interviews, complemented by quantitative data through a mini-
survey with statements on which interviewees could give a rating
(on score sheets with seven-point Likert scales) to provide addi-
tional information. In this mini-survey, interviewees were asked to
score each mentioned stakeholder on the seven items of Scholes
and Johnson (2001). Hence, the number of questions posed to in-
terviewees varied with the number of stakeholders they discussed
in the interview. Both interviews and surveys were in the native
language of the interviewee. Before the interviews were started, a
detailed interview protocol was developed. Interviews lasted for
one to two hours, and respondents filled in the surveys directly af-
terwards.
Interviewers were from the respective country teams, and spoke
the country’s native language. Most interviews were processed
throughout the month after that. For every interview, a summary
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of the answers was made available in English; from this we de-
rived the qualitative information. In total, after removing cases
with missing values, 288 interviews were used for the current study,
from seven different countries and fourteen police forces/regions.
Table 2.4 gives an overview of interviewed countries and police
forces used in the current study. The countries in the project were
originally selected to provide a representative view of European
police forces. Countries in West, East and Southern Europe are
represented; only Scandinavia was not included. Large European
countries such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom are
part of the project. However, the Czech Republic, France and Italy
were dropped from this particular dataset, because the number of
responses was not sufficient for quantitative analysis.
Table 2.4: Countries included in the sample




















Our final sample (n = 288) consisted of approximately 81 per
cent men and 19 per cent women. A majority of the respondents (53
per cent) is between 36 and 50 years old. Nineteen per cent is older
than 50 and 24 per cent is younger than 36 years. With respect to the
46 Chapter 2.
representativeness of the sample, younger and older people may be
under-represented. Females might also be under-represented in the
sample, but generally the proportion of females in police organisa-
tions is lower than that of males. The majority of the respondents
have been through higher education (70 per cent), 29 per cent has
education of an intermediate level and only 1 per cent has received
only basic education. Of the respondents, 48 per cent is in an oper-
ational function, 20 per cent in a supervisory function and 32 per
cent in a top / strategic / senior function, which probably means
an over-representation of the highest level. Average tenure is 18.5
years. There is presumably somewhat of an over-representation of
higher educated respondents. It is not surprising that only a very
small proportion of the respondents have only received basic edu-
cation as police officers generally need to go through intermediary
or higher education before they can carry out their policing func-
tions.
We do not expect that these under- and over-representations in
the sample are an issue in terms of validity, as our sample implies a
good representation of different functions within the police. At dif-
ferent functional levels, police officers have to deal with different
external parties. While high-level executives will have to handle
external parties such as the government, officers at an operational
level will be more practically involved with external parties such
as emergency services. Hence, this study is a fairly good represen-
tation of different functional levels, providing information about a
broad range of external stakeholders.
2.3.3 Measures
Dependent variable
Evidently, measuring the satisfaction of a diverse group of stake-
holders with an even more diverse range of interests is a challenge.
Following the suggestion of Scholes and Johnson (2001), we in-
cluded a survey item that asked interviewees to assess their per-
ception of their police force’s performance on the expectations of
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external stakeholders. We refer to this satisfaction measure as the
police’s performance on stakeholder’s expectations. Specifically, this was
measured by means of the statement ’We perform very well on the
expectations of external stakeholder x’, where respondents could
answer on a Likert scale that runs from 1 to 7, indicating to what
extent they agree with the statement, where 1 is associated with
’completely disagree’ and 7 with ’completely agree’.
In the interview, each respondent was asked to list her or his po-
lice organisation’s key stakeholders. Subsequently, they were asked
to answer a series of questions regarding these stakeholders, in-
cluding the above item involving performance evaluation. In this
way, we could (a) flexibly accommodate differences across police
organisations and (b) collect data that offer the opportunity to con-
struct a performance measure that is uniform across respondents
and stakeholders (and countries). Many respondents gave a series
of evaluations as to a set of different external stakeholders (e.g.,
the general public and public prosecution), but not all respondents
mentioned the same (number of) stakeholders.
The stakeholder management literature does not specify how
stakeholder satisfaction should be measured, and thus leaves us at
liberty to choose a variable appropriate for this study. We recog-
nise that using a self-perceived subjective dependent variable may
have its downsides, such as potential biases.2 By way of validity
check, we interviewed 25 external stakeholders, asking them to
score the same seven-point Likert performance assessment item
from their perspective. A t-test of sample means indicates that the
police scores are not significantly different from those of our sam-
ple of police professionals.We examine the problems of this mea-
sure more elaborately in the discussion. Furthermore, it may ap-
pear illogical to measure organisational constructs at the level of
the individual. As was already explained earlier, the stakeholder
handling by police organisations can be very diverse, because even
individual officers have autonomy in deciding how to deal with
stakeholders; they are often stakeholder managers themselves, with
2We discuss this issue more extensively in Chapter 5.
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overlapping environments with other officers from their unit, force
or organisation. This is why we take the individual level for our re-
search, and do not aggregate this to the level of the police force or
the organisation, because aggregation would require a stakeholder
to be of a certain type, and to hence have only one theoretically cor-
rect stakeholder management strategy. We do ask, however, what
the police does to manage expectations and how the police performs
on the expectations, rather than asking what the individual does
and how the individual performs on expectations. This is because
the individual police officer will often not be the only one to man-
age expectations. His/her stakeholder environment may overlap
with a substantial number of colleagues to whom the stakeholder
poses the same challenge and where there is a common manage-
ment strategy towards that stakeholder. We do not want to focus on
what a single police officer does to satisfy a stakeholder, but rather
what is undertaken at a certain level of the organisation to achieve
stakeholder satisfaction.
Independent variables
First, relating to Hypothesis 1 and the associated lemmas, we con-
structed a fit measure from the data by creating a dummy referred
to as Fit. To do so, we first had to categorise stakeholder types
and management methods in line with the conceptions implied by
Table 2.3. This categorising exercise was initially done by one of
the authors. Subsequently, a random selection of cases has been
checked by a second author. This has the benefit that the work is
done consistently, but the disadvantage that the categorisation has
not been fully open to discussion for each and every case. There are
no rules of thumb for formulating ’fit’ variables, as work from the
contingency literature shows (e.g. Burton et al., 2002; Parker and
van Witteloostuijn, 2010). Also Blair et al. (1996), who use the map-
ping from Savage et al. (1991) empirically, do not provide a strong
formalisation as to how they categorise stakeholders and manage-
ment methods on the basis of open questions. Given that there is
a lot of variety in formulating fit, we would not necessarily argue
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that our formulation is optimal. The main strength is that it is well
explained and allows for repetition without a change in the results.
We will briefly discuss the coding process below. Detailed coding
schemes can be found in Appendix A.
Initially, based on the qualitative interview information and
score sheet results, external stakeholders were classified into our
four stakeholder type categories: marginal, non-supportive, sup-
portive or mixed-blessing. From the score sheet statement ’This
external party has high influence on our activities’, we could al-
ready divide external parties into high and low-influence external
stakeholders. External parties with an influence score above 4 were
classified as external stakeholders with greater influence, and those
with scores of 4 and below were coded as external stakeholders
with smaller influence. We chose 4 as the threshold assessment to
distinguish high from low influence because of the nature of the
associated seven-point Likert scale. With scores above 4, respon-
dents agreed (to some extent) that the external stakeholder has an
influence over police activities; scores of 4 and below indicate the
absence of a noteworthy influence of the external stakeholder on
police activities.
Having made this distinction, we looked into the qualitative an-
swers. Interviewees were asked to mention the interests of external
stakeholders. If those interests included resources that the external
stakeholder demands from the police, we could categorise this ex-
ternal stakeholder as supportive or mixed-blessing, depending on
the influence level that we found earlier. If interests were marginal,
non-existent, not relating to the police, or only included resource
demands on behalf of the police, then the stakeholder was cate-
gorised as marginal or non-supportive, again dependent upon the
influence level.
For the management methods, we extracted all information
from the qualitative interview material. Interviewees were asked
how the police manage the expectations of external parties. By
means of a list of keywords, included in Appendix A, we struc-
turally categorised the answers in Table 2.3’s matrix of different
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management methods (monitoring, defence, involvement and col-
laboration strategies). Of course, with qualitative data, this is evi-
dently open to interpretation. The management strategy categori-
sation is as much as possible based on Savage et al. (1991), as they
do give examples of the different management strategies they dis-
cuss. All strategies that were found in the data, but that were not
described by Savage et al. were categorised at our discretion. Pos-
sibly the categorisation is not perfect, but at least it is transparent.
1. We categorised stakeholder management methods as moni-
toring when the police have little or no contact with the ex-
ternal party, or only on particular occasions that concern the
stakeholder. Examples are (semi-)annual meetings and (infor-
mal) contacts for specific matters. A few respondents claimed
to ignore particular stakeholders’ requests altogether.
2. Defence was coded when the police simply were obliged to
meet the demands of external stakeholders without any ques-
tion or if the police try to guard themselves against the de-
mand of stakeholders. Interviewees frequently indicated that
they can ’just try to meet the demands’ - for example, those
of judicial and governmental bodies. In other cases, the police
seek to convince external stakeholders that they are not capa-
ble of meeting their expectations in an attempt to convince
these stakeholders to lower these expectations.
3. Stakeholder management methods that involve more frequent
face-to-face contact with external parties and where stake-
holders are given some influence, but only on particular is-
sues, were classified as involvement strategies. Key words
here include task forces, meetings to discuss concrete issues,
consultation platforms, and programmes for information ex-
change.
4. Collaboration strategies involve frequent communication and
explicit cooperation with external stakeholders, where both
parties can affect each other. Examples are weekly meetings
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and frequent feedback contacts. Additionally, rules and regu-
lations that force a cooperative partnership upon the parties
by law were classified as a collaborative strategy.
For the purpose of our analysis, it is important to assume that
stakeholders are independent, i.e. the management by the police
of one stakeholder does not influence the management of another
stakeholder due to capacity constraints. On a project, for exam-
ple, where time and resources are limited, managers may have to
make decisions about which stakeholders to prioritise and may not
have the opportunity to execute the optimal management strategy
with each and every stakeholder. This means that ’fit’ with some
stakeholders can have spill over effects to cause ’misfits’ with other
stakeholders. We would like to argue that we may assume indepen-
dence of stakeholders in this case, as the police has plenty human
resources to tend to stakeholder management, and hence will be
less bothered by capacity constraints, at least in this respect. We
will return to this issue in the discussion.
Having coded both stakeholder types and management meth-
ods, we subsequently created a fit dummy, where 1 indicated a fit
(and 0 a misfit), in case of the following pairs, in line with Table 2.3:
(1) marginal stakeholder - monitoring method; (2) non-supportive
stakeholder - defence method; (3) supportive stakeholder - involve-
ment method; and (4) mixed-blessing stakeholder - collaboration
method. Table 2.5 shows a cross-tabulation of the frequencies of
all stakeholder type - management method combinations. Clearly,
the majority of external stakeholders are classified as supportive or
mixed-blessing. Monitoring occurs relatively infrequent compared
to other strategies.
The other two independent variables come directly from the
quantitative mini-survey through interviewees’ assessments of two
statements. These statements, too, had to be (dis)agreed upon by
means of a Likert scale ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 7
(completely agree). Whether the police actively managed the ex-
pectations of an external stakeholder was asked by means of the
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Table 2.5: Frequencies
statement: ’We actively manage the expectations of external party
x’. This provides the measure of Active management of expectations,
as is central to Hypothesis 2. Additionally, we asked respondents
to assess the statement: ’It is very difficult for us to meet the expec-
tations of external party x’. This gives our measure of Difficulty to
meet expectations, as related to Hypothesis 3.
Control variables
Because we ask individual officers to rate the performance of their
police force on the expectations of stakeholders, we include a num-
ber of demographic characteristics of respondents in our model to
control for variance caused by individual characteristics of respon-
dents. Depending on these demographics, respondents may have a
somewhat biased perception of how the force performs on the ex-
pectation of stakeholders. We may expect, for example, that police
officers in higher ranks are those who perform better (possibly on
stakeholders’ expectations as well), as this is why they have prob-
ably been promoted into these higher functions in the first place.
Furthermore, police officers with basic levels of education may not
perform as well as others, because policing is often argued to re-
quire intermediate or higher education. Moreover, Waldman and
Avolio (1986) document non-linear relationships between age and
tenure, on the one hand, and performance, on the other hand. Al-
ternatively, older police officers, or those with longer tenure, may
be better able to handle stakeholders because of their experience.
Indeed, generally, many prior studies suggest that demographic
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characteristics such as age, gender, education and tenure may have
an influence on outcomes such as performance, turnover, satisfac-
tion, selection and leadership (Blau, 1985; Parsons and Liden, 1984;
Steckler and Rosenthal, 1985). On top of this, Tsui and O’Reilly
(1989) report that employees who share similar demographic char-
acteristics are less prone to conflict and can more effectively work
together. This may imply that respondents with lower education
have more difficulty working with highly educated stakeholders,
such as public prosecutors. Likewise, operational officers may work
better with operational stakeholders, such as emergency services.
So, given all this, we control for the potential influence that de-
mographic characteristics may have on the perception of perfor-
mance by the respondents, both in the organisation and related to
the relationship between respondents and stakeholders. The demo-
graphic control variables that we include are Gender (1 = male and
0 = female), Age (in years), Education (0 = basic, 1 = intermediary,
and 2 = higher), Tenure (in years) and Job level (0 = operational, 1 =
supervisory, and 2 = strategic/top/senior).
Furthermore, we control for country effects by including coun-
try dummies. This is important for two reasons. First, Johnson et al.
(2008) state that culture can have an influence on stakeholder man-
agement practises. Second, the country where a respondent is from
may influence how he/she responds to questions (Fischer, 2004).
2.3.4 Analysis
With our cross-section data, we apply linear regression. We esti-
mate the standard errors using the Huber-White sandwich estima-
tors. Such robust standard errors can deal with a collection of mi-
nor concerns about failure to meet the standard OLS assumptions,
such as non-normality, heteroscedasticity, and few observations ex-
hibiting large residuals, leverage or influence (Chen et al., 2011).
We cannot guarantee independence of our observations, as respon-
dents often have provided information about multiple stakehold-
ers, hence generating multiple observations. Therefore, we cluster
the respondents to take this into account. We have used Stata 10 for
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all descriptive statistics and model estimations. We will estimate
the following equation:
Perceivedper f ormance(i, s) = α + β1Fit(i, s)
+ β2 Activemanagement(i, s) + β3Di f f icultytomanage(i, s)
+ Controls(i) + e
(With s being stakeholder and i respondent)
A final methodological remark is worthwhile making as to our
single-respondent design. Because all data are self-reported and
collected through the same questionnaire during the same period
of time with a cross-sectional research design, common-method
variance may cause systematic measurement error, further bias-
ing the estimates of the true relationship among theoretical con-
structs. This involves variance that is attributed to the measure-
ment method rather than the constructs of interest. Method vari-
ance can either inflate or deflate observed relationships between
constructs, thus leading to both Type I and Type II errors (Chang
et al., 2010a; Podsakoff et al., 2003). Harman’s one-factor test was
conducted on all questionnaire items to test the presence of a com-
mon-method effect. The result from the factor analysis is that the
survey questions load onto three factors with respective propor-
tions of variance of 25.55 per cent, 16.31 per cent and 12.15 per
cent. Hence, none of the factors is responsible for the majority of
the variance. From this, we can conclude that the data are unlikely
to suffer from a common-method bias.
Another argument why we believe that common-method vari-
ance is not an issue here follows from the nature of our key in-
dependent variable: fit. Respondents do give all the inputs for
the creation of a fit variable (influence, interests and management
strategy), but the actual measure of fit has been created by the au-
thors, not by the respondents. As the likelihood that respondents
are aware of the stakeholder management contingency theory un-
derlying this central variable is very low, we expect that artificial
correlation due to fact that respondents use an implicit theory that
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closely corresponds to the explicit contingency theory we try to test
here is very unlikely to emerge indeed (see Chang et al., 2010a).
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Stakeholders of European police forces
Below, we give a review of the stakeholder recognition by respon-
dents in the sample, to give a better idea of the stakeholder envi-
ronment before we continue with further analysis. For a more elab-
orate analysis of stakeholders in this sample we refer to van den
Born and van Witteloostuijn (2011). Overall, the stakeholders can
be categorised into five groups; governments (local, regional, na-
tional), citizens, other police forces, partner organisations and judi-
cial bodies.
It is not surprising that police forces mention governments as
a key stakeholder, as they are often trying to live up to the stan-
dards and priorities set by governments. In countries such as the
UK, the local government has formal authority over the police. In
the cases where the national government has formal authority, the
local influence can still be substantial. Both national and local gov-
ernments tend to have expectations such as executing their tasks in
a timely manner, sharing information and providing assistance in
cases of public events.
Citizens are stakeholders that expect safety, protection, problem-
solving interventions and quick response times. In some countries,
like the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, citizens increasingly
expect police officers to execute tasks that are not related to the core
of policing, such as social work. Some respondents indicate how-
ever that they also make good use of citizens for gathering infor-
mation for example. With the growing use of smartphones, there
is more photo and video footage to be gathered amongst citizens
than ever before.
Criminals and crime are becoming more complex. On the one
hand, we see trends in the areas of organised crime, terrorism and
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cybercrime. The open borders in Europe facilitate perpetrators to
spread their criminal activities across borders, which forces the po-
lice from different countries to work together. We, however, notice
that police forces find it very difficult to manage other forces, es-
pecially cross-country. When different forces collaborate, they ex-
pect good communication and information sharing, things which
are realised by (in)formal agreements. Cooperation is often shaped
in terms of joint task forces or integrated action teams. While by
nature police forces have a good understanding of policing, expec-
tations are often not met, possibly due to a lack of formal author-
ity or influence. Although the performance of the involved forces
could be increased by cooperation, the outside pressure is often not
quite high enough to trigger successful collaboration. On the other
hand, police forces have to deal with complex, multidisciplinary
problems, causing them to maintain good relations with partner
organisations. Large traffic accidents will need involvement of po-
lice, ambulances and fire brigades. Fighting domestic violence will
often need more than the judicial chain, like a network comple-
mented by social and healthcare partners. Though many respon-
dents recognise the needs and benefits of partner organisations,
they explain that it is often difficult to manage them because of
the difference in culture, the lack of formal authority and unpre-
dictability of expectations.
Judicial bodies as stakeholders are inherent to police work.
Without prosecutors and judges, it would be impossible for the
police to lock away criminals. They are often predictable in terms
of what they want from the police, and they have a good under-
standing of police work. Luckily this is the case, as they have a high
level of influence. Still, police find it sometimes difficult to meet de-
mands of judicial bodies. Prosecutors, for example, demand much
information, such as data and evidence to solve criminal cases. Tak-
ing a case to court with too little evidence is obviously making it
difficult to prosecute a suspect. Yet, sometimes the police believe
that their report is sufficient, but the prosecutor may not want to
go to court because losing a case is a risk for his/her own career. It
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is a classical clash that we stumbled upon throughout this research.
Different performance measures and rewards cause incentivised
behaviour in parties, which makes it unattractive (to some extent)
to collaborate, even though they should do so for the greater good.
Not surprisingly, depending on the police officer’s role and the
county, we have found different groups of stakeholders to get men-
tioned more or less frequently by respondents. Some police forces,
like the Romanian Border Police, deal mainly with the national
government, and local governments are not that relevant. In other
countries, like the UK, local governments are much more impor-
tant. Higher-ranked interviewees mostly refer to policy-related and
higher-level parties, whilst lower-ranked interviewees mostly refer
to external parties they encounter in their daily work. Again, we
refer to van den Born and van Witteloostuijn (2011) for more infor-
mation and comparisons across countries and levels.
2.4.2 Results from data analysis
Descriptive statistics of the focal variables and bivariate correlation
coefficients are reported in Table 2.6. As can be seen, Age corre-
lates highly with Tenure (0.88) and fairly high with Job level (0.44).
So, we decided not to include Age in the model, as this might po-
tentially disturb to the model’s estimates. Basically, the extremely
high correlation of age with tenure implies that, in our sample of
respondents, age and tenure are measures of a single underlying
construct. The reason for this is that police officers rarely change oc-
cupation, implying that their tenure quasi-perfectly correlates with
their age. Another observation that we can make is that intervie-
wees assess, on average, their performance on stakeholders’ expec-
tations as quite high. This may indicate that police professionals are
positively biased about their own organisation’s performance. As
the interviewees were not aware of the underlying model we test,
and as we have shown that our data do not suffer from common-
method bias, we assume that this is a systematic bias. Systematic
bias of performance does not pose a problem in the context of the
current study, as we try to explain differences in performance, and
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not absolute performance levels.
We created a cross-tabulation to visually inspect the data, as
presented in Table 2.7. On the one hand, a Fit between stakeholder
type and management method is, on average, associated with a
perception of higher performance on external party’s expectations.
On the other hand, a Misfit is not related with a perception of
low performance. A frequent mismatch is that of a mixed-blessing
stakeholder and a defensive strategy. For supportive stakeholders,
the misfit collaborative strategy is even recorded more often than
the fit involvement method.
Next, we estimate our model to test our set of three hypotheses.
Before we include Difficulty to manage expectations and Active man-
agement of expectations in the model, we have to make sure that they
do not differ greatly across the stakeholder types or management
methods, because this may indicate an underlying relation that will
bias our estimates. A one-way ANOVA (with Bonferroni post-hoc
test) reveals only a significant difference between supportive and
mixed-blessing stakeholders (for p < 0.05). If anything, we would
expect marginal and non-supportive stakeholders to be different
from their supportive and mixed blessing counterparts, as they are
not dependent on the police.
We can see from Tables 2.7 and 2.8 that a monitoring strategy,
which is supposedly the least active form of stakeholder manage-
ment, scores lower than other strategies on the Active management
of expectations variable. The ANOVA shows, however, that there is
only a significant difference between monitoring and involvement
(for p < 0.05), and not between any of the other strategies. Hence,
we can include both variables in the regression without concern for
associations with the management methods.
The control variables fail to contribute much: Job level has a
(marginally) significant positive coefficient. We may possibly con-






















































































































































































































































































Table 2.7: Performance on external party expectations - means and
frequencies (in brackets)
Table 2.8: Means
lems, and thus being more positive. Two of the country dummies
(Spain and the UK) are related to the perceived performance. The
Spanish police officers are somewhat more positive about perfor-
mance on expectations, while the UK officers are more negative
than respondents from other countries. The complete Model 3 gives
an adjusted R2 of 0.42, implying that 42 per cent of the variance in
the dependent variable can be explained by this full model. The R2
of Model 2 is slightly lower than that of Model 3, which indicates
again that the control variables do not contribute much to the ex-
planation of perceived performance on the expectations of external
stakeholders. An R2 of 0.42 indicates that other variables not in-
cluded in the model influence performance on the expectations of
stakeholders. However, this observation notwithstanding, we are
happy to find that our model does account for quite a large portion
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Table 2.9: Regression results
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Fit 0.48*** 0.51**
(-0.117) (-0.153)
Active management of expectations 0.49*** 0.45***
(-0.096) (-0.102)










3.Germany dummy -0.03 0.30
(-0.307) (-0.24)
4.Spain dummy 0.28 0.54*
(-0.255) (-0.208)
7.Macedonia dummy -0.12 -0.01
(-0.377) (-0.272)
8.Netherlands dummy -0.62 -0.16
(-0.409) (-0.372)
9.Romania dummy -0.31 -0.06
(-0.73) (-0.462)
10.UK dummy -0.94* -0.62∼
(-0.427) (-0.343)
Observations 312 374 312
R-squared 0.11 0.39 0.44
Adj. R-squared 0.08 0.39 0.42
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ∼ p<0.1
DV: Performance on the expectations of stakeholders
(intercept estimated, but not recorded in table)
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of the variance and, more importantly, that the independent vari-
ables are significantly related to the dependent variable. Moreover,
our set of independent variables - Difficulty to meet expectations, Ac-
tive Management of expectations, and Fit - generates an impressive
increase in the explained variance vis-à-vis the model with control
variables only: the R2 increases from a meagre 0.08 to 0.42 from the
controls-only Model 1 to the full Model 3, respectively.
2.4.3 Post-hoc analysis
We see a number of patterns in the data that we had a priori no
theoretical expectations for. We see that a misfit between the stake-
holder and the management method does not necessarily leave a
stakeholder unsatisfied. Table 2.7 shows that stakeholders can be
still quite satisfied when the police manages them ’wrongly’. An-
other observation from this table is that collaboration is the man-
agement method that has the highest average performance on the
expectations of stakeholders. Defence and involvement have some-
what lower average satisfaction rates, and monitoring the low-
est. Even though our literature (Savage et al., 1991; Scholes and
Johnson, 2001) does not assign certain levels of effort to different
management strategies, we may reasonably believe that coopera-
tion requires more effort than involvement, and involvement more
than monitoring. Defence could in principle vary much in terms
of effort, but given the satisfaction level we may choose to put it
between cooperation and involvement in this context. We would
like to test if delivering more effort to a stakeholder gives them
greater satisfaction, but that means we have to put some value
to the different management methods. We have inserted several
measures of ’effort’ into the regression, but found no significant
results, as Table 2.10 demonstrates. For example, we ranked the
management strategies between 1 and 4 (1 Monitoring, 2 Involve-
ment, 3 Defence, 4 Collaboration) and added these to the regres-
sion, but we could not confirm that ’more effort’ finds better out-
comes regarding expectation’s satisfaction. In another attempt, we
also ranked the stakeholders from 1 to 4 (1 Marginal, 2 Support-
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ive, 3 Non-supportive, 4 Mixed-blessing), and subtracted this from
the fit management methods, giving a high number when a stake-
holder that needs little effort gets a lot, and a low (negative) num-
ber when a high effort stakeholder receives very little. We will esti-
mate the following equations:
Perceivedper f ormance(i, s) = α + β1Fit(i, s)
+ β2 Activemanagement(i, s) + β3Di f f icultytomanage(i, s)
+ β4Managementmethodrank + Controls(i) + e
and
Perceivedper f ormance(i, s) = α + β1Fit(i, s)
+ β2 Activemanagement(i, s) + β3Di f f icultytomanage(i, s)
+ β4Managementrank− stakeholderrank + Controls(i) + e
(With s being stakeholder and i respondent)
Another issue that we want to pay attention to is the poten-
tial multiplicativity of our variables of interest. Although Scholes
and Johnson (2001) do not explicitly mention the interaction be-
tween different aspects of stakeholders and management methods,
we cannot exclude the possibility that they interact with each other.
The relation between fit and satisfaction may be altered by active
management or the difficulty to manage expectations. The positive
relation of active management with performance on expectations
may be reduced by (mis)fit or the difficulty of managing expecta-
tions. Finally, the relation between difficulty to manage expecta-
tions and performance of expectations may be influenced by fit or
active management. Hence we run several regressions after, includ-
ing the interaction effects between our three variables of interest.
We will estimate the following equation:
Perceivedper f ormance(i, s) = α + β1Fit(i, s)
+ β2 Activemanagement(i, s) + β3Di f f icultytomanage(i, s)
+ β4Fit(i, s) ∗ Activemanagement(i, s)
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Table 2.10: Regression results - post-hoc test of effort measures
VARIABLES Model 4 Model 5
Fit 0.48** 0.47**
(-0.158) (-0.155)
Active management of expectations 0.45*** 0.47***
(-0.103) (-0.1)
Difficulty to meet expectations -0.13** -0.12*
(-0.045) (-0.046)
Management method rank 0.05
(-0.073)










3.Germany dummy 0.3 0.31
(-0.238) (-0.235)
4.Spain dummy 0.54** 0.54**
(-0.203) (-0.201)
7.Macedonia dummy -0.01 -0.01
(-0.269) (-0.265)
8.Netherlands dummy -0.14 -0.15
(-0.368) (-0.366)
9.Romania dummy -0.07 -0.09
(-0.46) (-0.456)




Adj. R-squared 0.41 0.42
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ∼ p<0.1
DV: Performance on the expectations of stakeholders
(intercept estimated, but not recorded in table)
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+ β5Fit(i, s) ∗ Di f f icultytomanage(i, s)
+ β6 Activemanagement(i, s) ∗ Di f f icultytomanage(i, s)
+ Controls(i) + e
(With s being stakeholder and i respondent)
As is demonstrated in Table 2.11, we might indeed want to con-
sider an interaction between fit and active management, which has
a negative coefficient with marginal statistical significance. Rather
than strengthening one another, fit either reduces the strength of
the relation between active management and performance, or more
active management reduces the strength of the relation between fit
and performance.
2.5 Discussion
In this chapter, we investigated how the use of management strate-
gies with certain stakeholder types is associated with the police’s
perceived performance on stakeholders. We did this by means of
a study of external stakeholder management of fourteen European
police forces in seven countries, and by analysing how the fit be-
tween external stakeholder types and stakeholder management
strategies is associated with the perception of performance of these
police forces in terms of meeting these external stakeholders’ ex-
pectations.
Our results show a positive association between fit and percep-
tion of performance on stakeholder’s expectations. Moreover, our
findings suggest that good performance can fairly well be related
to just actively managing stakeholders, irrelevant of the nature of
the strategy. Our post-hoc analysis suggests that fit and active man-
agement may be supplementary. Furthermore, the study provides
evidence for the hypothesis that external stakeholders whose ex-
pectations are difficult to manage will also be more difficult to
please, ceteris paribus. This set of findings offers support for our
three hypotheses, and illustrates nicely the applicability of stake-
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Table 2.11: Regression results - interaction effects
VARIABLES Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Fit 0.51** 2.04* 0.67∼ 0.52*** 2.13*
(-0.15) (-0.91) (-0.35) (-0.15) (-0.96)
Active management of expectations 0.45*** 0.53*** 0.45*** 0.53* 0.59**
(-0.1) (-0.12) (-0.1) (-0.21) (-0.21)
Difficulty to meet expectations -0.13** -0.13** -0.11 0.00 -0.01
(-0.05) (-0.05) (-0.07) (-0.25) (-0.21)
Fit*Active management of expectations -0.28∼ -0.27∼
(-0.16) (-0.15)
Fit*Difficulty to manage expectations -0.05 -0.03
(-0.09) -(0.08)
Active management of expectations*
Difficulty to manage expectations -0.02 -0.02
(-0.04) (-0.04 )
Gender 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.05
(-0.15) (-0.15) (-0.15) (-0.15) (-0.15)
Tenure -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01)
Job level 0.18∼ 0.17 0.18∼ 0.18∼ 0.18
(-0.11) (-0.11) (-0.11) (-0.11) (-0.11)
Education 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.17
(-0.15) (-0.16) (-0.15) (-0.15) (-0.16)
3.Germany dummy 0.3 0.27 0.29 0.32 0.28
(-0.24) (-0.24) (-0.24) (-0.24) (-0.24)
4.Spain dummy 0.54* 0.53* 0.55* 0.56* 0.55*
(-0.21) (-0.23) (-0.21) (-0.22) (-0.24)
7.Macedonia dummy -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01
(-0.27) (-0.29) (-0.27) (-0.28) (-0.29)
8.Netherlands dummy -0.16 -0.23 -0.17 -0.11 -0.20
(-0.37) (-0.38) (-0.37) (-0.39) (-0.38)
9.Romania dummy -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03
(-0.46) (-0.44) (-0.45) (-0.43) (-0.42)
10.UK dummy -0.62∼ -0.69∼ -0.62∼ -0.62∼ -0.68∼
(-0.34) (-0.36) (-0.35) (-0.35) (-0.37)
Observations 312 312 312 312 312
R-squared 0.44 0.46 0.44 0.44 0.46
Adj. R-squared 0.42 0.43 0.41 0.42 0.43
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ∼ p<0.1
DV: Performance on the expectations of stakeholders
(intercept estimated, but not recorded in table)
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holder management contingency theory in the context of our four-
teen European police forces.
This chapter is not only interesting per se, producing insights
into the three hypotheses that were posed. Our findings reveal that
the police often do, by and large, not select the theoretically ap-
propriate management methods - i.e., the stakeholder management
strategies that imply a fit with the external stakeholder types. Our
categorisation implies that about half of the chosen methods are
misfits. Our means show that such a stakeholder strategy misfit of-
ten implies that the stakeholder will still be quite satisfied, but that
another management method would have led to even greater sat-
isfaction. Misfit is hence not associated with extreme disappoint-
ment on the behalf of stakeholders. We explored by means of post-
hoc testing, whether there was an ’effort’ argument responsible for
these findings. We tried to find out if there was effort related to
the different management methods such that stakeholders may al-
ways be more satisfied with certain management methods. We did
not find this to be the case.
We did not ask, however, how much effort the management of
a stakeholder took, such that we can, based on theory and post-hoc
testing, only make an educated guess. We see in the data that the
police often collaborates with supportive stakeholders, but we can-
not argue that this is overinvestment, or that an involvement strat-
egy would be more efficient. We do not fully want to exclude the
possibility that some particular strategies may involve more or less
effort, and depending on the number of stakeholders in a certain
category, a particular strategy may be more desirable. For example,
it is easier to maintain close contacts with one public prosecutor
than with all the schools in a region. This again emphasises the
desirability of a flexible approach to stakeholders by the police at
different levels of the organisation. Most likely, not all schools need
to be tended to, but community officers may indicate which schools
are more prone to judicial problems with students.
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. We have
created a multivariate model of fit that adds to the empirical fit lit-
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erature, which is relatively scarce compared to the theoretical work
done in this field. Furthermore, this study goes a step beyond the
work of Savage et al. (1991) and Frooman (1999) by empirically test-
ing the stakeholder contingency theories on an extensive quantita-
tive dataset, rather than only further developing the theory or pre-
senting a few case studies. Also, we empirically study an important
public organisation: police forces.
2.5.1 Limitations and future research
This study is not without limitations. We find in the data that the
majority of the stakeholders in this study are mixed-blessing stake-
holders, who should be collaborated with. Respondents have been
asked to name key stakeholders, which might make them prone
to mention stakeholders with high influence/authority and clear
interests. There might be more stakeholders of other types in the
policing environment that are under-represented in the answers of
interviewees. We would still like to argue, however, that collabora-
tion is an important management strategy, as it is one that should
be employed with stakeholders that are considered to be ’key’ by
interviewees. Collaboration is a form of stakeholder management
that could not only lead to satisfied stakeholders, but possibly also
to better performance for both parties on specific issues, if con-
ducted correctly. In Chapters 3 and 4 we will dig deeper into the
optimisation of collaboration between the police and other public
organisations.
Another challenge is to measure and analyse performance on
stakeholder’s expectations which is difficult for an organisation
where the interests of stakeholders are so diverse. Within the time
constraints in the COMPOSITE interviews, unfortunately, the only
option was to include our subjective performance assessment item
and to ask police officers to give their evaluation. To ask insiders
about their performance is not uncontroversial, as this may be as-
sociated with systematic biases. Yet we feel that our self-perceived
measure of performance is appropriate for a first enquiry in our
context for three reasons. First, subjective performance measures
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are commonly used in general management research, as objective
performance data are often difficult to obtain (Dess and Robin-
son, 1984). Second, we had 25 interviews available with external
stakeholders, which we used to test for significant differences be-
tween the performance perception of external stakeholders and po-
lice professionals. Although the t-test indicates that the difference is
not significant, we observe that, interestingly enough, if anything,
the external stakeholders are more positive about the performance
of the police than the police interviewees. Third, only variance mat-
ters in the current study, and not absolute values. A systematic
positive bias in the perception of police interviewees would not
be harmful, as we still find variance that can be explained by our
independent variables. We are however not sure whether each re-
spondent has the same bias, and thus have to be careful with the
interpretation of the coefficients; these may be biased. A measure
of the performance on stakeholder satisfaction would be improved
by asking at least also the stakeholders what they think. It might
be of help if interests are specific to ask satisfaction questions re-
lated to different aspects of their specific interest. Suppose that a
stakeholder wants information from the police, questions could be
asked in relation to the extent, manner and the speed in which in-
formation is transferred.
We have assumed the independence of stakeholders, and ex-
plained why we trust this to be a reasonable assumption for this
study. Because the police is a large organisation, consisting mainly
of human resources, we believe it to suffer much less from bind-
ing constraints regarding stakeholder management than a ’regular’
organisation. The reasoning stakeholder management is a natural
part of much police work anyway. We cannot, however, guarantee
that this always happens. The police is still a hierarchical organisa-
tion; despite the autonomy of police officers, they might not always
be able themselves to extract the necessary resources for all their
stakeholder management activities, causing capacity constraints at
the lower level. We would expect this to be an exception however,
and the occurrence would be random rather than predictable.
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There are also some research design issues that must be touched
upon. Our findings were not based on randomised trials. Rather,
we studied the relations between stakeholders and police (officers)
as they exist (or are perceived) in real life. This means that we may
not have observed all variables that may have an effect on per-
ceived performance, such that results may be subject to over- or un-
derestimation due to, for example, an omitted variable, or an omit-
ted fixed effect bias. The nature of the bias on the included indepen-
dent variables depends on the nature of the correlation between the
dependent and the unobserved variable and the independent and
the unobserved variables. If these unobserved variables are either
positively or negatively correlated with both the independent and
the dependent variable, then the coefficient we have estimated in
the study may be overestimated. If the unobserved variables corre-
lates positively with the independent variable, but negatively with
the dependent variable (or vice versa), then the effect will likely be
underestimated.
One issue that we have not taken into account, for example,
is the history that the police has with the stakeholder. We do not
know how long the police has been managing a specific stake-
holder and/or whether or not they have a pleasant relation with
the stakeholder. These will be aspects that may be positively re-
lated with fit, as over time the police might learn how to react to
a stakeholder in a satisfactory manner. If the police and the stake-
holder have a good relation, they might manage the stakeholder
more actively. As it may also be positively associated with per-
ceived performance of stakeholders, possibly the associations be-
tween fit and/or active management with perceived performance
are overestimated. The association between difficulty to manage
stakeholders and performance may then be underestimated, be-
cause the difficulty to manage stakeholders should reduce as the
police and the stakeholder have a longer or warmer bond (nega-
tive correlation), while the relation with perceived performance is
positive.
All in all, we believe that the findings of this exploratory study
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have suggested a potential use of contingent stakeholder manage-
ment and we would encourage future research to explore this mat-
ter further, with a stronger research design in order to better judge
the underlying causalities.
2.5.2 Policy implications
Beyond the theoretical contribution, this study can provide prac-
tical insights to police officers at different job levels. Even though
they all have to deal with external stakeholders in the context of
their own function, the main findings from this study, we believe,
can be generalised across functions. Management strategies that fit
with stakeholder types are associated with better performance on
the stakeholders’ expectations. Although we have to be very care-
ful about making implications about causality, theory and logic
suggest that fit will rather influence perceived performance than
the other way around. A different research design is necessary to
draw implications about causality from a statistical perspective. A
policy or management implication on the use of ’fit’ to design man-
agement strategies in line with stakeholder types to enhance stake-
holder satisfaction hinges on both the causality and the appropri-







We may have all come on different ships, but we’re in the same
boat now.†
Abstract
This chapter investigates which team member characteristics contribute
to perceived cooperation and performance of Public Interdisciplinary In-
terorganisational (PII) teams. We use self-reported data from profession-
als working in Dutch so-called Safety Houses to uncover the relationship
between team member characteristics, interdisciplinary cooperation and
perceived team performance. We find team member extraversion to be
positively related to cooperation. Perceived resistance from the partner
organisation is negatively associated with cooperation. Perhaps most in-
teresting is our finding that professional autonomy of team members is
positively related to cooperation, but negatively to performance, possibly
suggesting an optimal balance of autonomy.
∗This chapter is the result of joint work with Arjen van Witteloostuijn and Arjan
van den Born




As was pointed out in Chapter 2, key stakeholders to the police
are often mixed-blessing stakeholders, with whom collaboration is
the strategy associated with the greatest satisfaction of the stake-
holder. In the modern world, organisations recognise that coopera-
tion in different forms can also assist them in performing better on
issues that go beyond their core business, (legal) responsibilities or
capabilities. Increasingly, networks of stakeholders begin to arise
and stabilise around certain issues in the public sector, like crime,
homelessness and healthcare (Provan and Kenis, 2008). Based on
the findings of Chapter 2, one may wonder whether network col-
laboration of this kind is even a desirable strategy. This would only
be the case if the stakeholders are of a mixed-blessing nature. For
this to be the case, stakeholders need to have interest and influ-
ence. We would like to argue that this is the case here. Logically, if
the stakeholder did not have interest in the issue, it would not get
involved in the network. The level of influence of stakeholders in
an issue-based network will vary, but has to be present at least to a
reasonable extent, because a stakeholder with low influence is un-
likely to stay in a network where it gets left behind by stakeholders
who decide to collaborate (Roloff, 2008).
Networks in health care are the prime example used in the sci-
entific literature on public sector collaborations (e.g. Provan and
Milward, 1995; Provan and Sebastian, 1998; Vollenberg et al., 2007).
Public networks are usually formed around a certain issue where
multiple stakeholders (such as nurses, specialists, general practi-
tioners and pharmacists) need to be involved to give optimal care
to patients like those in palliative care or patients who have had
a stroke (Kramer et al., 2013). In the study of such networks, the
theoretical basis is commonly network theory, and the relations
amongst the stakeholders are the focus in determining how net-
works form, how they should be governed, how ties are used, how
committed stakeholders are, etcetera.
Network theory or network analysis tries to predict behaviour
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of individuals, groups or organisations given their social structure,
and is useful in a broad array of fields. It may just as well explain
who needs to take the lead in a group of people as well as in a net-
work of organisations. Because it says more about the characteris-
tics of relations between stakeholders, the attributes of stakehold-
ers themselves generally receive less attention. We would like to ar-
gue that, for the police, the characteristics of stakeholders will com-
monly be very important when they form an issue around a net-
work. This is because the police will often have to work with stake-
holders from other disciplines, and not surprisingly so. The num-
ber of organisations in law enforcement and order maintenance
tends to be limited, so that a lot of stakeholders will not have this
core business. Yet, many issues that the police has a stake in are not
exclusively judicial (anymore). For example, the common repeat of-
fender who is often addicted, spiralling in criminal networks, and
sometimes without a home or identification, is unlikely to alter his
behaviour by the repressive capabilities of judicial organisations
alone. Forming and working in a network with organisations from
other disciplines may have different implications than working in
a mono-disciplinary network; beyond the relationships, the char-
acteristics of the stakeholders matter.
Because most of the focus has been on the network and rela-
tional aspects of public sector collaborations, in Chapter 3 and 4
we rather seek to deepen our understanding of the characteris-
tics of stakeholders in relation to perceived performance of inter-
disciplinary interorganisational efforts involving the police. Net-
work theory has proven to be an interesting basis for exploring
the the functioning of public networks, but the main theoretical fo-
cus here will be on the literature on interdisciplinary cooperation
(Bronstein, 2003), which argues that the characteristics of organi-
sations and individuals in networks influence the (perceived) suc-
cess of interdisciplinary collaboration. We do however not want to
ignore all the knowledge on network performance, and there are
thus some organisational-network issues that we incorporate the
most prominent one being, as we will see in Chapter 4, the gover-
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nance structure of the network. Depending on the size, trust and
centrality of partners in the network, the mode of governance may
vary. The networks studied in Chapters 3 and 4 are governed by
an Network Administrative Organisation (NAO), which is an in-
dependent body whose purpose is to govern without intervening
in the content. This is the optimal governance mode for networks
with many participants, where trust is low, and where no one has
great centrality, which we expect to occur frequently is these types
of networks, as we will explain.
The literature on interdisciplinary cooperation focuses more
commonly the characteristics of individuals, because, on the one
hand, at operational level it are the individuals who cooperate
(Bronstein, 2003), and, on the other hand, studies on interdisci-
plinary collaboration between organisations are very scarce. Most
of the studies look at interdisciplinary collaboration within one or-
ganisation, for example, nurses and physicians collaborating, or
professors from different departments at a university working to-
gether (exeptions are Abram et al., 2005; Bronstein and Wright,
2007; Cole and Logan, 2008; Maschi and Killian, 2011). When study-
ing interdisciplinary collaboration within one organisation, a lack
of variance in the organisational characteristics does not make this
a highly interesting variable. Smith and Mogro-Wilson (2007) also
show that most of the variation in collaborative practice is at the
individual level, indicative of the importance of studying this topic
at this level, rather than the organisational one.
What it then essentially comes down to in most studies is that
scholars look at the characteristics of a number of individuals work-
ing in an interdependent fashion toward a common and meaning-
ful goal, and that is exactly as how we could define a team (Morgan
et al., 1986). This is why we rather describe the operational aspects
of collaboration as working in a team, then simply framing it as a
stakeholder management strategy as would be in line with Chapter
2. Indeed, it is a management strategy, but not one solely executed
by the police. Collaboration is a mutual effort, which needs inputs
from all those involved to be satisfactory. Clearly, taking this ap-
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proach invites us to take on board literature from the stream of
teamwork studies.
The literature on team behaviour and team performance is very
large, and still growing rapidly. But to determine what exactly de-
fines a team is not so straightforward. With a definition as broad as
that of Morgan et al. (1986), which we have used above, we have to
be cautious not to apply the empirical findings about specific kind
of teams across the literature to every type of team. A taxonomy
of teams is needed to understand the relationship between team
behaviour, on the one hand, and team performance, on the other
hand, and to assess what findings apply to which kind of teams.
The most commonly studied type of team is probably a group with
members (a) sharing a common background that (b) work together
for a lengthy period (c) within the boundaries of the same organisa-
tion (Beaubien and Baker, 2004), (d) toward the same goal, and (e)
under guidance of a team leader of some sort. These are the teams
that we commonly encounter in both the public and the private
sector, such as a squad of firemen or a department of accountants.
With increasing cooperation between and within organisations,
the literature becomes more diverse. For instance, studies may fo-
cus on temporary project management teams that work together
for a short spell of time, both within an organisation (intra-organisa-
tional) (Pinto et al., 1993) and between organisations (inter-organisa-
tional) (Leufkens and Noorderhaven, 2011). Other work has been
done on joint ventures, where inter-organisational cooperation is
established to strive for a shared goal, whilst the involved organi-
sations try to protect their own interests (Cyr and Schneider, 1996;
Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005). In this tradition, special attention
has been paid to cross-cultural joint venture teams (Beamish and
Delios, 1997). Similarly, as we described earlier, other studies deal
with inter-organisational networks within the same discipline or
sector, such as healthcare networks (Vollenberg et al., 2007). But
there are also studies of interdisciplinary teams in the same organ-
isation, such as hospices and schools (Bordons et al., 1999; Reese
and Sontag, 2001). Academics have studied public-private partner-
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ships (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004; Roggencamp, 1999; Schaeffer and
Loveridge, 2002), teams with complex vis-à-vis simple tasks (Higgs
et al., 2005; Pepinsky et al., 1960), and virtual teams that involve
members who do not meet physically very often, or not at all (Gib-
son and Cohen, 2003; Warkentin et al., 1997).
However, to the best of our knowledge, still limited research
has been directed at the teams that work in interdisciplinary net-
works in the public sector: the Public Interdisciplinary Inter-organi-
sational team (PII team, in short). In such teams, professional mem-
bers from different public home organisations collaborate on joint
tasks. We define the ’home organisation’ in this context as the focal
organisation for the professional: The organisation that pays the
professional’s salary, and where the professional executes her or
his primary tasks. We use the term ’partner organisations’ to refer
to organisations that are represented in the PII team, but which are
not focal to the professional member involved. We argue that PII
teams are a special kind of teams, struggling with three kinds of
difficulties that make them especially hard to work in:
• due to their public character, PII teams can measure outputs,
but it is difficult to measure how output of a PII team is re-
lated to performance (or outcomes), and are hence it is often
uncertain if their cooperation is actually worth the effort.
• as a result of the interdisciplinary composition, PII teams typ-
ically have members with different professional backgrounds,
not speaking each other’s language, and having different
agendas and/or performance measures.
• given their inter-organisational nature, PII team members
may have to fight for mandate with and within their home
organisation, to have the discretion to operate within the PII
team with an open eye for both the team’s and their home
organisation’s interests.
PII teams are, despite their inherent difficulties, useful and up-
coming (Provan and Kenis, 2008). Police forces are likely to be(come)
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part of cooperation efforts between judicial, welfare and/or health-
care partners, because punishment, healthcare and rehabilitation
often have to be combined into a coordinated mix in order to help
individuals with complex profiles, involving criminal, health and
social issues. Yet in other areas, the need for such PII teams is on the
rise, too. Especially in areas with so-called wicked problems (van
Bueren et al., 2003), where private organisations will not step in, a
PII team is often the only option to tackle the issues involved. The
potential domain of PII teams stretches far beyond the public man-
agement of policing, healthcare and social support, but includes
the wider issues of environment, traffic, safety, health regulations,
et cetera. Given the growing importance of complex and wicked
problems, the study of these PII teams is important to find out what
characteristics (members of) PII teams are associated with better
cooperation. Specifically, in this chapter, we explore the question;
How are the characteristics of individuals working in a public inter-
disciplinary interorganisational team associated with how these individu-
als perceive their collaboration and team performance?
Here we look specifically at the personal and professional char-
acteristics of individuals and the structural characteristics provided
to individuals by their home organisation.
This chapter’s contribution to the literature is at least fourfold.
First of all, little is known about PII teams, as yet. While the lit-
erature on interdisciplinary cooperation is plentiful in the field of
social work, education, hospices and hospitals (Oliver and Peck,
2006), by far the majority of these studies relate to interdisciplinary
teams within a single organisation. Some work has been done on
police-probation partnerships (e.g. Corbett et al., 1996) and there
are also a number of case studies on collaboration in a network
of police, social work and healthcare organisations (Abram et al.,
2005; Bronstein and Wright, 2007; Cole and Logan, 2008; Maschi
and Killian, 2011), but the current study looks at individuals that
come from an even larger and broader range of public organisa-
tions. Second, in this chapter, we link team member characteristics
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to both cooperation and performance. Although Bronstein’s (2003)
model of interdisciplinary cooperation has been tested empirically
before (Parker-Oliver et al., 2005), we contribute to this prior work
by adding a measure of performance satisfaction to the analysis,
next to the perceived collaboration. This is in line with the nor-
mative stakeholder theory that centralises the satisfaction of stake-
holders, as satisfaction of stakeholders is necessary for maintaining
relations with stakeholders over time. Third, we adapt the Bron-
stein (2003) model to be in line with other literatures on teams,
and especially the unique features of PII teams, by focusing on a
specific set of team member characteristics. Fourth, we empirically




Andrews (1990) defines interdisciplinary cooperation as occurring
"when different professionals, possessing unique knowledge, skills,
organisational perspectives, and personal attributes, engage in co-
ordinated problem solving for a common purpose" (p. 175). It is the
definition that Berg-Weger and Schneider (1998) use as well, but
Bronstein (2003) prefers to adopt the somewhat different approach
of Bruner (1991). Bruner (1991) puts more emphasis on the idea that
interdisciplinary cooperation allows for the achievement of goals
that individual professionals could not reach by themselves. Al-
though we will also use the latter definition in this chapter, much
more has been written about what interdisciplinary cooperation
truly entails. For conceptual work on this topic, we would like to
refer to D’Amour et al. (2005), as an extensive discussion is not
needed in the context of what we do here. Interdisciplinary coop-
eration is a broad term, being associated with a number of specific
aspects. In this chapter, we will focus on the five aspects identified
by Bronstein (2003): (1) interdependence; (2) newly created pro-
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fessional activities; (3) flexibility; (4) collective ownership of goals;
and (5) reflection on process. Each of these five aspects has been
subject to earlier research on teamwork. We explain them below in
line with Bronstein’s (2003) definitions.
Interdependence refers to the reliance of professionals on each
other (and interactions with each other) to accomplish their goals
or tasks. Professionals must have a good understanding of their
own roles and those of other professionals to achieve better coop-
eration (Scott, 1997; Waterhouse and Carnie, 1991). Characteristics
of such interdependence include (in)formal time spend with each
other and appreciation of one another’s inputs and opinions. Team
participants must be under the impression that they have more to
gain than to loose from cooperating and communicating with col-
leagues (Mattessich and Monsey, 1992). Carving out professional
territories and distributing responsibilities are hence two of the
major challenges facing interdisciplinary practice (D’Amour et al.,
2005). Interdisciplinary teams have to be aware of the danger of
turf wars that may be lingering under the surface (Hudson, 2002).
Newly created professional activities are those activities created
by the work of interdisciplinary cooperation that could not have
been achieved by individual professionals alone (Mattessich and
Monsey, 1992). These activities are often realised in practice, within
the boundaries of an organisation within which professionals face
interdisciplinary challenges. Examples are primary and secondary
schools, where teachers work together with social workers to help
pupils or students. Other examples are hospitals, in which medical
and social staff members join forces in creating a variety of novel
activities for patients and their families.
Flexibility goes beyond interdependence, and relates to behav-
iour allowing productive compromises in the face of disagreement.
Different professional roles are likely to bring about disagreement
as to what is the best way to solve a problem or help a client
(Billups, 1987). There might be cases where one approach can be
argued to be better than the others, and that there is no need for
compromise. However, the interdisciplinary nature of the client,
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case or issue usually provokes some sort of coordinated joint ef-
fort. If the approach of one organisation would have been suffi-
cient, it would have been tackled by that organisation; the issue
would not be discussed in the PII team. In order for a compromise
to be productive, all professionals involved must be able to reduce
or drop their demands when the argument of another professional
is stronger. Interdisciplinary teams that create intervention strate-
gies for clients tend to work on an ad hoc basis, and are frequently
under pressure to weigh each other’s arguments to achieve the
best outcome for their clients. In such circumstances, flexibility in
search for compromises is a must. Interdependence requires pro-
fessionals to know their own roles, while flexibility asks for blur-
ring roles. This seems contradictory; however, professionals should
know what their role is, in order to understand that working with
others is necessary. Once collaboration is initiated, they need to be
able to blur roles so that, for example, a police officer can take a
more social or healthcare oriented approach to a case. In practise,
it is difficult to separate interdependence from flexibility (Mellin
et al., 2010).
Collective ownership of goals has to do with the shared respon-
sibility that professionals have in the entire process of goal achieve-
ment. This stretches from joint discussion and decision-making, to
professionals individually carrying out promises that they have
made to the team. Participants from different organisations need
to consider the overall mission of the team, and how much they
are willing to give in on their individual position to achieve these
overall goals (Murphy, 2008). For instance, Mattessich and Monsey
(1992) and Wildridge et al. (2004) have found that successful co-
operative efforts imply realistic goals and a shared vision, aspects
which are implied by collective ownership. Lack of shared goals
and overambitious aims are identified as barriers to cooperation
(Alper et al., 1998; Sloper, 2004).
Finally, reflection on process relates to the awareness profes-
sionals have of what does and what does not work well in the
process of collaboration. Rather than ’just’ cooperating, they have
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to recognise that they are taking part in processes that may have to
be optimised. They need to consider the strategies to achieve their
overall mission as a team (Murphy and Lutze, 2009). To do so, pro-
fessionals must discuss their working relationships, and use feed-
back to make their cooperative processes more effective and/or
more efficient. Billups (1987) adds that organising periodic feed-
back meetings may be useful.
In her work, Bronstein (2003) describes a number of important
inputs for successful interdisciplinary cooperation, although she
does not provide a clear linkage between the factors that influence
interdisciplinary collaboration and the elements of collaboration as
we outlined them above. They are grouped into four categories: (1)
personal characteristics; (2) professional role; (3) history of coop-
eration; and (4) structural characteristics. From each of these cate-
gories, we have decided to include one exemplary variable in our
exploratory study design. Including a larger number of variables
would result in a model that cannot be sensibly estimated with a
relatively small sample, especially with high correlations amongst
variables. Keeping the number of variables small has the advantage
that the analysis will be tractable and parsimonious. We could have
decided to only focus on one of the categories, but this would then
have been an important limitation of our study. Rather, we prefer
to explore a relatively comprehensive model, taking into account
several aspects of the theory of Bronstein (2003). Making these se-
lective choices may seem like an exercise in ’cherry-picking’, but,
first of all, all variables that have been chosen have at least been
suggested by Bronstein (2003) to be relevant. This list of variables
has been narrowed down further, and we will argue below that we
have based the choice of our variables on the extant (team) litera-
ture or, where no such literature was available, on theoretical argu-
ments as to why we expect the involved variable to be influential.
Firstly, personal characteristics have been studied very broadly
in the teamwork literature. How team members view one another
outside their professional role is indicative for mutual trust, un-
derstanding and respect fostered between individual team mem-
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bers or in the team as a whole. This composition of personalities
is also what Bronstein (2003) indicates to be an important factor
for interdisciplinary cooperation. In the team literature especially
the so-called Big Five personality traits are frequently researched
individual-level attributes. Here, we will focus on extraversion1 as
a key Big Five personality trait. Generally, extraversion is seen as a
desirable trait for professionals, as extravert team members are so-
ciable, talkative and assertive (O’Neill and Allen, 2011). This trait
has been shown to be important in teams, although it is usually not
preferable to have a team with only extravert members, as this may
lead to unnecessary discussions and quarrels because team mem-
bers all want to be heard and all are leadership-oriented (Barry and
Stewart, 1997). In PII teams, we argue that it benefits the team if all
members are extravert, more so than any other personality trait, as
in this setting members should express their opinion from the per-
spective of their own discipline and home organisation to come to
an optimal solution for their cases. A team member failing to struc-
turally contribute to the discussion, and to the process of problem-
solving and decision-making, may not be perceived as cooperative.
Moreover, not having the perspective from all disciplines and/or
organisations on the table may lead to sub-optimal solutions. We
would like to emphasise here that, ceteris paribus, any additional ex-
traversion is good for the cooperation. The more extravert a team
member is, the more open he/she will be to discuss options for in-
terventions that are available for ’case’ (such as a repeat offender),
and the more likely a team member will be to have an open dis-
cussion about what is best for the case. By increasing extraversion,
team members will be able to get closer to a productive compro-
mise and hence improve on interdisciplinary cooperation.
Hypothesis 1. Extraversion of a team member is positively associated
with perceived PII team cooperation.
1Initially we also tested for associations between other personality traits and col-
laboration, but did not find them to be of statistical significance, and thus for the
reason of parsimony removed them from the model.
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Secondly, the professional role entails, in part, that individu-
als hold strong ethical and other values related to their profession.
For example, interdisciplinary cooperation requires strong profes-
sional identity to be successful (Billups, 1987; Corbett, 1998), yet
without undermining the understanding toward other professional
cultures (Reich and Reich, 2006; Sloper, 2004; Webb and Vulliamy,
2001). The professional role can also involve practical characteris-
tics, such as experience, as inexperienced staff hampers coopera-
tion (Sloper, 2004). We adopt professional autonomy in our design,
which we define as the freedom that professionals have to make in-
dependent judgements over their work (Bayles, 1981). This specific
variable has been mentioned by many researchers in the field to
be a great facilitator for interdisciplinary cooperation (Baird, 2012;
Botterill and de la Harpe, 2010; McLean, 2007; Mellin et al., 2010;
Wittenberg-Lyles et al., 2008; Wittenberg-Lyles and Oliver, 2007).
Also, it has been empirically studied before in an interdisciplinary
context (Rafferty et al., 2001). Rafferty et al. (2001) examines the
professional autonomy of nurses in hospitals, suggesting positive
synergy between professional autonomy and interdisciplinary co-
operation. Not only has it been tested before, we would also like to
argue that professional autonomy, either partially captures or will
strongly be related to a number of other professional characteris-
tics. Individuals must have knowledge and experience for their or-
ganisation to allow them to make independent decisions.
While professional autonomy is unlikely to play a major role in
an ’ordinary’ team, it may have substantial benefits in PII teams in
which professionals execute their PII tasks away from their home
organisations, and hence have to make autonomous decisions in
their role of representatives of their home organisation and col-
leagues. Professionals who are not used to autonomy may find this
difficult.
Hypothesis 2. The professional autonomy of a team member is positively
related to perceived PII team cooperation.
Thirdly, structural characteristics attribute to successful inter-
disciplinary cooperation. Professionals doing PII teamwork must
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have the time and freedom to do so effectively. In terms of time,
their caseload has to be manageable (Murphy, 2008), and the time
relieved from their primary tasks to meet and work with other pro-
fessionals should be sufficient. In terms of freedom, they need to
have a mandate from their home organisation (Sloper, 2004), as
well as sufficient organisational and administrative support (Bron-
stein, 2003). In Chapter 4, we will study the administrative support
further, as well as the time and space professionals have to col-
laborate. Here we will focus on organisational support, because,
even though it is not a characteristic of the team member, this is
the home environment offered to the team member. Professionals
should not be counteracted by their home organisation at any level
(be it strategic, supervisory, or colleagues) when they make and
execute agreements reached within the PII team. After all, profes-
sionals in PII teams tend to be dependent on colleagues in their
home organisation to execute these agreements. Resistance from
the home organisation will certainly hinder cooperation, as profes-
sionals can then not productively contribute to the PII team.
Professionals experiencing resistance from their home organisa-
tion at any level will either not participate actively in the PII team,
or will make promises to the PII team that cannot be kept. The
structural characteristics of the collaboration may be of more im-
portance for PII teams than for regular teams. A non-interdisciplina-
ry team tends to operate under the same management, which im-
plies that all members face the same structural characteristics. Pro-
fessionals from different disciplines are more likely to fall under
different managers, or even under different organisations, making
it more difficult to have good structural facilities in place for all of
them. This may be very detrimental to the team’s collective perfor-
mance, as every professional in the PII team is needed to achieve
the optimal solution. In contrast, we would expect that profession-
als who are allowed to make decisions independently struggle less
with issues of resistance at their home base.
Hypothesis 3. Experienced resistance in a team member’s home organi-
sation is negatively related to perceived PII team cooperation.
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Fourthly, the history of cooperation refers to experience in in-
terdisciplinary work, and is perceived by Bronstein (2003) to be
related to successful interdisciplinary cooperation. Mattessich and
Monsey (1992) also report that, in many studies, this is found to be
a factor of success. Professionals with more experience in interdis-
ciplinary work may be better trained in those areas that make them
successful in cooperating. They may, for instance, have experience
with weighing the opinions of others to come to a high-quality de-
cision. Moreover, a selection effect may imply that persons not en-
joying interdisciplinary cooperation may try to avoid such collab-
oration as much as possible, while the opposite may hold true for
those who enjoy this kind of activity. Weiss (1987) provides anec-
dotal evidence that professionals may stay committed to a cooper-
ative effort, because they believe in the concept, even if they could
run programmes on their own. We look here at cooperation history
of the individual. The more meetings an individual has been part
of, the higher the level of (perceived) cooperation will be. This is
because the individual with more collaboration history will have
more experience in working in the PII team, which is related to the
performance of (perceived) collaboration.
Hypothesis 4. The cooperation history of a team member is positively
associated with perceived PII team cooperation.
Bronstein’s (2003) model for interdisciplinary cooperation does
not incorporate the impact of interdisciplinary cooperation on team
performance. However, other team studies have included output
effects (Curci, 2011) - quite a few after developing their own mea-
sures of interdisciplinary cooperation and output. Successful co-
operation in interdisciplinary teams can have positive effects for
individuals participating in such teams. Hudson (2002) proposes
that effective interprofessional work can lead to more effective ser-
vice delivery and user outcomes, but cannot substantiate this hy-
pothesis with data. But indeed, empirical research shows that bet-
ter interdisciplinary cooperation is associated with, for example,
higher-quality care for cardiac patients (de Leval et al., 2000) and
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increased quality of care for hospice patients (Parker-Oliver et al.,
2005). Specifically, Kim et al. (2010) found that police officers tend
to see their partnerships with adult probation agencies as making
substantial contributions to the reduction of crime when they co-
operate well. Murphy (2008) refers to further empirical studies on
police-probation partnerships that offer proof that this can well be
related to successes. Sloper (2004) provides a review of studies that
look at outcomes of interdisciplinary work, reporting positive ev-
idence, too. The literature suggests that good interdisciplinary co-
operation is positively associated with performance or perceived
performance. If we continue along the line of the argument regard-
ing the theory and findings of Chapter 2, we would expect the bet-
ter the management strategy (collaboration in this case) may be
related to higher satisfaction on the performance on expectations,
here, that is a well-performing PII team.
Hypothesis 5. PII cooperation is positively related to satisfaction with
PII team performance.
Additionally, we argue that extraversion and professional au-
tonomy may have a direct relation with the satisfaction on PII team
performance, as prior work suggests that these variables have a
positive relationship with a range of team-related performance
measures. Extraversion is expected to be important for job per-
formance in the case of tasks that require frequent cooperation
or interaction with others (Barrick and Mount, 1991). Extraverts
should be more at ease with communicating PII agreements back
to their colleagues in their home organisation. Similarly, Rafferty
et al. (2001) show that autonomy is positively correlated with per-
ceptions of higher quality of care delivered. Having professionals
directly involved with decision-making does not only facilitate co-
operation, but also makes the actual outcomes better, as the cumu-
lative knowledge is maximised to come to an optimal solution.
Hypothesis 6. Extraversion has a positive direct relation with satisfac-
tion with PII team performance.
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Hypothesis 7. Professional autonomy has a positive direct relation sat-
isfaction with PII team performance.
Because we expect direct effects of extraversion and autonomy
on PII performance, we will control for the associated interaction
effects: That is, extraversion and autonomy may positively moder-
ate (i.e., affect the strength and direction of) the relation between PII
cooperation and team performance. We propose that having more
extraversion or autonomy in a PII team will benefit the relation be-
tween cooperation and performance. A PII team that cooperates
well and that has team members who are predominantly extravert
or autonomous will be associated more with higher performance
than a team with likewise good cooperation, but more introvert
and non-autonomous professionals.
Hypothesis 8. Extraversion positively moderates the relation between
perceived PII cooperation and satisfaction with PII team performance.
Hypothesis 9. Professional autonomy positively moderates the relation
between perceived PII cooperation and satisfaction with PII team perfor-
mance.
Our choice to assume that only extraversion and professional
autonomy will have a direct effect on PII team performance, rather
than all four variables, follows from what is known from prior
empirical work, in combination with the requirement to keep our
model parsimonious (given sample size restrictions). To the best of
our knowledge, literature indicating that resistance at home may
have a direct effect on PII performance is non-existent, as is evi-
dence as to a direct effect of collaboration history. Figure 3.1 vi-
sualises the full model, summarising all the hypotheses and their
expected signs. The arrows in the model point in one direction, sug-




For this study, we needed to collect data as to police-related teams
with public (P), inter-organisational (I) and interdisciplinary (I) as-
pects. Public management studies on interdisciplinary teamwork
in schools, hospitals and hospices (Webb and Vulliamy, 2001) and
inter-organisational studies on police-probation partnerships (Cor-
bett, 1998; Kim et al., 2010; Murphy and Lutze, 2009; Murphy, 2008)
have been published, but none focuses on the unique and com-
plex combination of judicial, (mental) healthcare and social pro-
fessionals. To fill this gap in the literature, we decided to look at
the Dutch case of Veiligheidshuizen - or Safety Houses, in English.
This group of network organisations is highly appropriate for two
reasons. First, Safety Houses are quite unique police-related col-
Figure 3.1: Conceptual model
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laborative arrangements between judicial, care and social organi-
sations. These network organisations deliver a number of public
goods by bringing together a group of professionals from differ-
ent disciplines and organisations. Second, across the country, these
Safety Houses are very similar, in the sense that judicial, (mental)
healthcare and social partner organisations always participate in
these collaborative network arrangements.
The Dutch Safety Houses were established in the 1990s, when
neighbourhood safety increasingly asked for cooperative and local
responses (Graham et al., 2012). Dutch Safety Houses were intro-
duced around 1997 in the context of an initiative called Justice in
your Neighbourhood ("Justitie in de buurt") in a few Dutch regions.
Today, about forty Safety Houses operate across the country, serv-
ing all Dutch regions. The initial main aim of Safety Houses was
to form a closely-knit cooperative network to treat predetermined
client groups or offenses, such as repeat offenders, young criminals,
domestic violence and ex-convicts. Recently, however, the Safety
Houses’ proposition started to increasingly shift toward allowing
any case, as long as the client involves a complex multi-problem
challenge. The Dutch Safety Houses’ approach is unique, as multi-
ple interdisciplinary stakeholders systematically work together on
offender-oriented solutions in a formal setting. The partners come
from both the judicial and the social field, and include the police,
public prosecution, parole agencies, child protective services, mu-
nicipalities and mental healthcare services.
Safety Houses aim at preventative as well as repressive reme-
dies. For each and every client, an integrated treatment plan is de-
signed, which tries to solve acute problems, but also seeks to pre-
vent future criminal or other deviant behaviour. Safety Houses of-
fer physical facilities for professionals to meet and discuss their
target group. These meetings are called casusoverleggen - or ’case
meetings’, in English. During these meetings, individual clients or
’cases’ are discussed. For each target group, usually one periodi-
cal case meeting is scheduled, although sometimes more of such
meetings are organised. For example, one meeting may be booked
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to discuss offending minors with police and youth organisations,
followed by another meeting where the public prosecutor joins to
discuss the penalties for these offenders.
Because Safety Houses are designed to suit local needs, they are
not identical across the country. What is important in the context of
the current study, though, is that essential core features are similar
across all Safety Houses, reflecting their PII collaborative charac-
ter. For one, each Safety House may target other types of high-risk
clients, suiting their local safety needs, although issues related to
serious and organised crime are always referred to other agencies.
Furthermore, the physical presence of professionals is very diverse
across Safety Houses: In some, professionals only meet weekly to
discuss a number of clients and then return to their own organi-
sations; in others, all professionals from a wide range of home or-
ganisations have their own workspace, allowing them to execute
tasks for both the Safety House and their home organisation. All
Safety Houses strive to have the same individuals participate con-
tinuously, but individuals are usually replaced by home organisa-
tions in case of sick leave or turnover. Although the Safety House
may seem close to an organisation or institution itself, it is only
a collaborative effort. The exclusive basis is a steady set of pro-
fessionals from different organisations collaborating, to exchange
information and to come to optimal solutions. The Safety House
can support these efforts, but has no steering influence as a regu-
lar organisation or institution would have. Because we can speak
of relatively fixed sets of individuals from different disciplines and
organisations working together, the case meetings in Safety Houses
are a very good examples of PII teams.
3.3 Methods
3.3.1 Research design
A research design shows how one intents to identify the causal ef-
fect of an independent variable on a dependent variable. We would
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like to show that there is a causal relationship between our inde-
pendent variables and the variables of interest: perceived collabo-
ration and satisfaction concerning performance. Ideally, we would
conduct a randomised experiment (with a sufficiently large num-
ber of participants), where an experimental variation is created for
the independent variables. In that case, if we see any difference in
the outcome variables, then we can conclude that the relation is
causal, because the independent variable is the only thing different
between the control and treatment groups. Now, this is unfortu-
nately not feasible in this study. We study teams as they are, rather
than subjecting them randomly to conditions. Although it would
have been interesting to do an experiment, it would have been very
difficult to achieve random distribution over control and treatment
groups. We cannot simply introduce a variable like extraversion to
a group like we could introduce music, or a coloured light. People
are extravert to some extent, or they are not. We could have taken
two random groups and could have introduced one extrovert per-
son to one group, and an introvert person to the other group, as our
argument is that a PII team will benefit from even one additional
extrovert team member. Then still, extraversion of this one person
is still not likely to be exogenous. Extraversion is probably related
to a number of other things that might also influence collaboration,
like managing interpersonal relationships.
Because we deviate from the golden standard of an experiment,
it means that we struggle with a number of issues that make it very
difficult for us to make causal inferences about our study. We ob-
serve PII teams in their natural setting, and that natural setting is
highly unlikely to be random. There may be characteristics of team
members that we do not observe, but which could be important.
Because we do not take these unobserved characteristics into ac-
count, we may be over- or underestimating the effect of the inde-
pendent variables on the outcome variables. As can be seen below,
we will try to restrict a number of issues. We have added controls
that we find theoretically to possibly have an effect on the outcome
variable, in an attempt to deal with the omitted variable bias. How-
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ever, we cannot be sure these controls are responsible for all unob-
served variation; most likely, they are not. As we make use of a
cross-sectional design, we cannot benefit from the estimation tech-
niques that can be used with panel data, mostly in terms of coping
with omitted fixed effects.
Hence, as we find the research design to be far from perfect, we
will not make any causal inferences about our findings, and (still
carefully) treat the findings of this correlational study as mere as-
sociations between the variables of interest. This does not mean,
however, that work of this nature has no merit on its own. Explo-
rative studies like these pave the way for further research, as asso-
ciations can suggest which variables may be of the greatest interest
or relevance. We will discuss the implications of the weaknesses in
our research design in the discussion of this chapter.
3.3.2 Data
The data were collected through online surveys. As there are rel-
atively few Safety Houses (42) in the Netherlands, we decided to
target all of them. By email, the managers of all Safety Houses re-
ceived a request to forward the survey to all participants of all case
meetings in that specific Safety House. A total of 204 people started
the survey. For different reasons, such as length of the survey or
because potential respondents turned out not to be in the target
group, not all distributed surveys were completed. Eventually, we
could create a dataset with 185 respondents from 47 different case
meetings in 21 Safety Houses. How many individuals participate
in total in Safety Houses’ case meetings is unknown, but we gues-
timate that the grand sum country-wide count will be in the 1,000
to 2,000 persons range. Hence, the overall response rate is normal to
good for online surveys, and the number of Safety Houses included
in the sample (approximately 50 per cent) is very satisfactory.
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3.3.3 Measures
We developed an online survey with fifty questions, based on Bron-
stein’s (2003) model, other teamwork literature, and pilot inter-
views with individuals working in Safety Houses. Given the length
of the survey, we have included the English translation of the full
survey in Appendix B for those interested. The original Dutch sur-
vey is available upon request.
Interdisciplinary cooperation is measured with an adjusted ver-
sion of the Index of Interprofessional Cooperation (Mellin et al.,
2010), to suit our target group. The internal consistency of this
adjusted index is very good with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.8942.
Overall, the sub-scales reveal moderate to high consistency, with
Cronbach’s alpha reliability scores of 0.8725 for professional flex-
ibility, 0.7002 for role interdependence, 0.7893 for newly created
professional activities, and 0.8413 for reflection on process. These
scores are lower than the outcomes of the original study, but very
acceptable for interdisciplinary cooperation indices (Wittenberg-
Lyles et al., 2007).
We use the 30-item scale measuring the Big Five personality
traits of Vermulst and Gerris (2006), and extracted the Extraver-
sion items from the data, which we averaged for every respondent.
The internal consistency of this adjusted index is high with a Cron-
bach’s alpha of 0.8764. The sub-scales reveal moderate to very high
consistency, with Cronbach’s alpha reliability scores of 0.8645 for
extraversion, 0.7909 for openness, 0.8568 for agreeableness, 0.9154
for consciousness, and 0.7265 for emotional stability.
We measure Autonomy by means of a scale with five items
(Meiksins and Watson, 1989). Respondents had to indicate on a
four-point Likert-type scale (ranging from never to always) how
often they:
1. decide when they come/leave work;
2. keep time of their projects;
3. decide when and how to go about their job;
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4. can obtain the resources they need without permission; and
5. can influence which project they work on.
The Cronbach’s alpha reliability score of this scale is 0.45, which
is unacceptably low (Kline, 2000). By means of an explanatory fac-
tor analysis, we found that the second item loads onto another fac-
tor than the other three, but removing this item still did not in-
crease the reliability to a sufficient level of at least 0.7. Therefore,
we decided to take one item out of the scale as our measure for
professional autonomy - i.e., the third item: ’How often do you de-
cide when and how to go about your job?’ This item covers work
process autonomy, which we expect to be of greatest importance.
It allows professionals to be flexible, and to exploit their creativ-
ity in the process of coming to an optimal client solution. It is a
relatively narrow and unambiguous question (Sackett and Larson,
1990; Wanous et al., 1997). We therefore presume, with some cau-
tion, that this third item provides an appropriate measure for our
purposes.2
Respondents were asked how often they perceive Resistance
in their own home organisation when they try to communicate
and/or execute agreements that have been made during the case
meeting of the PII team. Respondents were asked to provide an
answer on a scale from 1 (never) to 5 (always). Since a scale or con-
struct for this variable is not available in the literature, we decided
to use a question that we found to be very much at the heart of
experienced resistance in our pilot interviews with PII team mem-
bers. Although, in theory, home organisations should be support-
ive, because they have become part of the network in the first place,
professionals often do not experience the support when they try to
execute agreements. Hence, we asked to provide an answer to the
following narrow and unambiguous question (Sackett and Larson,
1990; Wanous et al., 1997): ’How often do you experience resistance
2The use of single item scales does not necessarily have to be problematic. They
are best used for concrete and singular (Rossiter, 2002) or narrow and unambigu-
ous issues (Sackett and Larson, 1990; Wanous et al., 1997).
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when trying to execute agreements made with the PII team?’
Cooperation history is an estimate obtained by approximating the
number of meetings a team member has joined, based on the tenure
of the respondent (in years), the average number of meetings per
year, and the percentage of meetings attended by the respondent.
All these figures were subjectively guestimated by the respondent.
Respondents were asked to rate their satisfaction with the Gen-
eral performance of their PII team on a five-point Likert scale. By way
of robustness check, we included a number of other performance
measures in our online survey. Factor analysis reveals that these all
load onto a single factor, indicating high correlation amongst differ-
ent performance measures. Using any one of them, or a composite
measure, produces similar results. These robustness analyses are
available upon request.
Finally, we included a set of control variables. As is common in
team studies, we control for a number of demographics of the PII
team (Tsui and O’Reilly, 1989). We have added controls for the gen-
der, age and level of education of the respondents. Age is measured
in years. Education has four answer categories: secondary educa-
tion, vocational training, higher vocational training, and university
degree. Gender is coded 0 for males and 1 for females.
3.3.4 Analysis
We apply path analysis in the form of a series of Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) regressions, using Stata 12. A path analysis is like
a structural equation model, but without the latent variables. Sev-
eral equations are simulated simultaneously in this model, creat-
ing measures of model fit, or explained variance for the full model.
Stata 12 reports direct and indirect effects, as well as total effects
and their standard errors. We estimate the standard errors using
the Huber-White sandwich estimators.3 Such robust standard er-
3By way of robustness check, we have also run the model with clustered standard
errors of the respondents by the team they are in, but found this to be of no
influence on the results.
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rors are appropriate when the data are associated with minor con-
cerns about failure to meet the standard OLS assumptions, such as
non-normality, heteroscedasticity, and few observations exhibiting
large residuals, leverage or influence. We will estimate the follow-
ing equations simultaneously in one model:
Interdisciplinarycooperation(i, t) = α + β1Extraversion(i)
+ β2 Autonomy(i) + β3Resistance(i, h) + β4Cooperationhistory(i) +
Controls(i) + e
and
Per f ormance(i, t) = γ + δ1 Interdisciplinarycooperation(i, t)
+ δ2Extraversion(i) + δ3Autonomy(i)
+ δ4 Interdisciplinarycooperation(i, t) ∗ Extraversion(i)
+ δ5 Interdisciplinarycooperation(i, t) ∗ Autonomy(i) + Controls(i)
+ e
(With t being team, h being home organisation and i respon-
dent)
A final methodological remark relates to our single-respondent
design. Because all data are self-reported and all data are collected
through the same questionnaire during the same period of time
with a cross-sectional research design, common-method variance
(CMV) may cause systematic measurement error, further biasing
the estimates of the true relationship among our theoretical con-
structs. CMV involves variance that is attributed to the measure-
ment method rather than the constructs of interest. Method vari-
ance can either inflate or deflate observed relationships between
constructs, thus leading to both Type I and Type II errors (Pod-
sakoff et al., 2003). We took precautionary measures to prevent
CMV, such as guaranteed anonymity for respondents (Chang et al.,
2010a). Moreover, it is very unlikely that respondents’ implicit the-
ories include the interaction effects of Hypothesis 8 and Hypothesis
9. After data collection, Harman’s one-factor test was conducted on
all questionnaire items to check for a potential common-method ef-
fect. The result from the factor analysis is that the majority of the
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survey questions load onto five factors with respective proportions
of variance of 13.89 per cent, 11.39 per cent, 10.11 per cent, 8.83 per
cent and 7.20 per cent. Hence, none of the factors is responsible for
the majority of the variance. From this, we can conclude that the
data are unlikely to suffer from a common-method bias.
3.4 Results
Table 3.1 shows the descriptive statistics. We have 185 observations,
which is sufficient to run a regression analyses, given the number
of variables included in our parsimonious model. The proportion
of females is large (74%). Because we cannot know the character-
istics of our target population exactly, it is difficult to say whether
or not our female-dominated sample is representative. However, as
many organisations in (mental) healthcare and social work are in-
volved in Safety Houses, with way more female than male employ-
ees, the large proportion of women in our sample does not come as
a surprise. The low standard deviation as to education signals that
the majority of our respondent has a similar educational level: i.e.,
higher vocational training. This is expected as vocational training
is appropriate, given the practical nature of the job. Within our PII
teams, most respondents are around 45 years old. This is in line
with our expectations, given the fact that most professionals must
have quite some experience in their own job to be a good network
collaborator.
In terms of professional autonomy, on average, respondents can
’sometimes’ determine how and when to go about their job: Be-
cause most of the respondents work at an operational level (there
are almost no managers among our respondents), many will be de-
pendent on a supervisor to make more important decisions. The
mean respondent does score quite high on extraversion. Again,
this is as expected, given the jobs that most professionals do: They
tend to work with people. Our respondents indicate that they, on
average, only sometimes experience resistance; interestingly, how-
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Table 3.1: Descriptives
Mean SD Min Max
Gender 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00
Age 44.60 10.33 21.00 67.00
Education 2.03 0.50 1.00 3.00
Extraversion 5.49 0.97 2.17 7.00
Autonomy 2.95 0.75 0.00 4.00
Resistance 2.02 0.89 1.00 5.00
Cooperation history 139.89 231.31 0.00 1817.00
Interdisciplinary Cooperation 3.66 0.45 1.34 5.00
Performance 3.75 0.68 1.00 5.00
Observations 185
ever, some professionals do so all the time. The average respondent
has participated in 140 meetings, but variation is substantial. Inter-
disciplinary cooperation and general performance are, on average,
given a passing grade; and looking at the variance, most people
give a pass. Again, however, the range goes from very poor cooper-
ation and performance to excellent scores on cooperation and per-
formance. All in all, the diversity of Safety Houses and case meet-
ings, and hence the variance in the data, seem to be worth exploring
further with regression analysis.
Table 3.2 provides the bivariate correlations between variables
in our data, including their (in)significance. We observe a signifi-
cant relationship between cooperation, on the one hand, and auton-
omy and extraversion, on the other hand, but the correlations are
not very strong. Moreover, the males in the sample tend to be older,
and extraverts tend to report higher professional autonomy. Evi-
dence of bivariate multicollinearity, which would frustrate regres-
sion analyses, is lacking. We tested for multivariate multicollinear-
ity by calculating the variance inflation factor (VIF). We found the













































































































































































































We estimated four different models. The results can be found in
Table 3.3.4 The number of observations, R2, AIC and BIC noted at
the bottom of the table are for the full model, as the path analysis
estimates the two equations simultaneously. Model 1 only contains
our control variables, and Model 2 all variables, except for the in-
teraction effects, as well as extraversion and autonomy in the per-
formance regression. In Model 3, we exclude only the interaction
effects; in Model 4, all variables are included. Model 4 gives the best
fit in terms of R-squared: The interaction terms contribute nicely to
the explanatory power of the model. We also base the preference
of Model 4 on the Information Criteria, not solely on the R2, as the
R2 always increases as more variables are added to a model. The
AIC and BIC are greatest for Model 4, meaning that this is the most
parsimonious model. A Model is only an approximation to the real
world; the goal of research is to create simple models that have
satisfactory explanatory power. In social sciences, there can often
be many explanations to a phenomenon, and simple yet powerful
models are not available. By means of information criteria one can
make a trade-off between the power of the model and the number
of simplifying assumptions made about the world. Although we
build a model on the basis of theory, we test it empirically to see if
it holds. If a certain variable offers only a meagre contribution, then
we prefer the more parsimonious option. However, in this case, the
full conceptual model is also the preferred parsimonious model.
The control variables do not have a significant contribution in
our models. They are not statistically significant, and a model with
only control variables produces a very low R-squared. Extraversion
has a positive and significant association with interdisciplinary co-
operation. For autonomy, the relation is marginally significant. H1
and H2 are therefore supported. The negative and marginally sig-
4Equations were estimated simultaneously, giving overall results for the number
of observations, R2, AIC and BIC. Despite the term direct effect, we must empha-
sise the correlational nature of our study.
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Table 3.3: Direct effects of variations of the conceptual model -
explained variance in cooperation and performance
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
DV: Interdisciplinary cooperation
Extraversion 0.070* 0.070* 0.070*
Autonomy 0.102* 0.102* 0.102*
Resistance -0.067∼ -0.067∼ -0.067∼
Cooperation history 0.000 0.000 0.000
Education 0.045 0.068 0.068 0.068
Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Gender -0.043 -0.047 -0.047 -0.047
DV: Performance





Education 0.094 0.049 0.049 0.053
Age 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.002
Gender 0.099 0.171 0.179 0.176
Observations 126 120 120 120
R-squared 0.018 0.142 0.147 0.187
AIC 1619 4079 4082 4661
BIC 1647 4121 4130 4714
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ∼ p<0.1
nificant relation between experienced resistance and cooperation
provides support for H3. However, the relationship between coop-
eration history and collaboration is insignificant: Hence, we have
to reject H4.
We continue with the second part of the regression: The direct
effects of our variables on team performance. Here we find mixed
results. We find that collaboration is positively and significantly as-
sociated with performance in Models 2 and 3: Hence H5 partially
is supported, as we do not find a significant relation in our pre-
ferred Model 4. Extraversion is not significantly related to perfor-
mance: So, H6 is not supported. Moreover, autonomy is negatively
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and significantly associated with performance: We therefore must
reject H7.
Our interaction effect of cooperation with extraversion is not
significant. We reject H8: i.e., we do not find that extraversion af-
fects the relationship between PII team cooperation and perfor-
mance. In contrast, the interaction effect of collaboration with pro-
fessional autonomy is significant: Autonomy increases the strength
of the relationship between PII team cooperation and performance.
Thus, we find support for H9. By means of marginal effect plots
(Johnson and Fay, 1950), we can gain deeper insights. Such plots
demonstrate the effect that the moderator variable has on the co-
efficient of the relationship between the PII team cooperation and
performance for different levels of the moderator variable, keeping
all other variables in the model at their mean.
Figure 3.2 demonstrates the conditional marginal effect of au-
tonomy on the relation between interdisciplinary cooperation (ic)
and performance. The shaded area shows the confidence interval
(CI) of the coefficient, which should either be fully above or fully
below zero for the moderation to be significant. It can be seen that
the beta coefficient for the relation between cooperation and per-
formance increases with higher levels of autonomy, implying that
the effect of cooperation on performance increases with higher lev-
els of autonomy. Although overall significant, this is not the case
for low levels of autonomy, where the confidence interval stretches
both below and above zero.
3.4.1 Total and direct effects
A path analysis provides information about the total effects (i.e.,
the effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable whilst
accounting for simultaneity in the system) and indirect effects (i.e.,
the total effect minus the direct effect). From Figure 3.2, and Table
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Figure 3.2: Moderation of autonomy and cooperation
Table 3.4: Indirect effects of Model 4









3.4 and 3.5, two conclusions can be drawn.5
5Because we do not expect any problems with the standard errors of our analysis,
and because these explorative results do not warrant robustness checks, we do
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Table 3.5: Total effects of Model 4












*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
First, extraversion, autonomy and resistance all have significant
relationships with cooperation, and cooperation has a positive sig-
nificant relationship with performance. However, there are no di-
rect effects of extraversion, autonomy and resistance on PII team
performance. Second, autonomy is by far the most powerful vari-
able in our analysis. It does have a significant direct positive ef-
fect on cooperation, and a direct negative effect on PII team per-
formance. The total effect (direct + indirect) of autonomy on per-
formance (-1.187) is significant and negative, too, as the direct neg-
ative effect (-1.279) is much larger than the indirect positive effect
(0.092).
3.5 Discussion
In this chapter, we have looked into a special and emerging type
of team: PII teams - interdisciplinary and interorganisational teams
that work in the public sphere. The aim of this chapter was to find
not add bootstrapped results.
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the inputs associated with successful cooperation and perceived
performance. Looking at our four variables (cooperation history,
resistance, extraversion and autonomy), we found mixed results.
First, cooperation history is not significantly related to cooperation,
or to team performance. The level of interdisciplinary cooperation
is significantly associated to PII team performance in two of our
models, but its statistical significance disappears when we add the
interaction effect between autonomy and cooperation. Hence, our
hypothesis was not fully supported. Second, PII team members
who experience less resistance from their home organisation are
more positive about cooperation in their case meeting. Third, we
found extraversion to be a relevant personality factor to correlate
with the team member’s perception of cooperation, but not with
satisfaction concerning performance. The more extravert respon-
dents are, the better they think about cooperation in their PII team,
but there is no significant relation between extraversion and over-
all perceived team performance. Fourth, autonomy is positively re-
lated to interdisciplinary cooperation, but in the end negatively to
team performance. This is a puzzle indeed, as this implies that
interdisciplinary cooperation increases with increased autonomy
of professionals, but overall team performance declines. Although
this negative effect vanishes somewhat at higher levels of auton-
omy (due to moderation effects), the total effect of autonomy on
team performance is negative. We did not expect the negative re-
lation, given the positive relation with autonomy in more common
team settings studied in the literature.
It is mere speculation, but the positive link between autonomy
and collaboration, combined with the negative link between au-
tonomy and performance may suggest that autonomy inhibits crit-
ical deliberation. Another suggestion would be that possibly, in PII
teams, professionals with much autonomy struggle to convince col-
leagues in their focal organisations that they should execute the
agreements they have made in the PII team. That would mean that
there is a perverse effect: As the professional has more autonomy
in the PII team, the connection to her or his ’home’ team is weaken-
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ing. Then, colleagues from the focal organisation may not be will-
ing or may not be able to execute the agreements made in the PII-
team, which hampers the overall effectiveness of the team. How-
ever, we have no evidence for such mechanisms at hand. Other re-
search would have to be executed for further enquiry. However,
we found support for most of the other variables from the Bron-
stein (2003) model that we studied. This could be an indication that
Bronstein’s theories are applicable to a wider field of professional
collaborations that includes members from organisations in polic-
ing, the judiciary and probation. Apart from the wide applicabil-
ity to different organisations, the theory is also very convenient to
studying teams that are very dissimilar in terms of how often they
meet and what issues they discuss.
3.5.1 Limitations and future research
As any other study, ours is not without limitations. The research
design is not optimal. Our findings were not based on an exper-
iment with randomised trails. Rather, we studied PII team mem-
bers in their natural environment. Extraversion is a difficult vari-
able to measure combined with giving ratings to collaboration. We
argued that the extraversion of a person contributes to collabora-
tion, but in fact, the relation between extraversion of a person and
the rating (s)he gives to collaboration may be psychological. We
cannot exclude that extraversion is associated with how positive
someone is about collaboration. Extraverts tend to be more posi-
tive about interpersonal relationships (Brees et al., 2013), which is
a relevant observation for our work on teams. Another problem
here is the selection bias that may have occurred. It may well have
been that relatively extravert respondents have been selected, be-
cause a lot of the jobs that PII professionals do involve working
with (difficult) clients, and introvert people are probably not as
likely to go into this line of work as extroverts are. Apart from that,
we cannot assume extraversion to be exogenous. It may be related
to other variables of interest that we have not observed. Extrovert
team members may be better intra-team communicators (Bradley
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and Hebert, 1997), and therefore possibly perceived by the team to
be an open and committed team member. This will probably also
be positively correlated with perceived collaboration and perfor-
mance, possibly causing us to overestimate the effect of extraver-
sion on performance here. As this may be the case for other vari-
ables, we have to abstain from making causal inferences about our
findings, and have done so by merely talking about associations,
relations and correlations, rather than causal effects. Beyond the
fact that we cannot establish causality in this study, we also cannot
exclude reverse causality. It is unlikely that collaboration or perfor-
mance would have an influence on variables such as extraversion,
as personality is supposed to be quite stable for adults. However, it
could be that satisfaction of collaboration and performance may in-
fluence the history of cooperation, instead of the other way around.
People who are satisfied may hang around, rather than satisfaction
occurring because people have been around for a long time. Ei-
ther way, as we did not find any association between cooperation
history and collaboration, this is not a crucial concern here, but it
should nevertheless be noted.
Our limitations all point to promising future research avenues.
To evaluate (perceived) public sector performance in any way, the
use of objective measures is often not satisfactory or all-encompas-
sing. This is not different for our case of police-involved PII teams.
Eventually, we chose to go with a fairly general measure: the sat-
isfaction with the performance of the case meeting. The interpro-
fessional cooperation index has been successfully applied in prior
work (Mellin et al., 2010), so we trust this to be a good and spe-
cific measure. However, to come up with a valid perceived perfor-
mance measure is extremely difficult in the case of teams involving
multiple disciplines and multiple organisations. Interviews with
managers at Safety Houses revealed that a common perception of
goals is simply non-existent. Some feel that Safety Houses should
increase (the feeling of) safety in their regions, whereas others in-
dicate that all that matters is helping clients. This pair of outcomes
can, in fact, be contradictory, such that asking respondents their sat-
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isfaction on these two issues might also not be a valid measure. It
would however also be complex to measure this more objectively,
as the feeling of safety is influenced by many other variables, even
such mundane ones as the absence or presence of street lanterns.
To find out whether clients are actually helped by the Safety House
would require a cohort study with an appropriate control group.
Either way, even when agreement as to the set of objective perfor-
mance measures could be reached, an experimental study would
be required with a sufficient amount of participants to assure that
subjects are indeed randomly distributed over a treatment and a
control group.
Very little is known academically about the functioning of PII
teams. There is still a world to be explored to deepen our under-
standing of what drives such teams’ effectiveness, a world into
which we will take a next step in Chapter 4. Further insights will
offer a toolkit of effectiveness-enhancing policies, making running
such team more attractive from the perspective of public agencies.
More and better functioning interdisciplinary interorganisational
networks may well boost the overall performance of the public sec-
tor, including policing. Therefore, we recommend that more studies
are done on this special type of teams in order to check the robust-
ness of our results, as well as to look for other variables that may
be crucial to the cooperation and performance of PII teams, such
as those suggested in our literature review. This line of work is
both rewarding and challenging, as collecting high-quality data of
a large enough sample of PII teams is anything but easy. Although
our sample was satisfactory for explorative purposes, a larger sam-
ple may allow for more complicated modelling, and hence for gain-
ing deeper insights.
Another suggestion for future research would be to study how
PII team members operate in their home organisations. We ex-
plained that PII members will often not be able to execute all the
agreements they make in the PII team themselves; they will often
have to delegate tasks to colleagues in their home organisation.
How successful professionals are in doing this may be associated
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with better cooperation and performance of the PII team, because
the PII team will get frustrated if agreements do not get carried out
and vice versa. It would be very interesting, for example, to use
network theory and look at the networks of professionals in their
home organisations. PII team members may have to reach out to
their network to get a job done. Their position in the network may
influence how (successfully) they go about this.
3.5.2 Policy implications
From our findings, we have to be careful to make implications for
policy or management, because the study is merely correlational,
implying that making causal inferences would not be appropriate.
We have taken some first exploratory steps in studying variables
that may cause successful cooperation and performance. We have
found a number of associations that are both statistically significant
and that could have practical value as well. We would encourage
future research to further investigate those variables that we have
found to be associated with the outcome variables of interest. Fu-
ture research may take an interest is resistance perceived by profes-
sionals. Our data shows that most resistance is perceived to derive
from direct colleagues of PII team members, which may also be an
interesting finding for organisations participating in public inter-
disciplinary networks. Even when management is fairly support-
ive towards participation in the network, this may not naturally







The CIA sharing a meal with the FBI. Now, if that isn’t inter-agency
co-operation, I just don’t know what is.†
Abstract
This chapter investigates which structural characteristics a network administra-
tive organisation (NAO) can offer to contribute to cooperation of institutionalised
public interdisciplinary interorganisational teams. We use self-reported data from
a survey among team members, and apply regression analysis to derive our find-
ings. We find that frequency and duration of meetings organised by the NAO to
be positively related to cooperation. Furthermore, a skilful chair in the meetings
is positively related to cooperation as well, while disagreement about the skilful-
ness of the chair does not affect cooperation or the relationship between the mean
skill and cooperation. We also found that the number of hours that professionals
spend at the network location is positively associated with the cooperation level
of teams.
∗This chapter is the result of joint work with Arjen van Witteloostuijn and Arjan
van den Born.




In Chapter 3 we started our investigation into collaboration as a
stakeholder management strategy. As we report in Chapter 2, the
key stakeholders of the police are often of a mixed-blessing na-
ture, implying in theory that collaboration is the optimal strategy
for the greatest stakeholder satisfaction. Furthermore, collabora-
tion can help the police and its stakeholders accomplish tasks that
they may not be able to (optimally) execute by themselves. In do-
ing so they can improve their services to other stakeholders, mak-
ing them more satisfied as well. For example, by collaborating with
the public prosecution, suspects can be prosecuted, and convicted
on the evidence that the police has gathered. Collaboration success
depends, however, not only on the inputs of one partner; it is a joint
effort.
The police will often find themselves collaborating with pub-
lic organisations in other disciplines to solve complex problems
that cannot be tackled by a single organisation. This requires inter-
disciplinary and interorganisational cooperation in a multi-agency
network context, but such cooperation can be very difficult. Un-
like private organisations, public organisations do not merely care
about producing outputs, but rather about outcomes of which the
value is difficult to measure (Scholes and Johnson, 2001). Further-
more, collective goals of the overall multi-agency network may
sometimes be conflicting with the primary goals or core tasks of
a single organisation, implying that public organisations have to
question whether they will seek to serve solely their own interests,
or those of others as well.
In Chapter 3, we introduced different streams of literature that
are related the study of these contexts. On the one hand, literature
focuses on the organisational level, looking at public network for-
mation, governance and functioning. One the other hand, the work
in the stream of research in interdisciplinary cooperation focuses
rather on the individuals who are operationally involved in the col-
laborative effort. Because the success of collaboration is found to
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be related mostly to the characteristics of individuals, this was the
level we focused on in Chapter 3, using the literature on interdisci-
plinary cooperation as a guideline. We defined the individuals par-
ticipating in the joint effort as an Public Interdisciplinary Interor-
ganisational (PII) team, and as such complemented our hypotheses
with literature from research on teams. Yet, we cannot ignore that
behind the individuals working together in an interdisciplinary ef-
fort, there is a network of organisations that also plays a role in
the collaboration. Bronstein (2003) argues that, apart from the char-
acteristics of individuals participating in interdisciplinary efforts
(studied in Chapter 3), structural characteristics, such as adminis-
trative support, also facilitate interdisciplinary cooperation. When
interdisciplinary cooperation occurs within one organisation, it is
clear that this organisation is the one to provide structural charac-
teristics. When it concerns a network of organisations, this is not so
clear.
Here we would like to make a bridge to the literature of net-
work governance. In terms of network governance, theory and em-
pirical literature have emerged that deal with optimal public multi-
agency network governance in given circumstances. For example,
theory by Provan and Kenis (2008) explains how the optimal form
of network governance depends on trust, the number of partici-
pants, goal consensus, and the need for network-level competen-
cies. When there are few participants and when both trust and goal
consensus are high, the best option is usually that the involved or-
ganisations share governance. When there are a larger number of
participants, having one lead organisation will be preferable, as it
will be difficult to steer the network with too many captains at the
helm. This requires, though, that all organisations trust the lead
organisation, because the lead organisation will probably gain a
stronger position, also in determining the goals of the network.
When trust amongst parties is not large or when the network is
highly centralised, it is preferable to have an independent entity to
steer the network, which is commonly referred to as a Network Ad-
ministrative Organisation (NOA). A NOA is a form of institution-
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alisation of the network, which is aimed to govern and facilitate
cooperation. Indeed, in networks with many parties that have dif-
ferent and (potentially) conflicting goals, agendas and cultures, de-
signing and implementing an effective NAO is the preferred mode
of governance.
Yet, while the focus of the literature is often on governance, we
expect in line with the literature on interdisciplinary cooperation
that a NOA can do more than taking care of administrative tasks;
indeed, in practice, a NOA is often much more than an administra-
tive agency. When a NOA comes about because of shallow trust
between parties, evidently this can also reflect upon the profes-
sionals who participate in this network cooperation. They may be
distrustful, too, having to build relationships and having to learn
how to work together. A NOA can design structures, implement-
ing the associated devices, in ways that facilitate cooperation. What
a NAO should offer in terms of such structural characteristics to
facilitate cooperation has, however, not been empirically assessed
before. Note that our use of the term ’structural characteristics’ is
in line with the broader literature on the topic of interdisciplinary
cooperation. It should not be confused with ’structure’ in terms of
governance of the network. We define structural characteristics as
those attributes or actions in the operational sphere that are aimed
at facilitating and enhancing cooperation in the network, or coop-
eration of teams within the network.
Facilitating cooperation is important, because cooperation be-
tween several agencies and disciplines may be associated with
greater satisfaction (as we found in Chapter 3) and better outcomes
in the context of many issues that are key to the public domain. By
working together, agencies can provide more ’seamless’ responses
to the needs of ’clients’ or the general public. Within the safety
domain, this has been recognised for the case of adolescent clients
(Webb and Vulliamy, 2001), but also for persons with a tendency to-
ward criminal behaviour (Murphy, 2008). Additionally, apart from
generating operational successes, cooperation looks great to the
public eye (Gilling, 1994), making cooperation easy to legitimise
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in national and regional communities. However, multi-agency co-
operation is easier to advocate than to practise (Weiss, 1987). Ev-
erybody seems to think cooperation is great, yet research indicates
that many cooperative relationships lack durability and often do
not work in practice (Stead et al., 2004). The current study there-
fore aims to investigate one of the critical facets of creating good
cooperation: structural characteristics, as defined above.
When the characteristics of the professionals and the organisations are
given, what can NAOs offer in terms of structure to improve cooperation
in these collaborative teams?
This chapter contributes to the literature in a number of ways
by studying Dutch so-called Safety Houses, which are examples
of networks with NOAs in place, where a variety of disciplines
and organisations collaborate to deal with offenders. Such Safety
Houses are physical locations that host what can be referred to
as public interdisciplinary inter-organisational (PII) teams, which
are individuals from different organisations working together to
achieve common goals. This study is, to the best of our knowledge,
the first that explores how the NOA can assist in terms of struc-
tural and operational facets, on top of and beyond governance as-
pects, that facilitate cooperation between professionals from differ-
ent agencies and disciplines. Moreover, we contribute to the state
of the art by studying the structural characteristics that may sup-
port interdisciplinary team cooperation in an inter-organisational
setting. While the literature on interdisciplinary cooperation is not
new, prior research mainly focuses on teams that work within the
same organisation, such as schools, hospitals and hospices (Oliver
and Peck, 2006; Parker-Oliver et al., 2005). The interdisciplinary na-
ture of these studied teams is limited, though, because their disci-
plines may differ, but are often in the same line of work, such as
nurses and doctors, or US police and probation officers (Corbett,
1998). Even teachers and social workers may have shared goals
in their dealings with students, although their intervention tech-
niques tend to differ. The networks we study have different per-
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formance measures, goals and cultures by the very nature of the
involved disciplines and organisations. This makes it even more




According to Andrews (1990), interdisciplinary cooperation oc-
curs when "different professionals, possessing unique knowledge,
skills, organisational perspectives, and personal attributes, engage
in coordinated problem solving for a common purpose" (p. 175).
Bruner (1991) emphasises the idea that interdisciplinary coopera-
tion allows for achievement of goals that individual professionals
could not reach by themselves. This definition is also used by Bron-
stein (2003), whose work will be leading in our literature review.
Hence, we will also start from this definition. Yet, more has been
written about this topic. D’Amour et al. (2005) offer a detailed con-
ceptual discussion. Here, such a broad discussion is not needed,
given this chapter’s exploratory purposes. According to Bronstein
(2003), interdisciplinary cooperation is a broad term, being associ-
ated with five success factors:
1. Interdependence, which is the mutual reliance that profes-
sionals must accept to accomplish the joint set of goals;
2. Newly created professional activities, which refers to activi-
ties produced by the team that could not have been designed
by any of the individual professionals alone;
3. Flexibility, which involves the team’s ability to settle on pro-
ductive compromises in the face of disagreement;
4. Collective ownership of goals, which relates to the shared re-
sponsibility that professionals have regarding the entire pro-
cess of goal achievement; and
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5. Reflection on processes, implying the awareness that profes-
sionals have as to working together and the optimisation of
processes.
Structural characteristics determine to a substantial extent whe-
ther or not these five critical success factors materialise (Bronstein,
2003), next to the personal and professional characteristics and co-
operation history that we studied in Chapter 3. For instance, pro-
fessionals must have the time and the opportunity for reflection,
and for deeply engaging in collaborative activities. These structural
characteristics are probably of greater importance for interdisci-
plinary teams than for regular teams. While non-interdisciplinary
teams operate under the same management, facing the same struc-
tural characteristics, professionals from different disciplines are
more likely to fall under different managers, or even under dif-
ferent organisations, making it less likely that they will all have
ample opportunities to meet and build relationships. Here, a NOA
forcing this upon (or at least facilitating this for) participating or-
ganisations may have an important role to play. So, the structural
characteristics determine whether and, if so, to what extent the in-
volved organisations allow their representatives to participate in
the network, which defines the boundaries of how a NOA can sup-
port the involved professionals. For example, a study by Stead et al.
(2004) reports that professionals recognise that collaborative meet-
ings can be central to their work, being considered as valuable and
necessary for sharing opinions, broadening understandings and
making decisions. As meetings are crucial in the context of the
problem-solving nature of an interdisciplinary public network, it
is essential that such meetings are organised frequently enough
so that professionals can stay up to date in order to handle the
issues that they are dealing with effectively. Bringing profession-
als together frequently enough for meetings allows them to build
relations amongst each other, in this way developing trust and a
collaborative history, which are important facilitators for interdis-
ciplinary cooperation (Bronstein, 2003).
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Hypothesis 1. The frequency of meetings is positively associated with
perceived PII cooperation.
Moreover, as collaborative meetings are needed for effectively
sharing opinions, broadening understandings and making deci-
sions, these meetings should be extensive enough to be able to
achieve this set of key goals (Stead et al., 2004). In PII teamwork,
different perspectives have to be combined, reflecting different dis-
ciplinary viewpoints and terminologies, and different - potentially
conflicting - organisational goals, agendas and cultures. To achieve
this in PII teams is anything but easy, and requires time-consuming
discussions. Hence, sufficient time should be spend on expressing
the different views, to create a shared understanding of the issues
at hand, and to be able to settle on effective compromises that are
considered legitimate by all involved.
Hypothesis 2. The length of meetings is positively associated with per-
ceived PII cooperation.
However, because PII cooperation can only be effective when
all the team’s professionals participate well, sharing knowledge
and/or information and expressing opinions, interdisciplinary lead-
ership skills facilitate interdisciplinary collaboration (Banfield and
Lackie, 2009; Mirabito, 2012). In a cooperative effort, based on meet-
ings, it is a chair, who is a neutral person amongst the interdisci-
plinary professionals, who executes these leadership skills, as there
is (and should be) a lack of natural hierarchy amongst the profes-
sionals in the PII team. It is important that a chairperson takes the
lead during the meetings to make sure that all professionals can ex-
change information and opinions fairly and productively. Having
a chair is commonly perceived as a characteristic that distinguishes
a meeting from any other communicative event, as well as a struc-
tural device for smoothly running the event (Orlikowski and Yates,
1994). Chairs serve a variety of purposes, such as opening and clos-
ing the meeting, introducing and shifting between agenda points,
allocating turns, and sanctioning inappropriate conduct (Angouri
and Marra, 2010). Allocating turns and sanctioning inappropriate
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conduct are especially important in a network context that brings
together interdisciplinary partners. A chair must make sure that
everyone can properly exchange information and express opinions
about the issue they are working on. When a chair facilitates the
meeting to run smoothly, and extracts all necessary information
and opinions from partners, group decision-making will improve
(Tropman, 1996).
Hypothesis 3. A chairperson who makes sure that all team members can
exchange information and express their opinion is positively associated
with perceived PII cooperation.
Not only the average feeling across all the PII team’s profession-
als as to the chairperson’s skill to have everyone exchanging infor-
mation expressing their opinion is important, but agreement on this
issue is essential as well. That is, the spread of the team members’
evaluation of the chairperson’s skill is argued to have an effect next
and on top of the mean chairperson’s skill assessment, as predicted
in Hypothesis 2. We admit that this is not a structural character-
istic, as it arises out of the participants rather than the actions of
the NAO. Yet, we find it important to include for the following
reasoning. A key task of the chair is to speak for the group, and
the collective decisions made, as a whole, and members expect the
chair to execute this task fairly (Tropman, 1996). When some of the
PII team members perceive that the chair does let everyone speak
their mind whilst others do not, this means that the task is eval-
uated as being executed fairly by some, but not by others. This is
likely to negatively influence the cohesion in the group, as well as
their willingness to cooperate well with one another. Professionals
may, of course, also agree that the chair does not operate effectively,
but this is less problematic because then the team is not split into
opposing groups on this critical issue, leaving the group’s cohesion
and cooperation willingness unaffected, still implying a passable
team (Tropman, 1996): If all team members agree that the chair is
executing her or his key task unfairly, the professional group as a
collective can try to bypass or compensate for the chair’s malfunc-
tioning.
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Hypothesis 4. Disagreement between professionals as to the chairper-
son’s skill to make sure that all team members can exchange information
and express their opinion is negatively associated with perceived PII co-
operation.
Additionally, we argue that intra-team disagreement will have
a negative moderating effect on the relation between the chairper-
son’s mean skill and perceived PII cooperation. In general terms,
this logic implies that the effect of the mean is conditional on the
spread, as argued by Boone et al. (2004). When mean skill is per-
ceived to be fairly good, cooperation may not be positively affected
when disagreement in the group is large because some team mem-
bers do then perceive the decision-making process to be unfair.
When those professionals do not put full effort into the team, oth-
ers may, in turn, be disappointed by this shirking behaviour. The
positive effect of (sub-)optimal decision-making on cooperation is
countered by the disagreement that leads to mutual disappoint-
ment and inappropriate conduct amongst the professional team
members, substantially reducing the likelihood of successful coop-
eration (Angouri and Marra, 2010; Tropman, 1996).
Hypothesis 5. Disagreement between professionals as to the chairper-
son’s skill to make sure that all team members can exchange information
and express their opinion negatively moderates the relation between the
chairperson’s mean skill and perceived PII cooperation.
Apart from organising and hosting the official PII team meet-
ings, the NOA may provide shared offices to all PII team mem-
bers, on top of their workspace in their home organisations. This in-
creases the opportunities for communication among the PII team’s
professionals (Sloper, 2004). Such communication outside formal
meetings is needed for the PII team’s professionals to connect fur-
ther, and to discuss issues that are not immediately relevant for
all team members. Examples relate to the joint execution of a task
by a sub-group within the PII team or more extensive bilateral in-
formation exchange between pairs of professionals. Furthermore,
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such interaction will create trust and short ties, improving coop-
eration further. Network locations should not only offer profes-
sionals meeting workspace, but should provide attractive oppor-
tunities to stay at the network location to deepen the ties with the
other PII team members outside the official meeting hours. This is
very difficult to achieve when all PII team members have to return
to their home organisation after the official meetings because the
NOA does not offer anything beyond formal meeting facilities.
Hypothesis 6. The hours professionals spend at the network location is
positively associated with perceived PII cooperation.
Figure 4.1 visualises the full model, referring explicitly to all
hypotheses and the expected signs of the relationships. Despite the
arrows in the diagram, we want to emphasise the correlational na-
ture of this study.
4.2.2 Policy background
For this study, we need a sample of police-involved PII teams -
hence, of teams in networks that have interdisciplinary and multi-
agency aspects. After all, our key argument is that such teams will
particularly benefit from structural support provided by a NAO.
Interdisciplinary and inter-organisational team members are less
likely to understand and trust one another, because of their differ-
ent professional and organisational backgrounds: Therefore, such
PII teams can benefit from the support delivered through a NAO.
Hence, we were looking for a NAO-governed network (a) with in-
terdisciplinary participants (b) from different organisations that (c)
include the police. The Netherlands offers an ideal study setting
in the form of an official network of inter-organisational cooper-
ation between judicial, care and social work organisations, called
Veiligheidshuizen (or Safety Houses, in English). Safety Houses are
an initiative launched in the 1990s to create a cooperative response
to local problems in the realm of neighbourhood safety (Graham
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et al., 2012). Initially, only a few regions started in 1997, but nowa-
days about 40 Safety Houses are operational, serving communities
in all regions of the Netherlands.
Safety Houses are examples of close cooperative networks, usu-
ally hosting a number of PII teams that specialise in dealing with
specific ’clients’ who face certain complex problems, such as re-
peat offenders and domestic violence perpetrators. The complexity
is that different types of issues are involved, each relating to dif-
ferent disciplines and different organisations. For instance, many
repeat offenders not only are in judiciary trouble, but also face
health and social challenges (e.g., drug addiction and broken fam-
ily issues). The trend is to move beyond strict specialisation, and to
engage with any complex problem that requires input from part-
Figure 4.1: Conceptual model
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ners from judiciary, social work and (mental) health care organisa-
tions. Because teams in Safety Houses will only deal with complex
multi-problem cases, partners from different disciplines and differ-
ent home organisations, including the police, are always involved.
A high-level steering group of senior professionals from the
partner organisations is responsible for strategic decision-making
as to a Safety House. Daily management and running operational
processes is arranged by a NAO. The NAO consists of professionals
who have their home base in one of the partner organisations, but
who are paid for from the budget of the Safety House. Despite their
background as professionals formally employed by a partner or-
ganisation, they operate independently in the interest of the Safety
House, and they will not interfere with the decision-making in the
PII teams. The NAO offers the partner organisations’ professionals
a physical location to meet, and the NAO is responsible for organ-
ising PII team meetings. In these PII team meetings, the teams dis-
cuss individual clients or other ’cases’ such as families or problem-
atic youth groups. This is why these team meetings are commonly
referred to as case meetings.
In the pre-design stage of this study, we visited a number of
Safety Houses several times and held informal talks with NOA
staff, professionals from the PII teams, and managers from partici-
pating organisations. The conclusion from this exploratory stage is
that, apart from organising meetings at a physical location, NAOs
do not act very homogeneously. For one, the frequency and dura-
tion of meetings are very diverse. Furthermore, some NAOs offer
all PII team professionals a workspace so that they can stay at the
Safety House outside official meetings to work on the spot, whereas
others will only offer workspaces to a limited number of PII team
professionals, or not at all. This means that PII team professionals
spend much time in some Safety Houses, while PII team members
only visit other Safety Houses for the official meetings to immedi-
ately return to their own organisation afterwards. Finally, although
we observe a trend toward professionalisation of NAO staff, the
heterogeneity across Safety Houses is quite substantial.
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These trends and differences imply that our setting represents
relevant variation, which offers ample opportunities to examine
whether an NAO’s contributions are significantly related to the ef-
fectiveness of interdisciplinary cooperation between professionals
from different agencies. Research findings may have policy impli-
cations, as NAOs are funded through public money, either directly
from the government (as is the case here) or indirectly through
public organisations. If investments in structural characteristics,
such as workspace facilities or NAO personnel, are not associated
to improved cooperation of professionals in PII teams, then the
NAO may indeed just as well stick to its administrative tasks alone,
and let the involved professionals organise successful cooperation
themselves; but if we do find a significant relations between spe-
cific structural characteristics and collaborations, then NAOs might
be able to do more to make public services, and especially policing,




Like in the previous chapters, we would like to demonstrate how
the methods of our study deviate from the ideal. By means of
a research design one can show how one intends to identify the
causal effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable.
We would ideally like to show that there is a causal relationship
between our independent variables and the variables of interest:
perceived collaboration and satisfaction with performance. Ideally,
we would conduct an randomised experiment (with a sufficiently
large number of participants), where an experimental variation is
created for the independent variables. This would allow us to at-
tribute changes in the dependent variable to a change in the inde-
pendent variable. Now, unfortunately, we could not achieve exper-
imental conditions in this study. We study teams as they are, rather
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than subjecting them randomly to conditions. Although it would
have been interesting to do an experiment, it would have been very
difficult to achieve random distribution over a control and a treat-
ment groups. We could have theoretically introduced conditions to
randomised groups, such as the meeting frequency, duration and
the time spend at the network location. We could have taken two
random groups and could have introduced a skilled chair to one
group, and an unskilled chair to the other group to test how the
skill of a chair contributes to cooperation. However, how skilled
the chair is perceived to be is not likely to be exogenous. The per-
ceived skill of the chair is probably related to a number of other
things that might also influence collaboration, such as the manner
in which he or she manages interpersonal relationships, or how
friendly this person is perceived to be.
However, because we have to deviate from the golden standard
of an experiment, it means that we struggle with a number of is-
sues that make it very difficult for us to make causal claims about
our results. We observe PII teams in their natural setting, and that
natural setting is highly unlikely to be random. Despite the con-
trol variables we use, there may be characteristics of the team that
we do not observe, but which could be important. Because we do
not take these unobserved characteristics into account, we may be
over- or underestimating the effect of the independent variables on
the outcome variables. We have added controls that we find theo-
retically to possibly have an effect on the outcome variable, in an
attempt to deal with the omitted variable bias. However, we cannot
be sure these controls are responsible for all unobserved variation;
most likely, they are not. As we make use of a cross-sectional de-
sign, we cannot benefit from the estimation techniques that can be
used with panel data, mostly in terms of coping with omitted fixed
effects.
Hence, as we find the research design to be far from perfect, we
will not make any causal inferences about our findings, and (still
carefully) treat the findings of this correlational study as mere as-
sociations between the variables of interest. This does not mean,
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however, that work of this nature has no merit on its own. Explo-
rative studies like these pave the way for further research, as asso-
ciations can suggest which variables may be of the greatest interest
or relevance. We will discuss the implications of the weaknesses in
our research design in the discussion of this chapter.
4.3.2 Data
Online surveys were used in this study to collect data. As there
are not that many Safety Houses in the Netherlands (about 40),
we decided to invite all of them to participate in the survey. All
NAO managers received an email with the request to circulate the
link to the survey amongst the professionals working in the Safety
House’s PII teams. In total, 204 respondents started the survey, but
not all finished, generating useable responses from 185 members of
47 different case meetings in 21 Safety houses. This response is not
disappointing, given that we received data from half of the Safety
Houses. A rough approximation, as the total number of PII profes-
sionals in all Dutch Safety Houses is unknown, suggests that our
sample represents about 10 per cent of the target population. From
the 47 case meetings, we eventually could make use of the data of
38 case meetings for which we had multiple respondents. We are
aware of the limited size of the sample, but our 5:1 ratio of obser-
vations to variables is sufficient for our explorative purposes (Hair
et al., 1998) in this new and emerging field of research on network
organisations.
4.3.3 Measures
We developed an online survey with fifty questions, based on Bron-
stein’s (2003) model, other literature, and insights derived from our
pilot interviews with individuals working in Safety Houses. This
is the same survey that we have used for the study in Chapter 3.
Therefore, we refer, again, to Appendix B for the full translated
survey. The full original Dutch survey is available upon request.
Because the responses to our survey are at the level of individual
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members of PII teams, while we wish to study team-level issues,
we have averaged the variables to the team level, unless specified
differently.
Our dependent variable Interdisciplinary cooperation is measured
with an adjusted version of the Index of Interprofessional Coop-
eration (Mellin et al., 2010), with non-substantive changes imple-
mented that suit the context of our target group. The internal con-
sistency of this adjusted index is good with a Cronbach’s alpha of
0.89. The underlying sub-scales reveal moderate to good consis-
tency with Cronbach’s alpha reliability scores of 0.87 for profes-
sional flexibility, 0.70 for role interdependence, 0.79 for newly cre-
ated professional activities, and 0.84 for reflection on processes.1
These scores are somewhat lower than the outcomes of the origi-
nal study, but acceptable for interdisciplinary cooperation indices
(Wittenberg-Lyles et al., 2008). The plausible assumption is that
higher scores on this scale and these sub-scales are associated with
higher PII team cooperation effectiveness (as is clear from the sub-
stance reflected in the formulation of the individual items, as listed
in Appendix B).
The first independent variable (H1), Meeting frequency, is mea-
sured by asking respondents to report how frequently their case
meetings take place. We provided four answer categories: (1) week-
ly, (2) biweekly, (3) monthly, and (4) ’other’. From these answers,
we calculated how many meetings the team has on a yearly basis,
as a team-level average. To measure our second independent vari-
able (H2), Meeting duration2, we asked respondents to assess how
1By way of robustness check, we estimated our model for the different factors of
interdisciplinary cooperation (available upon request), but found the model to
perform best when taking the average of all factors - and hence by focusing on
interdisciplinary cooperation as a composite construct.
2The preliminary interviews with managers and professionals have indicated that
meeting lengths(and frequencies) are commonly fixed in advanced by the NAO
and the partner organisations. After all, they cannot have professionals running
off to Safety House meetings all the time, they have other tasks. Yet, we can-
not fully guarantee that this is strictly the case for all Safety Houses, and we
also believe that, even when meeting arrangements are fixed, case meetings may
sometimes take a bit longer or shorter.
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long their meetings usually last. We, again, gave four answer cat-
egories: (1) half an hour or less, (2) an hour, (3) 1.5 hours, and (4)
two hours or more. Categories were then recoded into the average
number of hours at the team level.
Regarding the third independent variable (H3), respondents
were asked to score the chairperson on a number of skills3. A key
example item is "The chairperson makes sure that the opinions of
all professionals are heard." Answers were given on a Likert-type
scale ranging from 1 to 5, where 1 is ’poor’ and 5 is ’excellent’. The
team-level mean score is our measure of Chair’s skill. For the fourth
independent variable (H4), Disagreement on chair’s skill, we took the
standard deviation of the Chair’s skill variable for each team to cre-
ate our measure of disagreement. Our fifth independent variable
(H5) is the product term of Chair’s skill and Disagreement on chair’s
skill.
Our sixth independent variable (H6) is Hours at network loca-
tion.4 To create a proxy for this variable, respondents were asked to
assess how many hours per week they spend at the network loca-
tion. Again, we calculated the average number of hours spend at
the network location across all assessments of all members of the
same PII team to construct a team-level variable.
We added two control variables that are known to be important
from earlier work on team cooperation.5 Tsui and O’Reilly (1989)
3We initially included other skills of the chair as well, but we did not find these
to be significant in the model (available upon request). These other skills are: (1)
keeping time on agenda items, (2) starting and stopping the meeting on time,
and (3) summarising and formulating agreements.
4These hours are usually fixed in the collaboration agreement to some extent. Pro-
fessionals have other tasks at the home organisation, so they can often be at the
Safety House for a limited amount of hours. Some professionals need to be at the
location for a number of hours a week, sometimes even full time. Other profes-
sionals have more liberty to stay at the location, but this still needs to be facili-
tated by the NAO, because professionals need to have workspaces available. It is
thus, one way or the other, much in the hands of the NAO to stimulate/facilitate
the presence of a professional at the network location.
5Age heterogeneity may be another likely control variable in team studies. We
removed age heterogeneity from all models reported here, however, as this vari-
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report that employees sharing similar demographic characteristics
are less prone to conflict and can more effectively work together.
The first control variable is gender composition, taken as the pro-
portion of males in the PII team. The second control variable re-
lates to educational team-level heterogeneity, measured through
the standard deviation of the education measure at the level of the
PII team. Education was captured through four answer categories,
asking for the highest level of education: (1) secondary education,
(2) vocational training, (3) higher vocational training, and (4) uni-
versity degree.
4.3.4 Analysis
In principle, our data can be analysed with OLS regression, as
we have a cross-section with an independent variable that can be
treated as (quasi-) continuous. We estimate the standard errors us-
ing the Huber-White sandwich estimators. Such robust standard
errors are appropriate when the data are associated with minor
concerns about failure to meet the standard OLS assumptions, such
as non-normality, heteroscedasticity, and few observations exhibit-
ing large residuals, leverage or influence. We have made use of
Stata 12 to run the statistical analyses. We will estimate the follow-
ing equation:
Interdisciplinarycooperation(t) = α + β1Meeting f requency(t)
+ β2Meetingduration(t) + β3Hoursatnetworklocation(t)
+ β4Meanchairsskill(t) + β5Disagreementchairsskill(t)
+ β6Meanchairsskill ∗ Disagreementchairsskill(t) + Controls(t) + e
(With t being team)
Because all our data are self-reported by single respondents
and are collected through the same questionnaire during the same
period of time with a cross-sectional research design, we have to
check our data for common-method bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003).
able turned out to be non-significant in all models without effecting the pattern
or results (available upon request).
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This is variance that can be attributed to the measurement method,
rather than to the constructs of interest. Ex ante, we took precau-
tionary measures to prevent common-method variance, such as
guaranteed anonymity for respondents (Chang et al., 2010a). Ex
post, we conducted Harman’s one-factor test on all questionnaire
items to test for the possible presence of a common-method effect.
The result from the factor analysis is that the majority of the survey
questions load onto five factors with respective proportions of vari-
ance of 13.89, 11.39, 10.11, 8.83, and 7.20 per cent. Hence, not only
is the number of factors large vis-à-vis the number of variables, but
also is none of the factors responsible for the majority of the vari-
ance. From this, we can conclude that the data are unlikely to suffer
from a common-method bias.
4.4 Results
Table 4.1 provides the descriptive statistics. Approximately 74 per
cent of our sample is female. Because we do not know the charac-
teristics of our population, it is difficult to say whether or not this
is representative. However, many organisations in (mental) health-
care and social work, with relatively many female employees, are
involved in Safety Houses. This does explain the large proportion
of women in our sample. Most respondents have had higher voca-
tional training, which is to be expected as the involved profession-
als commonly carry out complex, but practical tasks. Within the PII
teams, the age difference is not that large (7.56 years). Most respon-
dents are around 45 years old, suggesting that we have a represen-
tative sample of experienced professionals in the PII teams.
The case meetings, on average, take place about 50 times per
year, so almost weekly, and the average meeting duration is nearly
1.5 hours. Overall, the respondents are quite satisfied with the skill
of the chair, with an average score of 3.85 out of 5, with the low-
est team average still being close to a pass. We do observe, how-
ever, that intra-team disagreement about the skill of the chair is
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substantial, albeit not huge (0.61): Most respondents from the same
PII team give the chair the same score, or one grade above or below.
The mean presence of a professional at the network location is 8.25
hours per week.
Table 4.2 shows the bivariate correlations between variables in
our data, including their significance levels. We find a significantly
negative relation between frequency and duration of meetings. The
more often meetings are organised the shorter they tend to be. Also,
we observe a significant relation between the mean skill of the chair
and the standard deviation of this skill variable: When intra-team
disagreement is high, the assessed mean skill tends to be lower.
Overall, we note that none of the bivariate correlations between
any pair of independent variables is above 0.5, way below the rule-
of-thumb threshold of 0.7. To check for multivariate multicollinear-
ity, we calculated the variance inflation factor (VIF): all VIF scores
are well below the common threshold for concern of 10 for all vari-
ables (1.38, on average).
We also studied the intragroup correlations to see to what ex-
Table 4.1: Descriptives
Mean SD Min Max
Interdisciplinary cooperation 3.59 0.24 3.1 4
Gender (proportion) 0.74 0.25 0 1
Education (SD) 0.37 0.32 0 1
Age (SD) 7.56 3.72 0 15
Meeting frequency 49.56 62.62 10.6 255
Meeting duration 1.48 0.34 0.6 2
Mean chair’s skill 3.85 0.36 3 5
Disagreement chair’s skill (SD) 0.61 0.49 0 1
Hours at network location 8.25 7.74 1 37
N 38
SD = standard deviation;
Minimum is rounded to one decimal;
Maximum is rounded to an integer.
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tent team members agree on the different variables. On the mea-
sures that team members should agree, such as meeting frequency
and duration the intragroup agreement was 0.71 and 0.44 respec-
tively. There is no perfect agreement, which may be an indication
of some variability in the meeting frequency and duration of ran-
dom error. The agreement was much smaller on the amount of
time spend at the network location (0.15) and the skill of the chair
(0.00), as is to be expected as not every professional spends an equal
amount of time at the network location, and skill of the chair is a
more subjective measure.
Table 4.3 lists the results for our regressions for eight models
in total, starting with a Model 1 with only the control variables.
Subsequently, in Models 2 to 6, we have separately added the inde-
pendent variables of interest. Model 7 contains all variables, except
for the interaction effect. Model 8 is the full model, including the
moderation product term. Models 7 and 8 are the best in terms of
adjusted R2: The models explain about 49 per cent of the variance
in the dependent variable, which is very satisfactory indeed for
team-level research. Model 4, which includes the control variables
and Hours at the network location, has a relatively good adjusted R2
(0.28), too, which gives an indication that this is a relatively impor-
tant variable in explaining Interdisciplinary cooperation. As Model 8
does not produce a better fit than Model 7 in terms of explaining
variance, we have added Akaike and Bayesian Information Crite-
ria to indicate the best model fit. Model 7 has the lowest (most neg-
ative) information criteria, indicating that the more parsimonious
Model 7 is preferable to Model 8.
Models 7 and 8 provide support for Hypotheses 1, 2 and 6. First,
the frequency of case meetings has a marginally significant pos-
itive relation with interdisciplinary cooperation, but with a beta-
coefficient close to zero (0.0001). Although we cannot reject H1,
its practical importance probably is very limited due to the small
coefficient. Second, the duration of meetings is positively and sig-











































































































































































































































































are related to better interdisciplinary cooperation in the team. H2
is supported. Third, the hours that professionals spend at the net-
work location is positively and significantly related to cooperation,
too. Looking at the full Model 8, the coefficient is again quite small,
though. H6 is supported, but is perhaps not of that much practical
importance.
The results for the chairperson’s skill variables are mixed. On
the one hand, Models 5 and 7 show that the mean perception of
the chair’s skill is positively related to interdisciplinary coopera-
tion; When professional PII team members feel that, on average,
their chair is skilful, they are also more positive about interdisci-
plinary cooperation in their team. Increasing this skill of the chair
with one standard deviation from the mean will improve interdis-
ciplinary cooperation with 3.2 per cent, suggesting some practical
relevance. On the other hand, this result disappears when we add
the interaction with intra-team disagreement about the chair’s skill.
Disagreement per se is negatively related to interdisciplinary coop-
eration (as predicted), but never significant, whilst the interaction
effect is insignificant, too, but positive. We might now decide to
rest our case, and conclude that our Hypotheses 4 and 5 are unsup-
ported. However, as the mean chair’s skill variable is significant
in Models 2 and 4, a closer look at the marginal effects of mean
chairperson’s skill on interdisciplinary cooperation, conditional on
different values of intra-team disagreement, may reveal deeper in-
sights. We have done so by means of a conditional marginal plot,
as reproduced in Figure 4.2.
The marginal effect plot suggests that the overall moderating
effect of disagreement about the chair’s skill on the relation be-
tween mean chairperson’s skill and interdisciplinary cooperation
is positive, but insignificant. However, the conditional marginal ef-
fect plot offers subtle insights, as this plot demonstrates how much
effect intra-team disagreement has on the coefficient of the rela-
tionship between mean skill and interdisciplinary cooperation for


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































shows the confidence intervals (CI) for the coefficient. Whenever
the confidence intervals fall fully below or above zero, the coeffi-
cient is significant. The plot shows that there is, indeed, a tiny pos-
itive moderating effect that is significant for intermediate to high
levels of disagreement. When the standard deviation of disagree-
ment on the chair’s skill is approximately above 0.75, then dis-
agreement has a positive significant effect on the relation between
the mean skill of the chairperson and interdisciplinary cooperation.
Thus, our hypotheses as to the moderation effect of disagreement
on the relation between the mean skill of the chairperson and inter-
disciplinary cooperation are partially supported after all.
Jointly, all results regarding the chair’s skill hypotheses suggest
the following. First, the mean skill of the chairperson has a posi-
tively significant relation with interdisciplinary cooperation - thus,
we find support for H3. Second, disagreement about the chair’s
skill does not seem to have a negative effect per se, as none of the
coefficients of this variable reach significance. Therefore, we have
Figure 4.2: Marginal plot of mean chair skill and intra-team dis-
agreement
4.5. Discussion 139
to reject H4. Third, there is no overall interaction effect between the
mean chairperson’s skill and disagreement on this issue on inter-
disciplinary cooperation. Fourth, we do, however, observe that the
positive effect of the chairperson’s skill on interdisciplinary coop-
eration increases somewhat for intermediate to high levels of dis-
agreement. However, the sign of this partial moderation effect goes
against our prediction: Hence, we must reject H5. We return to this
surprising finding below.
4.5 Discussion
This chapter’s aim is to gain deeper insights into the structural
characteristics that NAOs can offer to their interdisciplinary net-
work professionals in order to enhance their collaborative effec-
tiveness. With this study, we hope to have come closer to bridging
a gap in the literature that focuses only little on practical work in
network arrangements with partners from very diverse disciplines
and ditto home organisations, in the public domain of police and
safety-related services: While quite some attention has been given
to a variety of governance aspects, not much is known about the
operational ins and outs of such network practices. Knowing what
does and what does not work in enhancing PII teamwork is im-
portant, as this can guide intervention in ways that enhance the
effectiveness of this emerging type of challenging cooperation in
the public sector. Our exploratory study into Dutch Safety Houses
has generated a series of insightful results, of which some are as ex-
pected and others are not - in terms of both statistical significance
and practical importance.
Meeting frequency is positively and significantly related to co-
operation in our interdisciplinary and inter-organisational teams.
By way of robustness check, we tested whether there was a non-
linear relationship, but none was found (available upon request),
indicating that more meetings are (slightly) better, even when they
are organised on a daily basis. However, the coefficient is so small
for this variable that there is little practical value in adding more
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meetings to the PII team’s schedule, the more so given that such
extra meetings are costly by absorbing time of professionals who
could otherwise be more productive in their home organisation.
Hence, from a cost-benefit perspective, increasing the number of
PII team meeting does not seem to be an effective and efficient in-
tervention practice.
Meeting duration is also positively and significantly related to
interdisciplinary cooperation. Obviously, meetings that take too
long may have a negative effect on (interdisciplinary) cooperation,
because professionals may find themselves and others tired from
lengthy discussions, as a result perhaps even coming to less pro-
ductive compromises. We did control for this initially by adding
the squared meeting duration variable in our regressions, but we
could not find a non-linear relation between meeting duration and
interdisciplinary cooperation (available upon request). It could be
that the number of observations in our small dataset is insufficient
to confirm any non-linearity, or that the cut-off point is located
far above two hours. Taking, for now, the linear relationship for
granted, our finding reveals substantial practical relevance of the
meeting duration variable. We do not control for the content of the
meeting. Obviously, by extending the meeting with an hour while
nothing productive is being done will probably not contribute to
perceived collaboration or performance. We may hypothesise that
as meetings get longer, professionals lose their focus and are per-
haps not as sharp in exchanging information or thinking regarding
good intervention plans. If so, we might be underestimating the
effect of the meeting duration on collaboration. Together with the
meeting frequency finding, this suggests that it may be interest-
ing to devote more research to these topics, which would be better
tested by means of a randomised experiment.
As far as the chairperson’s skill variable is concerned, the ev-
idence is mixed. On the one hand, we find that a skilful chair, in
the sense of making sure all professionals in a PII team are heard,
is positively and significantly associated with interdisciplinary co-
operation. On the other hand, however, intra-team disagreement
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about this skill does not turn out to be as crucial as we had ex-
pected. When disagreement is high, the moderating effect on the
relation between the mean skill of the chairperson and interdisci-
plinary cooperation is positive, but the overall effect is not signif-
icant. Surprisingly, though, for intermediate to high levels of dis-
agreement, this lack of consensus actually slightly enhances the re-
lation between mean chairperson’s skill and interdisciplinary co-
operation. The following suggestion for what could be going on is
merely speculative, but possibly, ignorance is bliss in this situation.
Disagreement about the chair’s skill may not lead to actual conflict
in the team, as those who do not feel that the chair invites them to
contribute, may believe they have nothing relevant to add anyway.
Overall, our findings suggest that stimulating the chair to give each
and every PII team member a say in the discussion is of practical
relevance, enhancing the PII team’s interdisciplinary cooperation
with or without intra-team agreement on how the chair performs
this critical task.
We did find a positive significant association between hours
spend at the network location and interdisciplinary cooperation,
but as with meeting frequency with such a small coefficient that
even if there is a causal effect, we can doubt whether in practice
asking from professionals to stay at the network location longer
will add much to the effectiveness of PII team cooperation. Again,
we checked for a non-linear relationship, but none was found (avail-
able upon request). From a cost-benefit perspective, expanding the
number of hours spend at the network location does not seem to
be an intervention strategy that deserves priority.
4.5.1 Limitations and future research
Inevitably, there are some limitations to this study, particularly
given its exploratory nature, being the first of its kind, to the best
of our knowledge. The way we have conducted this study is far
removed from the ideal research design of a randomised experi-
ment. We did not randomly subject teams to different conditions,
but rather took a sample of existing teams and their existing con-
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ditions. Yet, this sample could have been better as well. Although
the setting of Dutch Safety Houses is appropriate, we were only
able to collect data regarding a small number of meetings and PII
teams, and from those meetings and teams not all participants re-
sponded. Evidently, it would have been preferable to have a larger
and more complete sample. It was, however, difficult to gain suffi-
cient research access to all Safety Houses (only about 40, across the
country), because they are independent network organisations that
have to approached and convinced one by one. Note that this ac-
cess and small sample issue is anything but unique to our setting,
as this tends to be a real challenge in the context of any group-level
research with the ambition to have multiple respondents per team
(see e.g. Bogaert et al., 2012).
Furthermore, due to the lack of a randomised experiment, there
is little we can say about causality in this study. Thus we have to
be careful to interpret the associations that we have estimated be-
tween the variables. We can only be certain that the independent
variables cause variations in the dependent variable if there is no
other explanation for what we find. However, because we proba-
bly do not measure all variables that may be relevant, we cannot be
sure that this is indeed the case. From our preliminary interviews
with PII team members and NAO members, we found that the vari-
ables which we tested were to the largest extent determined by the
participating organisations and the NAO. They decided how often
meetings should approximately occur, how long meetings should
last and how much time PII team members can spend at the net-
work location. This makes sense, because the PII team members of-
ten have to execute tasks at the home organisation as well. Organ-
isations that participate in the Safety House do not want their em-
ployees running off to the network location at random moments;
they should be available to the home organisation to a greater or
lesser extent. Yet, we cannot exclude the possibility that sometimes,
or at some Safety Houses, the PII team has something to say about
meeting frequency or duration. In that sense, if collaboration is go-
ing well, and they feel it is productive, the PII team may ask for
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more, or longer meetings, which could suggest that there might
be some reversed causality going on. As we do not have a panel
dataset, we cannot test this, though. In relation to the time spend
at the network location, PII team members may have a stronger
upper limit than a lower limit. That a professional is allowed to
spend 10 hours at the network location, does not mean that (s)he
will actually have to do that, or in fact does that. How much time
is spend at the network location may be related to how much the
professional likes spending time with other team members (to the
extent they are structurally present), and/or to the work pressure
of the professional that forces him or her to be at the home organi-
sation or with clients. As such, we may overestimate the estimated
association between spending time at the network location and col-
laboration.
Secondly, not all variables were measured in an optimal way.
Particularly, we had to rely on subjective measures of the chair’s
skill and interdisciplinary cooperation. In principle, objective mea-
sures of such variables are to be preferred. However, again, collect-
ing objective information about this type of variables is never easy
in team research - let alone in the context of public organisations
that are associated with additional measurement complexities due
to the very nature of their activities, as we will discuss further in
Chapter 5. Luckily, as far as our outcome measure is concerned, ear-
lier work illustrates that the Interprofessional Cooperation Index
is a good alternative (Mellin et al., 2010). Still, future work could
introduce other outcome measures, such as those based on client-
specific performance information. Moreover, regarding the critical
chair’s skill input variable, the actual perception of the chair’s skill
by team members is what really counts for team functioning, im-
plying that using a subjective measure is appropriate anyway. Nev-
ertheless, now that this study has shown that intra-team disagree-
ment regarding this skill is not so relevant for interdisciplinary co-
operation, future research may check the robustness of the effect of
the perceived mean skill of the chairperson by introducing a wider
set of, subjective and objective, measures. In Dutch Safety Houses,
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for instance, future work might explore whether or not a chair has
received special training, how (s)he performed during this training,
and how both skill-related variables affect intra-team chairperson
skill assessments (mean and spread) and interdisciplinary coordi-
nation.
This study is but a first step in studying the structural character-
istics that NAOs can offer to enhance team cooperation in interdis-
ciplinary networks with professionals from different home organ-
isations. We have produced preliminary evidence that some struc-
tural variables contribute significantly and practically to team co-
operation, above and beyond the oft-studied governance aspects,
but there is still a black box in terms of the functioning of such
PII teams. For instance, we have reason to believe that staying at
the network location longer improves interdisciplinary coopera-
tion, but we do not know how staying longer affects specific as-
pects of team functioning such as trust building or agreement fine-
tuning. Moreover, as this is the first study of its kind, we decided
to engage in cherry-picking, focusing on a limited set of structural
characteristics, leaving other potentially important variables unex-
plored, an example being the chairperson’s and team members’
personalities (see e.g. Boone et al., 2004), or intra-PII faultlines (see
e.g. Rico et al., 2007). Future works can deepen our understanding
of PII teamwork by further opening the black box of team function-
ing.
4.5.2 Policy implications
Given the correlational nature of our study, it is difficult to make
policy implications, because we cannot be sure about causality. Our
evidence suggests that practically, the relation between lengthier
meetings and cooperation is more relevant than that between meet-
ing frequency and cooperation. There might be something to gain
by lengthening meetings, but future research would have to point
out if there is truly a causal relation between the two variables.
Meetings should, of course, not be extended endlessly anyway, but
our results suggest a positve relation up to at least 2 hours. We did
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not find a very strong relation between cooperation and time spent
at the network location, such that we would perhaps not recom-
mend this as a policy. Our findings do suggest there is a relation
between a skilful PII team chairpersons and collaboration. Chairs
might have an important role in extracting the maximum informa-
tion from all involved PII professional team members to come to
the best agreements, combining the variety of arguments and in-
sights from the disciplinary perspectives represented in the team in
such a way that the total is more than the sum of the parts. Again,
future research has to point out whether there is indeed causality,
but this first explorative study does at least hint towards the rele-




Performance Bias through a
MTMM Model∗
Beauty is in the eye of the beholder, and it may be necessary from
time to time to give a stupid or misinformed beholder a black eye.†
Abstract
Knowing as an organisation how you perform in the eyes of stakeholders is im-
portant for (public) organisations, for both legitimacy and normative stakeholder
management. This will mean performing well on a range of objective and subjec-
tive measures. However, subjective perception measures are likely to be biased.
The bias can depend upon the specific stakeholder’s position vis-à-vis the focal
organisation. We show how a multi-trait-multi-method (MTMM) model cannot
only determine the validity of performance measures, but is also valuable in gen-
erating estimates the potential biases in both method (e.g., respondent type) and
trait (e.g., performance measure) of these subjective performance measures. To
demonstrate the benefits of this methodology in public management we apply
this method to the subjective performance of police forces in 26 European coun-
tries.
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In Chapters 2, 3 and 4, we investigate the relations between vari-
ables of interest and the satisfaction or perceived performance a-
mongst stakeholders. Knowing whether stakeholders are satisfied
with the performance of the focal organisation can be critical to
policy and strategy-making in both the private and public sector.
Private organisations will often want to perform well on perfor-
mance indicators that are important for shareholders, competitors,
or parties that have a potential interest in taking over the focal or-
ganisation. In these cases, the performance measures that are clos-
est to the satisfaction of stakeholders, also lay closest to measures
that are commonly measured by researchers as indicators of organ-
isational performance, such as objective financial performance in-
dicators, product market measures and shareholder return metrics
(Richard et al., 2009). In public sector research, the satisfaction of
stakeholders with the performance of the focal organisation is not
less important, because the organisation holds accountability to the
citizenry. The issue of performance measurement is however more
intricate, as organisational performance measures are more diffi-
cult to construct in the context of not-for-profit organisations. For
one, some stakeholders will care about outputs, while other stake-
holders will do so outcomes. For example, staying in our policing
context, the (local or national) government might require the po-
lice to achieve certain outputs, such as police patrols, or a certain
percentage of cases solved within a certain period. If the police
achieves these outcomes, the respective stakeholders will be sat-
isfied. In other cases, stakeholders will not give a clear ’target’, care
rather about outcomes, or do not even keep track of any measures
of performance that they should supposedly care about. The aver-
age citizen does not have frequent contact with the police, and may
relate their satisfaction or perception of police performance to how
safe they feel, how much police they see on the street, or what they
hear in the media.
Given the complexity of performing well in the eyes of stake-
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holders, a separate stream of literature focuses on the question as
to how public organisations’ performance actually should be con-
ceived and how this performance can be measured. Clearly, organ-
isational performance, or what stakeholders can/should be satis-
fied with, is less straightforward to determine for public organi-
sations because they commonly do not (aim to) make a profit, or
do not prioritise on efficiency (Anheier, 2000). To complicate mat-
ters further, public organisations often have a range of goals that
may be conflicting, serving their variety of different stakeholders
(Andrews et al., 2006).1 This is exactly why public sector studies
often use a mixture of different organisational performance mea-
sures. While some of these performance measures might be objec-
tive, pleasing specific stakeholder groups, many performance mea-
sures will likely be of a subjective nature, such as survey informa-
tion from different groups of the organisation’s stakeholders.
An issue that is very important to consider when using subjec-
tive performance measures is: Who are (or should be) the judges of
performance? Evidently, asking customers rather than producers
about customer satisfaction makes perfect sense, theoretically and
methodologically. However, perhaps more often than not, deciding
on who should be the judge of a public organisation’s performance
is not so straightforward at all. Given that public organisations
tend to feature a set of goals, targeting different groups of stake-
holders, an appropriate measure of organisational performance in-
volves multiple indicators, including a mixture of subjective mea-
sures collected through surveys among different groups of stake-
holders. For example, measuring a university’s performance com-
prehensively requires reliable and valid measures from the per-
spective of a range of internal and external stakeholders, such as,
students, teachers, managers and policy-makers.
1This is not to say that such issues are irrelevant in the context of private sector
organisations. Occasionally, for example, private sector work focuses on subjec-
tive measures such as customer satisfaction or managerial assessment. A case
in point is the literature on subsidiary performance of multinational enterprises,
which oftentimes resorts to managerial perception measures in the absence of
deconsolidated financial figures (e.g. Dikova and van Witteloostuijn, 2007).
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This implies a methodological challenge, because different stake-
holder groups may well be characterised by different perceptual bi-
ases. For instance, a university’s teachers might consistently over-
estimate performance as to teaching quality, whereas the univer-
sity’s students may systematically underestimate teaching quality.
Obviously, one might argue that perhaps it is the perception of
the student that matters here; if the stakeholder is not satisfied,
than it is up to the focal organisation to do something about this;
or to manage the stakeholder differently. However, if the stake-
holder is mostly biased, and does not objectively value the manage-
ment strategy of the focal organisation, then changing strategy may
not change performance much on the expectations of the stake-
holder. Suppose the management method of the focal organisation
towards the stakeholder is in fact optimal, but the that stakeholder
holds a negative bias towards the focal organisation, then trying to
tackle the bias might increase the perceived performance, whereas
changing the management strategy would not.
In this chapter, we suggest a methodological toolkit designed
to examine this issue of stakeholder bias, or respondent bias more
generally. Our aim is to raise interest for this topic in public ad-
ministration, as little has been written about informant bias in the
field, to date. The issue is discussed in empirical studies, but no-
body addresses the issue in a more methodological fashion, or of-
fers suggestions to solving the issue. In some other fields, such as
economics and psychology, informant bias is more frequently stud-
ied and accounted for. The issue of performance measurement and
bias is highly relevant, not only from a policy perspective, but also
from an academic view point. For instance, theoretical advances
in any field are highly dependent on empirical (dis)confirmation
(Donaldson and Grant-Vallone, 2002). Doing research based on bi-
ased measures can lead to support for inflated or deflated relation-
ships (Rogelberg, 2002) and hence invalid conclusions and incor-
rect support for (or rejection of) a theory. In this chapter we explain
and demonstrate an alternative way to determine and filters out bi-
ases: the so-called multi-trait-multi-method (MTMM) model. This
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model can estimate the magnitude of biases in the answers of sam-
ples of different groups of respondents, with the additional feature
that it can test the validity of measures, which is important if one
wants to measure one type of performance, based on several items.
For example, if the police would like to know how satisfied stake-
holders are with telephone communication with the police, they
might ask a number of questions, related to how fast the call was
answered, whether the police officer was helpful and polite, etc.
The MTMM model can then show if these questions indeed under-
lie the greater question of whether the stakeholder is satisfied with
telephone communication with the police.
Because the MTMM model does not only test whether there is
a bias, but also shows where the bias is, it gives researchers a lot
of information about their data, and allows them to make educated
decisions about how to proceed with their analysis. The MTMM
model is already quite commonly applied in the domain of psy-
chology, and is attracting increasing interest in organisational be-
haviour and sub-disciplines of the general management field such
as marketing and operations management. The methodology has
been developed, and is readily adopted, in these and other disci-
plines, but has yet to gain recognition in the field of public admin-
istration. Hence, in this chapter we investigate the following ques-
tion:
How are MTMM models useful in showing bias in perceived perfor-
mance of policing in Europe?
We demonstrate the MTMM model by means of an example in
policing, to stay as close as possible to the topic at hand. We anal-
yse unique data available from the European Social Survey (ESS)
to study biases in the opinions regarding three indicators of po-
lice performance (i.e., catching burglars, arrival times, and taking
bribes) of police employees and two groups of external stakehold-
ers: corporate managers and healthcare professionals. The MTMM
model we estimate in this policing example is used to answer
two specific questions: (1) Do the subjective performance measures
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used in the ESS offer an adequate assessment of overall police per-
formance as perceived by respondents?; and (2) Are police em-
ployees more biased in assessing police performance than external
stakeholders? We show that by applying a MTMM model we are
able to estimate trait, method and error variance, and thus to estab-
lish any biases amongst samples of different types of professionals
(i.e., police employees, corporate managers, and healthcare profes-
sionals). Moreover, we illustrate how this model can be applied to
evaluate the convergent validity of survey items, which provides
further information about their appropriateness as performance
measures (in our case, regarding policing organisations).
With this chapter, we aim to make several contributions to the
existing literature. Our main contribution is methodological: We in-
troduce the MTMM model in the field of public administration as a
toolkit to examine and potentially overcome biases in subjective or-
ganisational performance assessments across different stakehold-
ers. In so doing, we hope to enrich the debate on the use and ap-
propriateness of subjective performance measures in public organ-
isations. We show that the MTMM model does offer a very useful
and robust methodology when applied to the study of public sector
performance. Combining the MTMM methodology with the use of
various subjective performance measures can be a great alternative
to the current practice where performance is still often measured by
questioning a single type of respondent (e.g. operations manager)
or class of respondents (e.g. employees). Moreover, we illustrate
the practical usefulness of the MTMM model in European polic-
ing, focusing on differences between ’insider’ and ’outsider’ stake-
holder groups. Finally, this chapter adds to the literature on organ-
isational performance, generally, where the MTMM methodology
has only rarely been used, to the extent of our knowledge.
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5.2 Literature review
5.2.1 Performance measurement in the public sector
Boyne (2002) divided available performance measures regarding
public and private organisations under five headings:
1. Outputs - both quantity and quality;
2. Efficiency - cost per unit of output;
3. Service outcomes - such as impact and equity;
4. Responsiveness - such as consumer and staff satisfaction;
5. Democratic outcomes - such as participation and accountabil-
ity.
As one can see, many of these performance measures are based
on perceptions of stakeholders, clear examples being consumer and
staff satisfaction. A well-established insight in the cognitive psy-
chology of perception is, however, that any judgement of the per-
formance of oneself or someone else is very likely to be biased.
Research has abundantly shown that people tend to overestimate
their own performance on a variety of items. For example, peo-
ple overestimate their own popularity (Zuckerman and Jost, 2001)
and how well they can drive a car compared to others (McCormick
et al., 1986). In the case of organisational performance, Safizadeh
et al. (1996) report that average performance as perceived by man-
agers is improbably far above the industry average. In case of the
police, this is probably no different (Graham et al., 2012).
These biases, inherent to subjective performance measures, have
stimulated the emergence of the popular ’performance indicator
movement’ (Bird et al., 2005), which promotes the use of "hard" or
"objective" public service performance metrics. Despite the popu-
larity of this movement, in practice, perceptual or "soft" or "sub-
jective" measures are still frequently used in public and private
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management studies.2 This is understandable. Not only are non-
perceptual measures often simply unavailable, but, more impor-
tantly, objective measures often do not cover all the dimensions of
organisational performance that really need to be measured. Par-
ticularly in service sectors, maximising (financial) outcomes is less
important than using those outcomes to learn from and to improve
customer service and performance (Vargo and Lusch, 2004). Fur-
thermore, public organisations typically have to satisfy multiple
objectives (Andrews et al., 2006), although public managers can be
incentivised to focus on specific targets commonly known to be
measured by performance management systems (Clarkson et al.,
2009; Wilson et al., 2006), which are likely to be important to only a
limited number highly influential stakeholders, like governments.
All this implies that for measuring organisational performance, es-
pecially in public organisations, using a diverse set of objective and
subjective performance gauges often leads to the ’best’ estimate of
overall organisational performance. Just asking a single source how
they feel about their own performance or that of their organisation
tends to be associated with a systematic bias. We argue that the ap-
propriate design is often to involve multiple sources from a variety
of different stakeholders.
Andrews et al. (2011) reviewed 85 studies from major public ad-
ministration journals that use and/or analyse measures of organi-
sational performance in the public sector. They report that the large
majority falls into the categories outlined by Boyne (2002). A major-
ity of the studies rely on non-perceptual administrative measures
(52), while a smaller number (22) only uses perceptual survey infor-
mation. A small number of 11 studies include both administrative
and survey measures to construct public service performance in-
2The "objective" versus "subjective" and "hard" versus "soft" terminology is mis-
leading, as many so-called "hard" or "objective" metrics can be quite subjec-
tive. From here on, in this chapter, we therefore refer to perceptual versus non-
perceptual measures. Perhaps, measures of attitudes and perceptions, rather
than the (semi-)hard facts, are more appropriate organisational performance in-
dicators anyway, keeping in mind Andrews et al.’s (2006) observation that public
service beauty is in the eye of the stakeholder.
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dicators. Administrative measures are metrics collected and pub-
lished by government organisations, while surveys are generally
conducted amongst citizens and other stakeholders by academic
researchers. The administrative metrics may not necessarily map
perfectly onto the survey measures, but having the former com-
bined with the latter provides both an internal and an external per-
spective on organisational performance indicators. A few studies
use both managers’ and citizens’ opinions on items such as cus-
tomer satisfaction (Walker et al., 2011) and organisational effective-
ness (Meier and O’Toole, 2013).
Andrews et al. (2011) also looked into the 11 studies that used
both administrative and survey measures. They conclude that, in
general, which measure was used did not really matter for the con-
clusions. Hypothesised relations between drivers for public ser-
vice performance are confirmed equally well for administrative
vis-à-vis survey measures of public service performance. However,
the few studies that combine managers’ and citizens’ opinions on
public service performance produce different insights. The rela-
tion between performance drivers and subjective performance as-
sessed by managers is less strong than that between the perfor-
mance drivers and subjective performance evaluated by citizens.
Although realising that more work is needed before strong conclu-
sions can be drawn, they suggest that public managers may well
underestimate the effects of their activities on performance as per-
ceived by citizens. What is clear, is that the perceptions of different
groups of respondents are not similar, as the citizens’ opinion is
more strongly connected to the performance drivers than that of
the managers. The difference may be due to an informant bias,
possibly on the side of the managers, but there is no a priori reason
to assume that citizens’ are not biased.
What we can conclude from the extant literature is that the
number of established performance measures in public sector stud-
ies is plentiful, both in non-perceptual and perceptual terms. Re-
searchers may want to use either type of performance measures in
their work, and preferably even both, to get a good idea of overall
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performance on the expectations of a diverse group of stakehold-
ers. However, just like in any other discipline, researchers of public
organisations have to be cautious when using subjective measures.
The existence of biases has not only been proven, but also the idea
that people may perceive phenomena differently is common sense.
To the best of our knowledge, too little attention has been paid
to the respondents’ biases in public administration research, to
date. The subjective measures are often implicitly, but wrongly so,
assumed to be unbiased, while other disciplines have advanced,
discussed and adopted new methodologies to initially validate
their performance measures. We suggest that also in the field of
public administration methodologies need to be used that (a) can
estimate the direction and magnitude of these biases so that (b)
these can be controlled for statistically and/or (c) can be accounted
for whilst interpreting the evidence. A suitable tool for such an
assessment of biases is the MTMM model.
5.2.2 The multi-trait-multi-method model
The MTMM model offers a toolkit to examine potential biases in
measures on the basis of subjective assessments of "raters" or re-
spondents, or other so-called "methods". Figure 5.1 visualises the
MTMM model. The ’traits’ are the different constructs that are be-
ing measured, which could, for example, be different measures of
organisational performance.
The original MTMM matrix by Campbell and Fiske (1959) is al-
ready common ground for public administration researchers test-
ing the convergent validity of their measures. It has developed
since the 1960s into a more complex confirmatory factor analy-
sis methodology, which offers a systematic toolkit to assess trait,
method and random error variance by means of sophisticated sta-
tistical software.
The central argument behind the MTMM model is that vari-
ance stems from this set of three sources. The first source is the
(1) trait - that is, the variance in what one actually tries to mea-



















sure. True score theory (Lord et al., 1968) suggests that we can as-
sume that each organisation has a true or "objective" performance
score (or any other score, for that matter) that we try to measure.
However, the measured subjective score can be disturbed as a re-
sult of types of respondents who structurally over- or underesti-
mate the performance score. This is what is referred to as variance
due to the (2) method. Method can be defined in broader terms, but
here this relates to the variance caused by different types of raters
or respondents, providing biased assessments regarding the same
items. Then, raters are not capable of giving an "objective" subjec-
tive score of performance. Such variance may lead to serious bias
in parameter estimation (Doty and Glick, 1998).
Finally, disturbance can come from (3) random error, a variance
unique to the indicator. This can occur for a variety of reasons -
for example, because the respondent has no clue what the perfor-
mance score is, or doubts between different assessments. Because
of the random nature of this source of dispersion from the "objec-
tive" performance score, this type of variance should not challenge
parameter estimation to the extent that method bias does. How-
ever, random error variance, too, frustrates the construction of the
reliable and consistent measures that researchers so much desire.
Obviously, high trait variance (as this is the type of variation that
we seek to understand) and low error and method variance (as
these disturb the reliability and validity of our measures) would
be suggestive of a good indicator. In this case, a researcher may
come close to measuring a "subjective" performance score that is
"objectively" rated, and hence close to the "truth". When finding
low trait variance, the appropriateness of an indicator and/or the
respondents who have been included in the rater sample should be
seriously questioned.3
It can be a bit difficult to understand how one can measure a
3If low trait variance does not come as a surprise, then any scholarly study is
pointless, as we cannot expect to find any meaningful results with variables that
are characterised by low variance anyway. In our example, this would mean that
all police organisations perform equally bad or good, implying that studies seek-
ing to explain variance in performance are a dead end.
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’true’ score, when talking about subjective questions. Here a ref-
erence to the book The Wisdom of Crowds (Surowiecki, 2005) may
make our logic clearer. The main idea is that that a diverse collec-
tion of independently deciding individuals is likely to make certain
types of decisions and predictions better than single individuals or
even experts. Surowiecki gives numerous examples of this, such as
guessing the weight of an ox at a county fair. Despite that many
of the guessers had no knowledge of cattle, the average guess was
only 1 pound lower than the actual weight. The average guess was
closer to the actual weight than any individual guess, including
those of experts. That this works in practise is because individuals
make independent guesses - there is no bias. Error is random, so
by taking the average of all observations that cancels out, leaving
the ’true score’. Of course, this is more straightforward when there
is an objective answer. However, Surowiecki argues that this can
work equally well for more subjective issues. We have a standard,
not necessarily a high one, which allows us to give a good approxi-
mation of whether a particular strategy is good or bad, or a success
or a failure.
Apart from measuring the ’true’ score, the MTMM model has
another merit. The MTMM model shows that different groups of
people structurally deviate in their perception based on a character-
istic, such as their profession. This is still interesting for researchers
to know and to take into account when they are conducting a study
with respondent data. It still warrants for researchers to think in
advance about their respondents, whether they want a particular
group, or groups that do not structurally differ, or perhaps rather
random assignment.
This MTMM model is frequently used in the field of psychol-
ogy to assess measurement scales, and has its roots there. Byrne
and Bazana (1996), for example, study the assessment of social and
academic competencies in children by parents, teachers, peers, and
the children themselves. They find that, for pre-adolescent chil-
dren, perceptions are best estimated by children themselves and
their parents, but adolescent children are best judged on academic
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competencies by teachers and on social competencies by peers. Ep-
kins (1994) asks similar informants about the depression, anxiety
and aggression of children, but find that they are in overall agree-
ment of the children’s behaviour, again using an MTMM model,
indicating that the scales commonly used for such research are ap-
propriate for different informants.
The MTMM model is used less in assessing organisational per-
formance. Ketokivi and Schroeder (2004) find this unfortunate, be-
cause the MTMM model is more nuanced, and provides more in-
formation, than do the established inter-rater reliability or inter-
rater agreement statistics, which are popular methods in empiri-
cal studies in operations management and other fields in private
and public management. In their study of subjective performance
of manufacturing plants, they compare the responses of the plant
manager, research coordinator, and supervisor. They find both large
method and error variance, concluding that, despite the validity
and reliability of measures, the use of multiple informants is neces-
sary in order to achieve unbiased results. Venkatraman and Ra-
manujam (1987) use a MTMM model to show that senior-level
managers (e.g., CEOs) are not as biased in their assessment of firm
performance than many researchers argue they are, but also war-
rant the use of multiple informants to control for potential biases.
Blindenbach-Driessen et al. (2010) make use of an MTMM model in
their study of innovation projects to show that the success of such
projects needs to be judged based on both operational performance
and product performance. They find that project leaders appear to
be better informed to assess operational performance, while inno-
vation managers are better capable to assess product performance.
To the best of our knowledge, the MTMM model is not at all
used in the field of public administration to assess biases, but the
literature gives several examples of where an MTMM model can
be put to good use. We believe that the MTMM model could of-
fer a worthwhile contribution for public administration studies.
Similar to studying how a bank or manufacturing plant performs,
one could also question how governmental organisations perform
5.2. Literature review 161
(for instance, after a policy shock). Performance measures that have
been analysed by a MTMM model, give researchers more informa-
tion about how (un)biased such methods are. Hence, it allows them
to control for biases or, if necessary, develop other measures. By
means of an example in policing, we will illustrate the added value
of the MTMM model methodology above and beyond the standard
methods. We will go through this example as if we were preparing
the data for analysis. Hence, apart from demonstrating the bias-
detecting capabilities of the MTMM model, we will show how this
toolkit can be used to check for convergent and discriminant valid-
ity, and discuss other sources of hazard that can be encountered
when doing a MTMM model with subjective performance mea-
sures.
5.2.3 A policing example
The measures of police performance that can be found in the litera-
ture overlap with the five performance measurement categories of
Boyne (2002), to some extent, but also seem to be lagging behind in
advancement vis-à-vis other public sector industries. Collier (2006)
reflects upon the state of the art in the development of performance
indicators in policing by summing up a few findings. The focus
has primarily been on indicators that force accountability upon po-
lice forces in terms of organisational efficiency and solved crimes.
In policing, the focus is on "raw" numbers and "hard" metrics, but
these can be difficult to work with as "objective" performance mea-
sures, such as crime rates, are influenced by a large number of
other variables (such as unemployment or income distribution).
We agree that as a statistical hurdle, much can be overcome by re-
searchers if they have a decent research design. Stakeholders, how-
ever, who do not (always) do the statistical analysis, may be in-
clined to make assumptions about relations that may in fact not
be there. Additionally, the focus on efficiency indicators of polic-
ing provides a one-sided perspective on policing performance, as
some stakeholders not necessarily favour an efficient police force,
but rather a police force that carries out its tasks well. Despite the
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increased focus on stakeholders in the public sector domain, lit-
tle attention has been paid to perceptions of policing "clients". So,
turning to subjective measures by consulting stakeholder groups
would clearly add to police performance studies.
When introducing subjective measures, the issue of systematic
bias among stakeholder groups cannot be ignored. For example, a
bias is likely to occur when asking internal (police officers) or ex-
ternal stakeholders (citizens, or public prosecutors) about policing
performance. A recent study by Graham et al. (2012) posed police
performance questions to a set of 382 policing professionals and 59
external stakeholder representatives such as union representatives,
mayors and public prosecutors. Respondents were asked how well
the police perform on the requirements of formal authorities, vis-
à-vis the expectations of external parties, and compared to their in-
ternal priorities. They were also asked to what extent police’s in-
ternal priorities were aligned with the requirements of formal au-
thorities and the expectations of external parties. It was found that
policing professionals are (significantly) more satisfied with their
performance on these items than are the external stakeholder rep-




The data for this analysis were collected as part of the fifth round
of the European Social Survey (ESS), conducted in 2010 (European
Social Survey, 2010).4 The ESS is a bi-annual multi-country sur-
vey that addresses the attitudes and behaviours of people across
European countries over time. Five rounds of the survey have
been conducted since 2002, and data are freely available for non-
profit usage. The survey is identical in all countries and has been
subject to a careful translation strategy to ensure that translations
4The data set is available at http://ess.nsd.uib.no/ess/round5/.
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are appropriate (European Social Survey, 2009). It makes use of
strict random probability sampling, a minimum target response
rate of 70 per cent, and rigorous translation protocols (Başlevent
and Kirmanoǧlu, 2012). The hour-long face-to-face interview in-
cludes questions on a variety of core topics repeated from previ-
ous rounds of the survey, and a module developed specifically for
Round 5 only covering ’trust in the police’. Data on more than 650
variables was collected in 2010 in 26 countries.5 Our focus is on the
policing variables and the occupation of respondents. Hence, we
only use a small portion of the data.
The data for our analysis comes from three types of informants:
(1) police employees like police inspectors, crime detectives and po-
lice officers; (2) corporate managers, being defined as respondents
who, as directors, chief executives or department managers, man-
age enterprises, organisations or departments that employ a total
of three or more managers (ISCO 88 definition); and (3) health-
care professionals, including a range of doctors, nurses, midwifes,
dentists, pharmacists, medical assistants, psychologists and social
work professionals. We decided to work with respondents from
these three different professional groups for four reasons. First,
given this study’s purposes, we need to have different kinds of
raters. Second, for statistical reasons, three or more groups of raters
are generally preferred when using a MTMM model (Cote, 1995).
Third, as we have data from 26 European countries, we selected
professional groups with relatively large sample sizes. Fourth, this
set of three professional groups nicely reflects different perspec-
tives - internal (police employees) versus external (corporate man-
agers and healthcare professionals), and from primarily the private
(corporate managers) versus the public sector (healthcare profes-
sionals).
Different occupational or professional groups are likely to have
5Countries included are Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary,
Ireland, Israel, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation,
Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Ukraine.
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a different perspective on policing. A bus driver may have differ-
ent perceptions of the police vis-à-vis a plumber or a teacher. Yet,
due to the size of our dataset, we have decided to define broader
categories of respondents’ occupations or professions that we be-
lieve to have a similar professional identity. Specifically, we in-
clude healthcare professionals based on the suggestion of Hunt and
Arend (2002) that healthcare professionals may have a biased view
on policing due to their focus on individual patients rather than on
society at large. We have extended this occupational group to pro-
fessionals with a similar focus, but who work in emotional health-
care, to increase our sample size. We believe that these profession-
als have a similar view on client priorities, and thus serve the pur-
pose of our demonstration. Corporate managers are included be-
cause they may be primarily driven by financial motives in their
work, rather than by people. Our argument is that their focus on
efficiency may influence their perception of the performance of a
public organisation such as the police.
For our demonstrative purposes, we choose professional groups
that we believe are likely to have different opinions and ideas about
policing and police performance. Evidently, when doing a study, a
researcher may rather prefer to choose respondents who he/she
believes are not too biased, and use a MTMM model to validate
these beliefs. These are merely examples to illustrate the use of the
MTMM methodology. We want to stay as close as possible to the
topic of stakeholder management in policing, and that is why we
chose these readily available data (and professional groups) from
the European Social Survey.
5.3.2 Measures
All respondents have provided answers to three questions: (1) How
successful are the police at catching house burglars in your coun-
try? (with a scale ranging from 0 = extremely unsuccessful to 10 =
extremely successful); (2) How quickly would the police arrive at a
violent crime/burglary scene near to where you live? (with a scale
ranging from 0 = extremely slowly to 10 = extremely quickly); and
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(3) How often do the police in your country take bribes? (with a
scale ranging from 0 = never to 10 = always). Our choice concern-
ing the variables to include was restricted to the items that are in
the ESS of 2010, but we believe that this set of ESS items serves
our purposes very well, for both substantive and statistical rea-
sons. The lack of a common assessment scale substantially reduces
a potential source of common-method bias (Chang et al., 2010a;
Podsakoff et al., 2003). Common-method bias is variance that is at-
tributable to the measurement method, often caused by the use of
single respondent surveys (Chang et al., 2010a). Furthermore, be-
cause answers are given on a ten-point scale, extreme multivariate
non-normality is unlikely, as the answers can be more dispersed.
Moreover, we may expect that all three variables are correlated:
A well-performing police force solves crimes, arrives in time, and
does not take bribes (as bribery negatively affects execution of core
policing tasks).
Our sample consists of 267 police employees, 3,592 corporate
managers and 1,969 healthcare professionals. We used the cem com-
mand in Stata SE 12 to force case-to-case matching of corporate
managers and healthcare professionals with police employees in
the sample by country. By forcing case matching by country we en-
sure that ratings are given with reference to the same country. This
implies the assumption that our subjective performance measures
are roughly equal at a national level, but differ across countries.
The number of observations is too low to generate a statistically
meaningful match at a regional level. Because of the limited num-
ber of police employees in the sample, we ended up with a dataset
with 225 cases of ratings on three subjective performance variables
for three different rater groups. Raters have been sorted on age by
country in an attempt to match younger and older raters at the
country level, as our dataset was too small to exactly sort by age
(or an age category). We have tested in Stata SE 12 whether there
was a significant within-occupation difference between males and
females in their opinions about police performance, and found this
not to be the case, ruling out a gender effect. We have used Amos
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20.0 to estimate our model.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Mean comparisons
An initial suggestion for respondent bias may arise from significant
mean differences. The mean differences on our measured variables
for the different professional groups are reported in Table 5.1. The
t-tests reveal that police employees are significantly more positive
about their performance than both external rater groups - corpo-
rate managers and healthcare professionals - on all the subjective
police performance variables. They believe to arrive quicker at a
crime scene, to catch more burglars, and to take fewer bribes. So,
in these data, too, a systematic rater group-specific bias can be ob-
served. Whether this is only a positive bias on the side of the police
or also a negative bias on the side of the external professionals will
be assessed in our MTMM model. Moreover, estimating a MTMM
model produces insights as to the relative bias per different respon-
dent category, as well as vis-à-vis both other sources of variance
(trait and random error).
Table 5.1: Mean comparison
Variable Method Mean
Significantly different from
police perspective (p <0.001)
Arrival time Police employees 6.92 -
Healthcare professionals 5.74 Yes
Corporate managers 5.68 Yes
Catching burglars Police employees 5.64 -
Healthcare professionals 4.37 Yes
Corporate managers 4.39 Yes
Taking bribes Police employees 2.51 -
Healthcare professionals 4.09 Yes
Corporate managers 4.28 Yes
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5.4.2 Statistical assumptions
A reasonably multivariate normal distribution is an assumption re-
garding maximum likelihood estimation of a MTMM model (Byrne,
2001; Jöreskog, 1979). We have tested for excess skewness and kur-
tosis, as our ten-point scale variables do not satisfy the normal-
ity assumption. The skewness and kurtosis statistics of individual
items range between [-0.64, 0.96] for skewness and [-0.53, 0.62] for
kurtosis, suggesting no problems with the individual items (Byrne,
2001). Moreover, Mardia’s (1970) coefficient of multivariate kurto-
sis is 1.27, which is indicative of no problems, too (Bentler, 2005).
Hence, we do not have to doubt the appropriateness of our estima-
tion technique.
5.4.3 Model fit
Analysing MTMM data using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA),
Doty and Glick (1998) suggest that the following nested structural
equation models, as illustrated in Figure 5.2, should be estimated
and tested to show whether or not improvements in model fit can
be observed (Ketokivi and Schroeder, 2004):
1. The null model of independent variables, which posits that
all measures of performance are unrelated to each other;
2. The trait model, which assumes that all measures of per-
formance correlate because of a common underlying perfor-
mance trait; and
3. The trait-method model, which implies that measures of per-
formance correlate because of performance trait and method-
ological reasons.
Given the data we have, we decided to let our methods (i.e., the
opinions of our three different respondent categories) co-vary, al-
though this is optional. The CFA nature of the model only requires
co-variances between the traits - that is, the three different mea-
sures of performance, in our case. MTMM models are notorious
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for model-fitting issues such as under-identification (Byrne, 2001;
Cote, 1995; Marsh, 1989), but our model works fine under these co-
variance paths. We might, however, also expect that co-variances
exist between methods, even though respondents may be biased.
If the police, in fact, perform well, they may receive more positive
perceptions from all occupational groups than when they perform
poorly.
The overall model fit statistics are provided in Table 5.2, to-
gether with the improved model fit statistics. We report the Root
Mean Square Error Approximation (RMSEA), Comparative Fit In-
dex (CFI), and the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI). These are common
model fit statistics, indicating a good model fit when RMSEA <
0.05, CFI > 0.9 and TLI > 0.9 (Byrne, 2001).
The χ2 statistic of the null model is 371.1 with 36 df (p = 0.000).
Evidently, the model is misspecified, which also becomes clear
from the model fit indices. This is not surprising, as we would
expect significant correlations in our model, which contributes to
lower model fit. The trait model performs significantly better than
the null model, but still shows a very poor fit. We, again, conclude
that the model is misspecified. We add method factors to the model
to improve fit. Having done this does indeed increase the fit of the
Table 5.2: Overall model fit and comparison
Model fit χ2 statistic df P-Value RMSEA TFI CFI
Null model 371.1 36 0.000 0.204 0.000 0.000
Trait model 19.9 24 0.000 0.253 0.502 0.502
Trait-method model 8.5 12 0.744 0.000 1.031 1.000
Model comparison χ2 statistic df p-value
Null model - trait model 18.2 12 0.000

































































model significantly, now showing a good fit on all the indices.
5.4.4 Convergent and discriminant validity
To answer the question as to whether or not our set of three subjec-
tive performance variables form a good overall measure of police
performance, we must first look into the issues of convergent and
discriminant validity. These are the more popular uses of MTMM
matrices opposed to establishing the sources of variance. Conver-
gent validity is the degree to which measures of constructs that the-
oretically should be related, are in fact related; discriminant valid-
ity is the degree to which measurements that should not be related,
are in fact unrelated. As far as convergent validity is concerned,
we expect the different variables that measure police performance
to be correlated, as they try to measure the same underlying con-
struct.
The convergent validity of our variables is reflected in the fac-
tor loadings Byrne (2001). Table 5.3 gives these loadings. Between
parentheses, we indicate from which rater group the answer origi-
nates.
None of the trait factor loadings on the ’catching burglars’ and
’arrival time’ variables is significantly different from zero, which
signals little convergent validity. Also, the factor loadings on meth-
ods are generally larger than those on traits. This suggests that
the method effects (e.g., respondent type) attenuate the trait effects
(e.g., subjective performance measure), implying another sign of
little convergent validity. In all, the evidence reveals that our three
variables are separately not good measures of a common underly-
ing police performance. This could perhaps be expected as to the
corruption item, but is more surprising for the items relating to ar-
rival time and catching burglars. Apparently, these variables are
too different from one another to jointly measure the same under-
lying police performance construct properly. One would usually
hope to find convergent validity when studying performance mea-















































































































































































































































































even when the data demonstrate validity, this does not mean that
there is no bias as Ketokivi and Schroeder (2004) also show.
To examine discriminant validity, which demonstrates whether
concepts or measurements that are supposed to be unrelated are, in
fact, unrelated, we look at the correlations between factors. In order
to have discriminant validity, we would need to find low correla-
tions amongst the trait and method variables, which are displayed
in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4: Factor correlations
Measures Estimates
Catching burglars ↔ Arrival time -.455
Arrival time ↔ Taking bribes -.443
Catching burglars ↔ Taking bribes .613
CM ↔ PP .138
CM ↔ HP .168
PP ↔ HP .052
Given our assumption that the three subjective performance
items measure the same underlying construct (i.e., police perfor-
mance), our prior is to find significant correlations between factors.
However, in fact, this is not what we observe in Table 5.4. Hence,
we find evidence of discriminant validity. Again, this does not im-
ply evidence that there is no method bias in the data.
5.4.5 Estimating trait, method and random error variance
As we have a good model fit of our data with our MTMM model,
we can estimate trait, method and random error variance by calcu-
lating the squared standardised factor loadings for trait and method,
with the remaining variance capturing random error. The findings
are shown in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5 suggests that the method and random error are the
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Table 5.5: Trait, method and error variance in the trait-method
model
Source of variance (%)
Performance measure Respondent Trait Method Error
Catching burglars
Police employees 6a 51 43
Corporate managers 3a 72 24
Healthcare professionals 2a 28 70
Arrival time
Police employees 1a 47 52
Corporate managers 2a 42 56
Healthcare professionals 16a 75 8
Taking bribes
Police employees 23 23 54
Corporate managers 42 17 41
Healthcare professionals 17 10 73
Mean 13 41 47
a = not statistically significant at p < .05.
main causes of variance within the measured items, with random
error generating the largest variance of, on average, 47 per cent.
Method variance is significant for all factor loadings, indicating its
presence as to all variables, averaging at 41 per cent.
Table 5.6 reveals that police employees are, on average, not
much more biased than the two external rater groups. On the one
hand, corporate managers are extremely biased about the success-
fulness of the police in catching burglars. On the other hand, health-
care professionals are very biased about policing performance re-
garding arrival times. Hence, the difference in subjective perfor-
mance seems to be positively driven by police employees, on the
one hand, but negatively driven by both external rater groups, on
the other hand.
The trait bias is significant regarding the measurement of the
’take bribes’ variable, but is not significant for the other variables.
This finding, again, suggests that the three items do not measure
the same underlying common police performance construct. The
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Table 5.6: Mean variance by method
Method Mean variance (%)
Trait Method Error
Police employees 10 40 50
Corporate managers 16 44 40
Healthcare professionals 12 38 50
significant findings for the ’take bribes’ variable reveal that espe-
cially corporate managers evaluate this police performance indica-
tor well. This result is possibly due to corruption being a national
trait that is intertwined through all (public) service sectors. In coun-
tries that score high on corruption (e.g., the Russian Federation), it
may be common knowledge that bribery is a likely event; in con-
trast, in countries that score low on corruption (such as the Nether-
lands), respondents agree about the low likelihood that a police
officer can be bribed. Corporate managers may be more aware of
how easily police officers can be bribed, as they are more often in
a position where they (want to) give bribes, while police employ-
ees and healthcare professionals are more likely to (want to) take
bribes.
5.5 Discussion
This chapter aimed to introduce, discuss and demonstrate the use
of MTMM models in public administration studies to improve sub-
jective performance measures. We argued that the use of subjective
performance measures in the public sector is warranted, as objec-
tive measures often do not give a good overview of the perfor-
mance on the expectations of all stakeholders. Furthermore, they
are sometimes difficult to obtain and/or process. Yet, little atten-
tion is given to assessing the validity and especially biases of such
subjective measures. We proposed the use of an MTMM model, as
this offers an integrated approach to examining both biases and va-
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lidity. This is important, because a valid measure does not necessar-
ily make an unbiased measure. Furthermore, the MTMM method-
ology can demonstrate where the bias occurs, so that researchers
can take appropriate corrective measures in further analyses. We
demonstrated the uses of an MTMM model by means of an ex-
ample in regarding subjective performance of police organisations.
This is an interesting case, as objective measures of police perfor-
mance are notoriously difficult to handle due to, amongst other
things, the broad array of stakeholders that the police has to please.
It has to do well on certain ’hard’ measures or sometimes even
targets set by the government, yet they also have to please other
stakeholders and the citizenry as a whole. Our results show that
the majority of the variance regarding individual items is due to
method or random error. The high error variance is consistent with
other findings in the literature on organisational performance (Ke-
tokivi and Schroeder, 2004), but our method variance is relatively
high and trait variance is relatively low. Furthermore, all items are
associated with significant method bias for all three rater groups.
Hence, not only are police employees positively biased about their
own performance, but also are both external rater groups - cor-
porate managers and healthcare professionals - negatively biased
about subjective police performance. We find substantial difference
in the variances across our three rater groups at the indicator - or
trait - level. Corporate managers are more biased about the police
catching burglars, while healthcare professionals are more biased
about the police’s arrival times. Overall, however, the mean vari-
ance does not differ that much for different professional groups.
They are all biased to a fairly large extent. Moreover, a large ran-
dom error component indicates that they may lack the knowledge
to make a judgement. This even holds for policing employees. The
"take bribes" item is associated with the largest trait variance.
The outcomes of our MTMM model estimation also offer ev-
idence as to the degree of validity of the subjective assessments
as performance measures. In our example, we cannot be too pos-
itive about our three subjective variables as reliable measures of
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a single underlying police performance construct. The low conver-
gent and high discriminant validity indicate that the three variables
may be too different to measure the same underlying construct,
and all three items suffer from substantial method bias. With all
respondents exerting a bias in answering all three police perfor-
mance assessment questions, an "objective" and overall subjective
police performance measure cannot be constructed. This illustrates
how the MTMM model methodology can produce very insightful
measurement diagnostics, assessing convergent and discriminant
validity, as well as the sources of potential bias.
We believe that our policing example shows that the MTMM
model can offer a valuable methodological contribution to the field
of public administration. Looking at the convergent and discrimi-
nant validity of variables can only provide part of the answer as to
the appropriateness of subjective organisational performance mea-
sures. To date, little attention has been paid to the possible biases
that can occur when using such subjective measures. Our exam-
ple makes clear that the perceptions we have measured are based
mainly on method and random error, and not trait - an observa-
tion that holds true across three different rater groups. When trying
to estimate (causal) relations between measures, letting the poten-
tial biases go unnoticed may fatally hurt the reliability and validity
of findings. Hence, applying the MTMM model methodology in
future public administration work would greatly facilitate the de-
velopment of decent subjective measures of public organisations’
performance.
5.5.1 Limitations and future research
Although our study was primarily meant to introduce a new meth-
odology to the public administration literature, dealing with the
key issue of respondent groups’ systematic biases, the limitations
associated with our empirical example hint at potential issues that
researchers can stumble upon before or during the execution of an
MTMM model. The main limitations of our empirical example fol-
low from the number of observations and the nature of the data.
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First, matching professionals by country implicitly assumes that
police performance within a country is similar everywhere, ignor-
ing within-country variation. The important thing in MTMM mod-
els is that we try to ask different respondents a question about the
same thing, because we are not going to be able to measure a ’true’
score if we ask respondent A to rank an apple and respondent B
to rank a pear. As respondents are likely to answer questions relat-
ing to what they know - i.e., their locality - region-level matching
would imply a step forward. Obviously, the police in some regions
of a country may outperform the police in other regions, especially
in larger countries and/or in nation-states with decentralised po-
lice forces. This may have driven the low trait variance on the catch-
ing burglars and arrival time variables, which both may be per-
ceived to be locally differentiated. In contrast, taking bribes may
be a more stable characteristic of a country as a whole. Researchers
should be aware that in any case, in order for MTMM models to
come to good results, many observations are needed, preferably at
least five observations for every variable in the model (Hair et al.,
1998). MTMM models with few observations will not only be un-
reliable; they have a higher probability of producing errors. Fur-
thermore, we would like to add that matching respondents on na-
tionality does not control for country fixed effects in this example,
because here they relate to the different types of variances related
to the professions of respondents, rather than their nationality.
Second, another possible limitation involves the manner in which
questions were asked in ESS. When constructing organisational
performance measures, empirical studies regarding private busi-
nesses tend to focus on an organisation’s relative performance vis-
à-vis competitors (Dess and Robinson, 1984; Ketokivi and Schroeder,
2004). Trying to answer how well a firm performs may be difficult
when not assessing a focal organisation’s performance compared
to similar others, and lead to unnecessary bias and error in the re-
sponses because informants have no reference point. In public sec-
tor studies, adopting relative performance measures would offer
similar advantages. In our empirical example, it would be interest-
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ing to explore how respondents feel a focal police force performs
compared to forces in other regions or countries. This may well
give higher trait variance for police employees, as they might be
more aware of how many burglars they catch compared to other
forces, in contrast to the general public. Asking the ’right’ ques-
tions is evidently not something researchers can do when testing
existing public performance scales, but can be taken into account
when creating new measures.
Related to this, we can also add another critique on these ques-
tions posed in the ESS survey. Although these questions are per-
haps interesting to make an international comparison of how peo-
ple perceive police in their country, it is not so clear what gets mea-
sured with these survey questions. It is more about how people
deal with a question like this, than about police performance, be-
cause we are not sure which police force they are actually judging.
As such, these survey questions appear to be rather meaningless.
We have used these questions for this chapter merely for the il-
lustrative nature; we did not want to dwell too far from the polic-
ing topic, and the ESS data were readily available with sufficiently
large samples for analysis. However, these are typically not subjec-
tive measures on which one would like to base police performance.
Arrival times, catch-rates and corruption are surely concerns of
citizens, but our data show that citizens are to a large extent un-
knowing or biased about these measures. Other stakeholders, such
a governments, will rather care about the actual objective figures
than the subjective (heavily biased and erroneous) perceptions of
citizens. Subjective performance measures will be of better use in
more specific cases, such as satisfaction with telephone contact, or
treatment at the reception of a local police station. Preferably one
should ask people who (can) give an (objective) opinion about this,
at least people who have actually experienced contact with the po-
lice on the phone or at a local police station.
Yet, we would not completely like to discard the type of mea-
sures that we have used in this chapter. If we look at it from a
stakeholder management and stakeholder satisfaction angle, these
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may still be interesting measures to look at. Scores on these items,
whether it is response time, likelihood to be caught or bribery, will
well say something about how satisfied the public is with the po-
lice. Trust in the police and the legitimacy of the police as an organ-
isation might be negatively influenced if stakeholders think they
are corrupt or doing a bad job. If the police find low scores on their
perceived performance, based on error or bias, then possibly the
police can benefit from educating the citizenry or organising posi-
tive campaigns to diminish negative biases.
5.5.2 Policy implications
MTMM models do not only allow for the study of convergent and
discriminant validity, which was already common in public ad-
ministration, but additionally assess (a) the appropriateness of the
chosen groups of respondents (method) and (b) the importance
of different sources of variance (namely trait, method and error).
The MTMM model could prove to be a good instrument in finding
better subjective organisational performance measures. Evidently,
asking the opinion of people who feature a severe bias, or who
simply have too little knowledge of the topic, may distort the re-
sults when such measures are used in determining the drivers of
organisational performance. It may inflate or deflate relationships
between constructs, leading to incorrect conclusions (Rogelberg,
2002). The MTMM model methodology forces researchers to con-
sider not only how they measure performance, but also by means
of asking whom. We would recommend the use of this method in
future work to scrutinise the appropriateness of relatively under-
utilised subjective performance measures of public sector organisa-
tions, as this will generate more insights into the extensive debate
about performance measurements in the public sector.
Having the methodology to examine bias, the question arises
what can be done to deal with method bias. For a further discussion
on this topic, we would like to suggest Rogelberg’s (2008) hand-
book on research methods, which offers a number of suggestions as
to how to cope with method variance and error variance. One solu-
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tion is to nest MTMM within the model that has to be estimated, as
the MTMM model can be used to control for method and error vari-
ance. However, to maintain a decent ratio of observations to vari-
ables in a structural equation model of minimally 5:1 (Hair et al.,
1998), one would need to have potentially hundreds or thousands
of observations to run a structural equation model with a nested
MTMM model. This is often not feasible when working with sub-
jective measures, as datasets of interviewees or survey respondents
are simply not that large. Rogelberg (2008) also suggests a number
of other solutions, such as controlling for the believed causes of bias
by measuring them and including them in the analysis, or taking a
(weighted) average of different scores of informants.
Blindenbach-Driessen et al. (2010) find in their product innova-
tion study one type of rater to be very accurate on some variables
opposed to the other type of rater. They therefore suggest that is
may be better to only include the raters of the first group in their
analysis rather than unnecessarily biasing the results by including
both raters. Knowing the sources of variance in the data leads to
a range of opportunities to control for bias. This can be more or
less statistically demanding, but nevertheless a methodological im-
provement for public administration and policy studies.
For the police, the findings may also have implications. The po-
lice must indeed try to satisfy all stakeholders from the perspective
of normative stakeholder management. Knowing which stakehold-
ers hold biases or who are simply unknowing may encourage the
police to take up other/additional management strategies towards
these stakeholders. This allows them to tend appropriately to the
thoughts of all stakeholders.
As an implication for the studies done in this thesis, we have
to admit that our studies might have benefited from the use of an
MTMM model. A shortcoming of Chapter 2 was that we asked
police officers how satisfied they perceived stakeholders to be.
Compared to a smaller number of external stakeholders, who were
asked the same questions, we found that the external stakeholders
did not differ significantly in their rating of police performance on
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stakeholders’ expectations. The implications from this chapter for
Chapter 2 are that even if we would have asked stakeholders how
they feel about how the police performs on their expectations, we
might still get biased answers, such that optimally we might also
like to use an MTMM model in a study like that. This that was not
feasible in Chapter 2, due to the size of the sample, but could be a
suggestion for future research. In Chapters 3 and 4, we have asked
individuals from a range of organisations to limit the professional
bias, but the sample is not completely random. It would have been
interesting to test for structural biases amongst respondents from
different professional groups (e.g. justice, healthcare, social work)




6.1 Discussion of the results
With this thesis, we aim to gain more insights into the stakeholder
management strategies of police forces, and how these are related
to performance, placing the satisfaction and perceptions of stake-
holders central, in line with normative stakeholder theory. We study
this topic from different perspectives, initially very broadly, by
looking at how the police manages a diverse range of stakeholders
(Chapter 2). Having found that the police often collaborate with
their key stakeholders, we put more focus on how such collabo-
rations take shape. In Chapters 3 and 4 we investigate the people
amongst whom, and the environment in which complex collabora-
tions take place. Lastly, we concluded with a cautionary note about
subjective performance measurement in the face of multiple stake-
holders (Chapter 5).
In Chapter 2, we investigate how perceived performance on the
expectations of stakeholders is associated with the (theoretically)
appropriate management of stakeholders. Furthermore, we inves-
tigate the relation between active management and the difficulty of
stakeholder handling and the performance on their expectations.
We argue, in line with most theories, that different stakeholders
should be tended to in the appropriate manner, and propose differ-
183
184 Chapter 6.
ent strategies based on the level of influence and interests of stake-
holders. We do argue, however, that stakeholders will always like
to be recognised by the police and,furthermore, that some stake-
holders will always be difficult to handle, regardless of strategy.
Some stakeholders simply have very little understanding of polic-
ing, and might always demand more than is feasible, or reasonable.
We substantiate this argument with the significant associations we
find in the data, although we cannot produce causal claims regard-
ing these findings.
The results are much in line with our expectations. We find that
respondents rate the performance of their force on the expectations
of stakeholders higher when the force employed the theoretically
optimal strategy. The expectations of stakeholders are also better
met when stakeholders are actively managed, and when the police
does not find it difficult to manage the expectations of stakeholders.
These findings may suggest that these are relevant variables for
further exploration.
While we do find in Chapter 2 that the police collaborates more
often with stakeholders than theory would predict, given the high
influence and interests of many stakeholders, this stakeholder man-
agement strategy is probably also the one that should be employed
the most by police forces, or at least with key stakeholders. We
question what characteristics of cooperation between the police
and stakeholders are associated with the greatest satisfaction. Co-
operation between organisations has been studied in many forms,
from alliance theory to empirical work on healthcare networks. Yet,
we believe that police organisations, and their individual officers,
will often have to collaborate in such complex circumstances that
we have to contribute to the literature in attempt to reveal how
some of these difficulties can be overcome. We believe that the com-
plexity of collaboration is caused by three circumstances:
1. Collaboration is focused on producing public goods,
2. Collaboration is between different organisations with their
own agendas, and
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3. Collaboration is often interdisciplinary.
The nature of external stakeholders (opposed to internal stake-
holders) implies that police organisations deal with other organi-
sations and professionals from other organisations. These organi-
sations have their own agendas and performance measures, which
are not necessarily in line with the police’s. Although this is a com-
plex setting in which an organisation might not desire to find it-
self, we believe that studying this context is highly relevant for the
police. Societal problems can be so complex that police may have
to work with stakeholders from other disciplines to tackle some is-
sues. From the repressive perspective, the police may often do quite
well with organisations in their own judicial discipline. Yet, in or-
der to prevent crimes from happening, it is more straightforward
to take care of the causes, which may be addiction, unstable mental
health, poor social networks or status, which are all specialties of
other public organisations, rather than the police.
In Chapter 3, we argue that such public, interdisciplinary and
interorganisational (PII) collaboration in teams will suit some pro-
fessionals better than others. Bronstein (2003), who has done re-
search on public interdisciplinary teams, provides a good frame-
work to start from. She argues that professionals in such teams who
have favourable personal and professional characteristics will col-
laborate better, which is much in line with the general literature on
cooperation and performance in teams. Furthermore, collaboration
experience of individuals facilitates collaboration, as do structural
characteristics, such as the time and freedom individuals have to
work together. This time and freedom aspect in interorganisational
teams is, of course, especially interesting, because different organ-
isations may put in place different limits on the time and freedom
of team members.
By means of a survey, data were gathered on the individu-
als that participate in these PII teams. We find overall extraver-
sion to be positively related to cooperation in the teams, unlike
what one would expect in regular teams, where extraversion of all
team members is not optimal. In PII teams, it is however crucial
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for everyone to participate in information exchange and decision-
making, which requires an extrovert attitude of all team members.
The resistance that team members experience in their home organ-
isations is negatively related to cooperation. It supports to some
extent the argument that cooperation will be hindered when pro-
fessionals make promises that their home organisations will not
keep, although we cannot make a causal claim. Perhaps the most
interesting finding is that the autonomy of professionals is posi-
tively related to cooperation within the team, but negatively corre-
lated with perceived performance of the team. Our argument here
is that autonomous professionals find it easier to make decisions,
which is useful in cooperating with other team members. However,
the negative correlation with perceived performance could not be
explained. We speculated that autonomous professionals possibly
do not have the strongest ties to their home organisations, which
often have to execute the agreements made in the team. Future re-
search may be able to point out if this relation still holds and if it
does, why so.
Having appropriate individuals in the team is important for
good collaboration (Smith and Mogro-Wilson, 2007). In practise,
however, teams will not always have the opportunity to choose the
best team members. Human resources are scarce, and organisations
will not always send their best-fitting people. To get the best out of
any PII team, structural characteristics can be offered to the team
to facilitate their collaboration. We investigated in Chapter 4 which
structural characteristics can contribute to cooperation. Literature
about network governance (Kenis and Provan, 2009) suggests that
networks with many partners and decentralised trust are best gov-
erned by an independent body, a so-called network administrative
organisation (NAO). In our country of study for Chapters 3 and 4,
we find this to be the case for safety networks. We suggest in Chap-
ter 4 that NAOs can be more than an administrative back office.
When teams are involved, they can actively support teams to im-
prove collaboration amongst team members, and their respective
home organisations. Bronstein (2003) suggests that structural char-
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acteristics, such as organising meetings frequently and of sufficient
duration, will enhance collaboration, because it offers profession-
als the opportunity to meet and work together. Because leadership
skills also facilitate interdisciplinary cooperation, we argue that in
this context meetings are best guided by a skilled chair, who will
make sure that everyone is heard, in order to come to the optimal
solution or productive compromise, if necessary. We found signifi-
cant associations between all these variables and perceived collabo-
ration. Lastly, we also found a positive relation between perceived
collaboration and teams having workspaces at the network loca-
tion. The argument here was that this allows professionals to dis-
cuss issues amongst each other that are not completely necessary
to discuss with the whole team. Furthermore, it gives profession-
als the opportunity to spend more time together and get to know
each other also on an informal, personal level, rather than the rel-
atively high pressure that meetings tend to be under. Despite the
statistically significant relations, we did not find the coefficients of
all variables to be so large as to have practical significance as well.
Meeting frequency and time spent at the network location had such
low coefficients that they are perhaps not of the greatest interest for
future research, or in view of policy implications.
In line with normative stakeholder theory, which has a focus on
perceived performance and satisfaction of stakeholders, we have
asked many police officers and stakeholders throughout the stud-
ies in this thesis how they feel about the performance of the police
and collaboration with police organisations. Evidently, police of-
ficers may be positively biased when it comes to their own per-
formance. Bias may give distorted results, and we have tried to
take this into account in all chapters. In Chapter 2, the observations
of police officers did not significantly differ from those of exter-
nal stakeholders. In Chapters 3 and 4, we have tried to overcome
bias by questioning professionals from many different organisa-
tions to get a more representative view, and used existing scales
where possible, to check for reliability. In the field of police per-
formance, the focus is often on objective measures, such as targets
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set by the government. These only may satisfy a few stakehold-
ers, however, while the police should try to satisfy everyone. This
means the police should measure the opinions from stakeholder
groups that may not be as pleased with objective metrics. The field
of police performance has not paid much attention to subjective
measures that have been proven to be unbiased. In fact, we know
very little about biases in subjective performance measures. This
is actually of great importance, for researchers on the one hand,
because biases cause over- or underestimations in statistical anal-
ysis. On the other hand, it is also relevant for the police, because
performance on ’objective’ measures does not please all stakehold-
ers, and secondly, management strategies may not be as effective
towards stakeholders if these stakeholders hold severe negative bi-
ases towards the police.
In Chapter 5, we offer a solution for finding appropriate sub-
jective performance measures in public management, focusing on
the specific example of policing. By means of a multi-trait-multi-
method (MTMM) model, one can test how biased and unknowing
different types of respondents are regarding certain performance
measures. Data from the European Social Survey is used to assess
how police officers, health professionals and corporate managers
feel as to the arrival times, catching burglars and taking bribes of
police forces in their country. The MTMM model proves to be very
useful in showing that, in fact, all respondents are biased (either
positively or negatively), but that all also have a very poor estima-
tion of performance, because they simply have no idea how good
performance is.
While the MTMM model is associated with some methodolog-
ical hurdles, the findings warrant further use of this model, be-
cause the benefits are plenty. Not only does it allow researchers to
pick and choose their most appropriate measures, but the MTMM
model can also be nested into another model to provide unbiased
and informed scores, even when measures contain bias and error.
We hope this methodology will be picked up by scholars in public
management in the future, because we believe it can bring bene-
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fits to studying many different public organisations that have to
deal with a broad range of stakeholders that they have to please.
Secondly, it may also help these public organisations to find out to
what extent their stakeholders’ opinions are based on bias or a lack
of knowledge, rather than the actual actions of the organisation.
In sum, this thesis contributes to the topic of stakeholder man-
agement in policing in conceptual, methodological and empirical
ways. The overall contribution is that we give more insights into
the relationship between police organisations and their stakehold-
ers. We know more about which methods the police employ to
manage stakeholders, and how these methods are associated with
perceived stakeholder satisfaction. We looked more deeply into the
stakeholder management strategy the police employs with many
key stakeholders, to see which factors are associated with a more
positive perception of the collaborative effort. Lastly, we recognise
that the stakeholders may have a biased view or are unknowing of
police performance, and that this should be taken into account in
research and practice alike. The findings are often in line with our
expectations, but sometimes they are counterintuitive. All chap-
ters offer surprising findings, sometimes already in the descrip-
tive data. In Chapter 2, we found a correlation between manag-
ing stakeholders in the right way and greater performance on ex-
pectations of stakeholders. Currently, the police surprisingly often
collaborate with stakeholders, much more than theory can explain.
Although we do not find that stakeholders are (on average) dissat-
isfied if they are ’wrongly’ managed, the ’correctly’ managed stake-
holders are, on average, more satisfied.
In Chapters 3 and 4 we find that some types of professionals
and some structural characteristics of PII teams are correlated ei-
ther positively or negatively to the perceived success of these com-
plex partnerships. Surprisingly enough, there seems to be little ef-
fort put into optimising PII teams; the stakeholders are often in dis-
agreement about the team and its performance. There appears to be
little team cohesion and even less reflection on team collaboration.
Some team members even expressed in interviews that they have
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no idea what to expect from one another. The collaboration is very
much focused on content, which involves discussing clients, and
much less on the process of actually coming to a good solution to-
gether. It seems that the police, other public organisations and the
NAO in the Safety House may have to consider making improve-
ments here, given the complex nature of their collaboration.
In the final study, our main goal is to demonstrate the useful-
ness of MTMM models in subjective performance measurement in
public administration, yet we are surprised to find that so much of
the variance was attributed to bias. In conclusion, we can say that
these studies do not only contribute in the manners we had strived
for, but actually give us several additional interesting insights into
the relationships between police organisations and their stakehold-
ers.
To finalise the discussion of results, Table 6.1 gives an overview
of the tested hypotheses per chapter, whether there is support for
the hypothesis, and additional findings for Chapters 2 through 5.
6.2 Limitations and future research
Although this dissertation is a serious step towards deepening our
understanding of the successes and hazards in stakeholder man-
agement in police organisations, there are a number of limitations
in the current studies that warrant future research.
First of all, the studies we did are quite explorative and corre-
lational in nature. We hope to have given some impulses to further
research, such that in the future we may be able to draw strong(er)
conclusions about the causal nature of the relations we studied,
which may allow us in turn to make more valid policy implica-
tions. A strong research design would be required to do so, ideally
in the setting of a randomised experiment. Given that this may be
difficult, it would be at least desirable to compose a panel dataset,
to better control for omitted variable bias by including fixed and
random effects.
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Table 6.1: Overview of chapter hypotheses and (additional)
findings
Chapter Hypothesis Hypothesis supported Additional findings
2 H1: Fit in management and performance (+) Yes
Police collaborates much
more than theory can explain.
H2: Active management and performance (+) Yes
H3: Difficulty to manage and performance (-) Yes
3 H1: Extraversion and cooperation (+) Yes
There is little effort put into
optimising PII teams; the
stakeholders are often in
disagreement about the team
and its performance. There
appears to be little team cohesion
and even less reflection on team
collaboration. Team members have
no idea what to expect from one
another. The collaboration is very
much focused on content, which
involves discussing clients, and not
on the process of actually coming
to a good solution together.
H2: Autonomy and cooperation (+) Yes
H3: Resistance and cooperation (-) Yes
H4: Collaboration history and collaboration (+) No
H5: Collaboration and performance (+) Yes
H6: Extraversion and performance (+) No
H7: Autonomy and performance (+) No
H8: Extraversion mediates between
collaboration and performance (+)
No
H8: Autonomy mediates between
collaboration and performance (+)
Yes
4 H1: Meeting frequency and cooperation (+) Yes
H2: Meeting duration and cooperation (+) Yes
H3: Chair’s skill and cooperation (+) Yes
H4: Disagreement on chair’s skill and
cooperation (-)
Yes
H5: Disagreement on chair’s skill mediates
between chair’s skill and cooperation (-)
No




Both citizens and police officers
are mostly biased and unknowing
about police performance.
The reason for this dissertation is that stakeholder management
in policing is a current, and highly relevant topic. In Europe, where
all studies have been conducted, police organisations struggle with
managing their stakeholders. On the one hand, the police is a pub-
lic organisation that needs a lot of legitimacy from the public to
properly execute its tasks. As such, they must please a wide array
of stakeholders. On the other hand, the core business of the police
is getting more complex, requiring the involvement of stakehold-
ers regarding specific issues. An example is the free movement of
goods and persons facilitating intra-European crime. Many Euro-
pean countries have seen their police organisations becoming more
service and community oriented, while they used to be a relatively
unapproachable authority. Policing nowadays goes much further
than order maintenance and solving criminal cases. These ’core
tasks’ are more and more often complemented by activities such
as prevention, reintegration and keeping warm relations with com-
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munities. Police organisations will often find themselves in a situ-
ation where they will need to work with other parties to execute
all these tasks properly, and to keep all the involved stakeholders
satisfied.
Our main focus in this dissertation, in Chapters 3 and 4, has
been on collaboration between the police and other parties. We
know from Chapter 2 that police organisations often collaborate
with stakeholders, causing us to take deeper interest in this strat-
egy. However, we have not yet provided an elaborate answer as
to how to approach all those stakeholders with whom the police
does not collaborate. So, we may question what successful ’in-
volvement’, ’defence’ and ’monitoring’ strategies are, and on what
their success depends. Some stakeholder groups, such as the me-
dia or citizens, may be particularly interesting stakeholder groups
to study in relation to these management strategies.
Secondly, we have focused much on the ’service and commu-
nity’ side of police collaborations. The integrative approach that
can be taken towards certain groups of offenders is complex, and
thus interesting to study, but of course this is not the only type of
cooperation that the police is engaged in. We should not forget that
police forces will often have to cooperate with each other in crim-
inal investigations, across the country or internationally. Although
our studies do give some hints at what the barriers in such collab-
orations may be, such as organisational resistance, there may be
other hurdles to overcome, or other success factors to emphasise,
when collaboration is public and interorganisational, but mono-
disciplinary.
6.3 Policy implications
Like we have said in Chapters 2 through 4, we have to be careful
about making policy implications given the correlational nature of
our studies. Our results from Chapter 2 do provide some interest-
ing findings, even though we cannot be certain about causation.
We find that, on average, the police perceive that stakeholders are
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quite satisfied with the performance on expectations, even when
stakeholders are (theoretically) mismanaged. As such, there may
be no immediate concern for mismanagement of stakeholders, al-
though we cannot be sure whether the perceptions of the police
are a valid measure here. Furthermore, we do see a positive rela-
tion between ’fit’ management and performance on expectations,
which warrants further investigation.
Although we see that police organisations collaborate more of-
ten with stakeholders than theory can explain, we must recognise
that the police has many stakeholders that will (theoretically) be
most satisfied with this management method, and with whom the
police can even mutually improve performance by working to-
gether. This is a result from the observation that in increasingly
complex societies public organisations like to take an integrated ap-
proach to solving ’wicked’ multidisciplinary problems. Yet, these
collaborations are generally difficult, because several organisations
from different disciplines try to come to an optimal solution. Or-
ganisations and their respective professionals generally do not un-
derstand each other’s languages and have their own (hidden) agen-
das. They often produce public goods, or solutions to problems, of
which the value cannot always be measured. Hence, organisations
often have to trust that their collaborative actions are worth the
effort. When studying these interdisciplinary public networks, we
find that the perception of the collaborative relationship is associ-
ated with participation of the right individuals and the right struc-
tures being in place. Again, our correlational study cannot offer
solid policy implications.
In our final chapter, we encourage the use of MTMM models in
public administration to benefit optimally from subjective perfor-
mance measures in research. We can however also draw a policy
implication for police forces. That is, the police should recognise
that both police officers and external parties may not only be biased
about performance, but they may in fact have no clue how well the
police is performing. The policy implication is to maintain good
lines of communication with stakeholders, and to provide relevant
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information in terms of what the police does, how well they per-
form, and what may be expected of them. This may be more useful
in terms of influencing the stakeholders’ perceptions than changing
overall stakeholder management strategies. Citizens, for example,
may have very limited knowledge of police performance, because
individually many citizens in fact do not deal with police officers
on a frequent basis. Yet, everybody has an image of the police, and
how they perform. Police forces can possibly do more to inform cit-
izens about their performance, such that the views of citizens will
be more realistic. This might also give them more reasonable ex-
pectations of the police.
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Appendix A
Supplements to Chapter 2
We carefully coded the answers of all interviewees as to stakeholder-
relevant questions to construct a dataset with codes for stakeholder types,
management methods and performance perceptions. Combining both
codes as to stakeholder types and management methods gave our as-
sessment of fit or misfit. The next figures visualise our coding schemes
for stakeholder types and management methods. The lists with relevant
items are included on the next pages.
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Figure A.1: Stakeholder type coding scheme
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Table A.1: Stakeholder interest lists
List A List B
- issues that are not related to the police
- for stakeholder and police to do their own job
- offer information to the police
- offer assistance to the police
- for the police not to intervene
- taking over work from the police in a competitive manner
- stakeholder has to operate by itself
- police is concerned about how stakeholder perceives the police
- prevent and act against crime /
criminal behavior
- contribution to safety
- protection
- maintaining public order
- upholding the laws
- execute stakeholder’s orders
- ensure safe environment / conditions
- information (exchange)
- cooperation / collaboration
- achievement of common goals
- offer assistance / support
- attention
- trust
- sticking to agreements / protocol
- authority
- dialogue with the police
- the police as mediator
- accessible police officers
- for the police to do their job in a fair way
- presence of police on the streets
- good performance
- for the police to solve problems
- professional relationship
- submission of complete case reports
- act in the interest of the stakeholder
- solve issues
Figure A.2: Management method coding scheme
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Table A.2: Management strategies lists
List 1 List 2 List 3 List 4




- parties take care
of their own
responsibilities
- reporting people who
can be helped
by stakeholder
- think along with
stakeholder







- presence of officers
- ignore requests from
stakeholder
- meeting at community
events




- give general information
to stakeholder about
police
- relationship with stakeholder
is purely institutional
- (semi) annual meetings








- trying to explain operations
to stakeholders
- offering assistance where
needed
- provide high level of
professionalism
- try to meet requests of
stakeholder





- attending meetings when
possible
- police joins some
meetings of stakeholder
-invite stakeholder to
participate in specific projects
- listening to and
communicating with the
stakeholder
- assist stakeholder in
projects
- (ad-hoc) task forces
- project-related consultation platforms
- consultation of stakeholder
- using offers from
stakeholder
- keeping contact with
stakeholder
- information exchange
- circulars and guidelines
- citizen care offices





- rules, protocols and
regulations
- various forms of
meetings















Supplements to Chapters 3
and 4
English translation of the Safety Houses survey
Welcome to the survey Safety Houses
This survey has been developed by the Universities of Utrecht and Tilburg to
study collaboration during case meetings in Safety Houses. The goal of this study
is to find out how the characteristics of the case meeting and its participants influ-
ence successful collaboration in the case meeting. We will ask different questions
about your background and tasks in the Safety House. Our tests persons show
that one should be able to fill in the survey properly in 15 minutes, although oth-
ers take up to 30 minutes. Please be patient when filling in the survey. Given the
complexity of the analysis, it is of great importance that you answer all the ques-
tions decently. We have already removed questions out of previous versions of
the survey to make it as compact as possible.
All that you write down in this survey is of course confidential. The scientific
studies will only provide statistics about the Safety Houses as a group. We will
offer Safety Houses a benchmark report, which will show the means of every-
one that has filled in the survey for that specific Safety House. Information will
never be traceable to an individual without permission of this individual. Only
the scientific staff will be able to look into individual surveys.
We thank you for your time!
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1. What is your gender? (please choose one)
2 Male
2 Female
2. What is your year of birth?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. What is the highest level of education that you have completed? (please choose
one)
2 Lower vocational training
2 Higher vocational training
2 University
2 Other: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The questions below are about your employer.
4. For which organisation are you working for the Safety House?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. What is your position in this organisation?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6. In which year did you start working at this organisation?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7. How many years of experience do you have in the field of healthcare or social
work?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8. How many years of experience do you have in the field of justice, policing or
parole?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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2 More than 50
10. Below are a number of statements related to the possibility your employer of-
fers to do your work when and how you like it. Please indicate for every statement
how often this applies to you. Please use the scale below (please choose one):
Never Once in a while Sometimes Fairly often (Nearly) always
0 1 2 3 4
Statement Score (0-4)
1. I decide when to come and leave work
2. I am required to keep a record of time spent on individual projects
3. I decide when and how to about my job
4. I am able to obtain the resources I need for my job without asking for permission
11. How much influence do you have on the choice of projects on which you are





12. For which Safety House do you work? (If several, choose one at random) . .
13. What is the official name of the case meeting you work for in above mentioned
Safety House? (If several, choose one at random.)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
14. In which city does this case meeting take place? . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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2 Other: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Type of case meeting
2 Penalization meeting
16. Are you the only representative of your organisation in this case meeting?
(Please choose one.)
2 Yes
2 No, there are . . . representatives of my organisation in this case meeting




2 Other: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
18. How often are you present at the case-meeting? (please choose one)
2 (Nearly) never
2 A quarter of the time
2 Half of the time
2 Three-quarters of the time
2 (Nearly) all the time
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19. How long does a case-meeting usually last? (please choose one)
2 Less than an hour
2 An hour
2 One and a half hours
2 Two hours
2 More than two hours
20. On average, how many clients do you discuss during a meeting? . . . clients
21. How well do you know the clients that are discussed during meetings?
. . . % I know personally
. . . % I do not know personally, but I do know from their files
. . . % I only know by name
. . . % I do not know at all
22. Are you the chair of your case meeting? (please choose one)
2 Yes→ Go to question 24
2 No, someone else is the chair
2 No, this meeting does not have a chair→ Go to question 26
23. Which organisation does the chair of your case meeting come from?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .














26. In which year did you start working for the Safety House?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
27. How did you become a participant in the Safety House? (please choose one)
2 Out of my own initiative→ Go to question 29
2 Out of the initiative of my employer




2 I don’t know
29. How many hours per week are made available to you by your employer to
work for the Safety House? (These may also be general network hours, if your
organisation does not officially participate in the Safety House.)
. . . hours (in case of 0 hours→ go to question 32)
30. How many hours per week do you spend on the following tasks in the Safety
House?
Presence in the case meeting: . . . hour(s)
Preparation of the case meeting: . . . hour(s) (including deliberation with your
colleagues)
Staying in touch with participants outside the case meeting: . . . hour(s)
31. How many hours per week are you physically present in the Safety House?
. . . hours (in case of 0 hours→ go to question 32)
32. How many percent of the time you are physically present in the Safety House
do you spend on working on primary tasks? (That is, tasks that fall under the task
description from your employer.)
. . . %
Appendix B. 225
33. Below you see a list with characteristics of people. Please indicate to what
extent you have this characteristics, and try to be as honest as possible (please
choose one)












imaginative ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
irritable ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
sloppy ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
restrained ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
nice ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
searching ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
nervous ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
careful ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
silent ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
helpful ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
easily
upset
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
orderly ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
closed ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
versatile ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )












anxious ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
accurate ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
talkative ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
innovative ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
helpful ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
shy ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
pleasant ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
artistic ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
anxious ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
neat ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
withdrawn ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
systematic ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
sympathetic ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
nervous ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
creative ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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In the Safety House you will often have to make agreements with partners about
clients who have been discussed in the case meeting. You will often need people
within your own organisation to execute these agreements. In this section we will
ask you question about how you and your Safety House go about this.
34. How often does it happen that you cannot execute agreements made in the
Safety house due to resistance from your own organisation? (please choose one)





35. Who will offer resistance? (please choose one)
2 Generally operational staff
2 Generally management staff
2 Both
36. Imagine that you cannot execute an agreement made in the Safety House due
to resistance of your own organisation. Who within the Safety House has the man-
date to solve such a problem? (multiple answers possible)
2 The manager of the Safety House
2 The chair of the case meeting
2 The board of the Safety House
2 Other: . . .
37. Imagine that you cannot execute an agreement made in the Safety House due
to resistance of your own organisation. Who is the most likely person to solve this
problem? (please choose one)
2 The manager of the Safety House
2 The chair of the case meeting
2 The board of the Safety House
2 My direct supervisor
2 Someone at a strategic/tactical level in my own organisation
2 Other: . . .
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38. Below are a number of statements about the relationship between your or-
ganisation and the Safety House. Please read the statements and indicate to what
extent you agree or disagree with these statements. Give your answer in the box
on the right by means of the following answering key:
Completely disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Completely agree
1 2 3 4 5
Statement Score (1-5)
1. The board of my organisation believes in the use of the Safety
House
2. My direct supervisor believes in the use of the Safety House
3. Operational staff from my organisation believes in the use of the
Safety House
4. My direct supervisor backs me when it comes to executing agree-
ments that I have made in the Safety House
5. Operational staff from my organisation backs me when it comes to
executing agreements that I have made in the Safety House
6. Agreements that I make in the Safety House meet the expectations
that people in my own organisation have
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39. Below are a number of statements about the case meeting in which you par-
ticipate. Please indicate to what extent you (dis)agree using this answering key:
Completely disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Completely agree
1 2 3 4 5
Statement Score (1-5)
1. Team members discuss strategies to improve their working relationship.
2. The team works together to resolve problems among members.
3. The team incorporates feedback about its process to strengthen its effectiveness.
4. The team informally and/or formally evaluates how they work together.
5. Team members talk about similarities and differences among their professional
roles in working with clients.
6. Members of the team address conflicts with each other directly.
7. The team discusses the degree to which each professional should be involved with
a particular case.
8. Team members talk about ways to involve additional professionals with various
expertises in the team.
9. There are "turf" issues among members of the team.
10. The team does not welcome new ideas about how to help clients.
11. Team members respect one another even when they have different ideas about
how to help clients.
12. The team has appropriate expectations of the roles of members in supporting
clients.
13. The team respects the opinion and input of each member.
14. There is open communication among team members.
15. Team members focus on understanding the perspectives of others rather than de-
fending their own specific opinions.
16. The team supports each member in his or her work with clients.
17. There is freedom to be different and disagree within the team.
18. New practices related to working with clients occur as a result of the diversity of
ideas among team members.
19. Working with team members who have multiple perspectives results in new pro-
grammes available to help clients.
20. The roles and/or responsibilities of team members change as a result of team-
work.
21. As a result of working as a team, services/supports for clients are delivered in
new ways.
22. Team members take on tasks outside their role when necessary.
23. The team depends on members with varying roles (e.g., police, public prosecu-
tion, mental healthcare, parole, etc) to implement specific activities.
24. The team relies on members with varying roles (e.g., police, public prosecution,
mental healthcare, parole, etc) to accomplish its goals.
25. The team makes distinctions among the roles and responsibilities of each member.
26. The team consults with members who have a variety of perspectives about how
to address the needs of clients.
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40. Below are a number of statements about the case meeting in which you partic-
ipate. Please read the statements and indicate to what extent you are satisfied or
dissatisfied. Give your answer in the box on the right by means of the following
answering key:
Completely dissatisfied Dissatisfied Neutral Satisfied Completely satisfied
1 2 3 4 5
Statement Score (1-5)
1. Performance of the case meeting in general
2. Discussion time per client during the case meeting
3. Number of discussed clients opposed to the whole target group
4. The quality of interventions produced by the case meeting
5. The participation of police/judicial partners in the Safety House
6. The participation of parole partners in the Safety House
7. The participation of healthcare and social work partners in the
Safety House
8. The participation of municipal partners in the Safety House
9. The participation of youth partners in the Safety House
This is the end of the survey. Thank you for your time. If you have any questions
or suggestions please let us know in the space below.
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